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ABSTRACT 
In the summer of 1995, eighteen protesters came into armed conflict with over 
400 RCMP officers and soldiers in central British Columbia. The conflict escalated into 
one of the costliest police operations in Canadian history. 
Many accounts of Aboriginal aggression provided by the RCMP are not 
consistent with evidence disclosed at the trial of the protesters. Moreover, the substance 
of the legal arguments at the heart of the Ts' Peten Defenders' resistance received little 
attention or serious analysis by state officials, police or the media. 
The RCMP constructed the Ts' Peten Defenders as terrorists and downplayed the 
use of state force that included military weaponry, land explosives and police snipers, 
who received orders to shoot to kill. Serious questions remain about the role of the 
RCMP, who acted as the enforcement arm of state policies designed to constrain the 
effort to internationalize the Aboriginal title question. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After attending sessions of the trial of the Ts' Peten Defenders,1 it became 
apparent to me that there were wide discrepancies between the accounts provided by the 
RCMP and the accounts provided by protesters regarding fundamental aspects of the 
Gustafsen Lake standoff. By contrasting what the RCMP told the press during the 
standoff with the evidence that emerged at the trial, I shall explore the hypothesis that the 
RCMP knowingly fabricated aspects of the press release accounts of Aboriginal 
aggression to turn popular opinion against the Ts' Peten Defenders and to create consent 
to use military personnel and equipment to remove the protesters. 
The trial of those charged in connection with the Gustafsen Lake standoff was 
originally meant to determine the guilt or innocence of fourteen Native and four non-
Native Ts' Peten Defenders. These protesters defended Sundance ceremonial grounds on 
the basis of deeply held spiritual and legal principles. At the trial, the Defenders provided 
a thoroughly researched and compelling legal interpretation of Canada's constitutional 
laws that express and safeguard Aboriginal rights. 
Many of the Ts' Peten Defenders and their supporters have asserted that members 
of the RCMP as well as some officials in the British Columbia government acted 
unethically and illegally at Gustafsen Lake. In his autobiography, From Attica to ;; 
Gustafsen Lake. 1995 Sundance Chief, and Mohawk activist. Splitting the Sky also 
alleges that the Canadian government broke its own constitutional laws by not honouring 
the Ts' Peten Defenders' assertion of Aboriginal title. There is compelling evidence that 
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he is right. (A full discussion of the historical and constitutional arguments is provided in 
the following chapter.) 
In the book he published in 1999, the lawyer who acted for some of the Ts' Peten 
Defenders, Brace Clark, who also counselled them from within the protest camp wrote, 
"The non-Native governments have no right to assume the jurisdiction to police it [the 
Sundance camp]. In contrast, the Indians have a prima facie right to defend the land from 
invasion."2 For a time, the Ts ' Peten Defenders apparently shared this view and were 
inspired in their stand by Clark's legal advice. 3 Although their arguments were 
discredited by police and government officials, the Defenders were the latest in a long 
line of Aboriginal activists who have emphasized that there are deep and far-reaching 
implications of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 with reference to the Aboriginal title 
issue in British Columbia. 
Regarding the constitutional stand taken by the Ts' Peten Defenders, and their use 
of armed force (characterized by Judge Joshephson as the use of "violence in a manner 
designed to compel a course of action upon government,") 4 it is important to keep in 
mind that specific legal and political channels had been pursued for years by Aboriginal 
activists regarding unceded territory in British Columbia. Although the state has been 
willing to consider the issue of Aboriginal title within fairly narrow domestic parameters, 
Canada has flatly denied opening up the question of Aboriginal title to international 
arbitration. Moreover, there has been little reckoning with the evidence of class divisions 
within Native communities, which compromise the credibility of Native leadership who 
negotiate with the Canadian government. Two years before the Gustafsen Lake conflict, 
sociologist Menno Boldt suggested that the inability of the Canadian government to deal 
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substantively with Aboriginal title issues and grievances has left Native people across the 
country increasingly open to the use of force to forward their demands. 5 
With very few exceptions, the Aboriginal Tribal Council governments aligned 
themselves with state officials who discredited the Ts' Peten Defenders. The goal of the 
RCMP, state officials, and Tribal Council leaders appears to have been to discredit the 
Defenders' legal position by exaggerating their violent tendencies, using a technique 
RCMP officers referred to as "disinformation and smear." 6 Then - British Columbia 
Attorney General, Ujjal Dosanjh argued that the conflict at Gustafsen Lake was a simple 
law and order issue and refused to investigate the protesters' legal interpretation that was 
fundamentally in conflict with the prevailing political reality in British Columbia. 
Dosanjh, who took his post less than a week before the standoff escalated, stated. "We 
fully support the RCMP. There is one law for all people in Canada." 7 
Many of the conclusions I draw here regarding the evidence of the use of 
"disinformation and smear" 8 techniques by the RCMP are discussed by British Columbia 
lawyer, Janice Switlo in her book, Gustafsen Lake Under Siege: Exposing the Truth 
Behind the Gustafsen Lake Standoff. Switlo worked with some Ts' Peten Defenders 
while they were preparing their legal defence in 1996. Her book was published as the 
Gustafsen Lake trial was still ongoing in 1997. Since then, more evidence has emerged, 
the bulk of which reinforces the substance of her allegation that the RCMP 
misrepresented the Ts' Peten Defenders as terrorists. Moreover, she argues that the harsh 
treatment of the protesters was part of an overall strategy she calls the "Aboriginal 
agenda" of the Canadian provincial and federal governments to "insulate Canada from 
international scrutiny."'' 
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Although the efforts of the Canadian government to avoid serious domestic and 
international scrutiny of their actions at Gustafsen Lake have been largely successful, 
there has been a recent change. In October 2000, an Oregon state judge was asked to rule 
on the case of Ts' Peten Defender, James Pitawanakwat. Canada sought the extradition of 
Pitawanakwat from the United States State Department because of charges related to the 
violent conflict at Gustafsen Lake, which 1 also refer to as the Battle of Gustafsen Lake. 
Pitawanakwat argued that he and the Ts' Peten Defenders were engaged in the defence of 
ancestral lands and that the charges against him were a result of a principled political 
protest, not a terrorist action. 1 0 After three weeks of reviewing court submissions. Justice 
Janet Stewart ruled that the charges against Pitawanakwat stemmed from a dispute that 
was manifestly political in nature and that Pitawanakwat was not bound by the request 
that he return to Canada. Justice Stewart endorsed the constitutional arguments that 
framed the Ts' Peten Defenders' stand and emphasized its important international and 
historical context by stating, "In a very fundamental sense, the Lake Gustafsen event is 
analogous to other separatist movements around the world, including the PIRA in Ireland, 
the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Basques in Spain, as well as various insurrections in Eastern 
Europe and Africa. All are violent efforts by indigenous people to overthrow an 
occupying government to achieve self-rule."" 
Regarding Pitawanakwat's assertion that the Canadian government engaged in a 
"disinformation and smear" 1 2 campaign to prevent the media from learning and 
publicizing the true extent and political nature of the events at Gustafsen Lake, 1 3 Justice 
Stewart simply stated she had reviewed evidence to this effect. I suggest here that there is 
solid and irrefutable evidence that an RCMP "disinformation and smear" campaign was 
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waged at Gustafsen Lake to obscure the constitutional issues the Ts' Peten Defenders 
raised. 
I suggest that the use of state-sanctioned force at Gustafsen Lake constituted an 
assertion of hegemonic power to quell a threat to state legitimacy. Because solid legal 
principles animated the Ts' Peten Defenders' stand, it was in the interest of all levels of 
government to silence the protesters' arguments so as to maintain the political, social and 
economic status quo. The Ts ' Peten Defenders' argument that a majority of British 
Columbia remains unceded territory posed a tremendous threat to both the state and the 
corporate sector in a province that depends upon trillions of dollars of resource extraction 
for its economic prosperity. 
The enormous show of state-sanctioned force that was deployed at Gustafsen 
Lake begs serious questions. How did the Ts' Peten Defenders' occupation of several 
acres of ranch land in a remote part of British Columbia pose a serous threat to public 
safety, as the police claimed? Unlike other Aboriginal protests, they were not blocking 
access to natural resources. They were, however, calling into question the land tenure 
regime of the province. Were the actions of the RCMP motivated by the desires of the 
provincial and federal officials to leave buried the issue of Aboriginal title by silencing 
the political and legal assertions of the protesters? 
My first aim in this thesis is to examine and review evidence regarding the 
allegations that the RCMP were engaged in a "disinformation or smear campaign" at 
Gustafsen Lake. My second aim is to analyse the motivations of police and state officials 
to quell dissent at Gustafsen Lake, I argue that because the Ts' Peten Defenders' 
compelling legal position posed a threat to state legitimacy, police and state officials 
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chose to discredit them through the use of propaganda and suppressed the protesters with 
a show of excessive force. Because vast amounts of private property and natural 
resources were at stake, the state had much to defend by discrediting the Ts' Peten 
Defenders' constitutional argument. By preventing other Aboriginal people in Canada 
from hearing a cohesive presentation of their argument, the state was marginalizing the 
Ts' Peten Defenders, with the result that they received relatively little support. 
Since the end of the standoff, there have begun to emerge indications from 
members of the media who reported on the Battle of Gustafsen Lake that they felt 
manipulated by a heavy-handed police media strategy designed to discredit the Ts' Peten 
Defenders by inflaming popular opinion. Vancouver Province columnist Joey Thompson 
wrote: 
When it came to covering the events clouding the 1995 Gustafsen Lake 
fiasco RCMP took reporters for a ride. We bought the Mounties' take 
on what was going down during that tense month-long summer siege. 
A lot of what we got - and dutifully reported - was crock. It's time we 
conceded that and apologized to the natives and citizens of BC. 1 4 
Why would the RCMP and the provincial and federal governments feel the need to 
misrepresent the legal and constitutional issues raised at Gustafsen Lake? Why would the 
RCMP engage in what CBC Ombudsman David Bazay refers to as manipulation and 
what RCMP officers refer to in their own video-taped discussions as a "disinformation 
and smear campaign?" Part of the motivation for the coercive tactics employed by police 
and state officials at Gustafsen Lake can be understood by exploring past episodes where 
the same tactics were used to suppress Aboriginal sovereignty struggles. Particularly in 
British Columbia, there is a long history of the use of state coercion to suppress essential 
aspects of the Aboriginal title issue. The Ts' Peten Defenders exist as part of a larger 
historical continuum. To fully understand the standoff, then, it is important to explore the 
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mixture of law, politics, history and spirituality that animated the Ts' Peten Defenders 
stand. 
In this work, I shall attempt to describe how a conflict between two men, Shuswap 
Faith Keeper Percy Rosette and American rancher Lyle James, escalated into a military 
confrontation that raised questions of law that resonate deeply with regard to Canada's 
constitution as well as in the forum of international law. 
I shall try to provide a chronological exploration of the events that transpired at 
Gustafsen Lake in 1995 by employing trial disclosures, court testimony, press reports, 
and interviews. Although no single narrative could capture every aspect of this 
controversial and complex episode, I have attempted to pull together relevant 
documentation to explain the actions and motivations of the Ts' Peten Defenders whose 
motivations were not fully understood. 
The complicity of the media in the RCMP "disinformation and smear" campaign is 
also examined. What role did the media play? Is there any accountability in the 
journalistic profession when reporters fall in line with a program of "disinformation and 
smear?" 
I focus on four key elements of the standoff. I devote a chapter to a summary of the 
events of June, July and early August (before the camp was sealed off by the RCMP) 
then provide closer exploration of the events of 27 August, 4 September, and 13 
September, each of which forms a chapter. 
In chapter one, I attempt an overview of the events of mid-June to mid-August 
1995, when the dispute remained a local conflict. As the conflict escalated the protesters 
stated publicly that they would view police action as an act or war that would be met with 
7 
"resistant force." 1 3 They also received legal advice that supported their position and 
quoted their lawyer who stated, "As a matter of strict law, you are acting within your 
existing legal rights by resisting the invasion." 1 6 
In chapter two, I focus on the events leading up to and including 27 August when 
the RCMP told the national media gallery that they were ambushed by the Ts' Peten 
Defenders. In their reportage of this incident, the RCMP skillfully mobilized public 
opinion by invoking ethnic stereotypes, alleging the Ts' Peten Defenders had 
"ambushed" police officers. Only at the ensuing trial did such oversimplified stereotypes 
begin to deconstruct when the RCMP could not substantiate their press release accounts. 
In fact, RCMP evidence was so weak that no Ts ' Peten Defender was charged in 
connection with the alleged ambush on 27 August that had received huge headlines in 
1995. 1 7 
In chapter three, I focus on the events of 4 September, when the RCMP alleged 
officers were "actively pursued" 1 8 by Natives who fired shots that damaged the mirror of 
an RCMP Suburban and lodged a bullet in the vehicle's headliner. Again the RCMP 
could not sustain the allegation in court. By the time that sentencing hearings were 
conducted at the ensuing trial. Defense Counsel stated confidently, "On 4 September, the 
RCMP said there was a shooting, we now know there wasn't... Everything [all the trial 
evidence] fits in with a smear campaign." 1 9 
The events of both 27 August and 4 September are crucial because the RCMP 
sent accounts of these alleged shootings to the Attorney General of British Columbia as 
well as to the Solicitor General of Canada to buttress their request for armaments and 
personnel from the Department of National Defence. 2 0 Trial evidence refutes the 
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accuracy many of these reports, copies of which are included here as appendices. 
In chapter four, I focus on the events of 13 September 1995 when upper 
management in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) were told by RCMP Staff 
Sergeant Peter Montague that there were hostages in the Gustafsen Lake encampment. 
Montague told the CBC that only by airing a message in Shuswap could this life-
threatening situation be ameliorated. Evidence collected here from transcripts of 
communications between RCMP officers confirms that that there was no hostage-taking 
situation and that the RCMP did in fact lie to CBC upper management as part of their 
larger strategy to demonize the Ts' Peten Defenders. 2 1 Of particular note are insights 
provided by former head of CBC radio Jeffery Dvorkin, who emphasized that the "CBC 
Radio's journalistic independence had been breached" when "the CBC had been 
manipulated in order to help the police" 2 2 on 13 September 1995. This event raises 
serious questions about the relationship between the CBC and the government and police 
on which it reports. 
In the concluding chapter I discuss the motivation for the huge show of state-
sanctioned police force at Gustafsen Lake and provide a brief overview of other events 
that transpired during the standoff that bear further research. Important questions arise 
about the accountability of the state officials and the police: To whom is the RCMP 
accountable, if anyone, for use of excessive force at Gustafsen Lake? 
1
 Both Native and non-Native people who were at the Gustafsen Lake Sundance camp in 1995 are referred 
to here by a number of names, all of which were used at different times in different contexts during the 
standoff. The term "Ts' Peten Defenders" is employed because "Ts' Peten" is the traditional Shuswap 
name for the land in dispute, which was considered a sacred burial ground where many Shuswap ancestors 
perished during the small pox epidemic. (In her Report to Gustafsen Lake Defense Team, dated 25 July 
1996, Valerie Van Clieaf writes, "Secwepemc [traditional spelling for Shuswap] oral history points towards 
the presence of a large burial site at Gustafsen Lake.) The term "Sundancers" was used, often by 
sympathizers, and sometimes by the media, because members of the Sundance society had been at the Ts' 
Peten grounds for a Sundance for several years as part of an annual ceremonial cycle. The term Gustafsen 
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Lake "Defenders" is used with reference to the fact that there was an armed stand made "in defence of 
Sundance grounds." The generic name "protesters" is also employed because the camp did constitute a 
protest against the prevailing interpretation of constitutional law regarding land ownership at the disputed 
Sundance grounds as well as throughout much of British Columbia. Each is true in its own way according 
to the changing circumstances within the camp, as the activities varied from ceremonial and political, to 
armed defence that was deemed by the state to constitute "terrorism." The appellations "terrorists," 
"fanatics," "renegades," and "cultists" were often used by state officials and mainstream media to refer to 
those inside the Gustafsen Lake camp. 
In legal documents, RCMP communiques, and media reports, "Gustafsen Lake" is sometimes spelled, 
"Gustafson" Lake. I employ the former usage throughout most of this thesis because it appears to have 
become dominant. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In many ways, the physical confrontation at Gustafsen Lake was a result of 
conflicting interpretations of constitutional law. Before examining a body of evidence 
that demonstrates that the state employed its federal police force as part of a program of 
propaganda to suppress the Ts' Peten Defenders' legal position, it is important to 
examine the particulars of the legal issues related to Aboriginal title in British Columbia. 
While the Defenders' legal position posed a threat to the legitimacy of the Canadian and 
British Columbian governments, state officials strongly asserted they retained jurisdiction 
to police the Sundance grounds. 
Although their protest was often portrayed as an unprincipled violent action, the 
Defenders' legal position was thoroughly researched and straightforward. Guarantees 
made to Aboriginal people by the British Crown that stem from the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763 form the essential point of departure for the Ts' Peten Defenders' convincing 
assertion that Aboriginal title has not been extinguished throughout a majority of British 
Columbia. To buttress their stand, the Defenders connected a series of legal and 
constitutional reference points dating from 1537 to 1982. They asserted that it was the 
governments of Canada and British Columbia, and the Mounted Police who acted on 
their behalf, who were the invaders at Gustafsen Lake. The Defenders stated plainly that 
where no Treaty has been signed with Aboriginal leaders, Canadian governments have no 
jurisdiction. Moreover, they asserted that Aboriginal Tribal Council governments have no 
jurisdiction in untreatied lands because their funding and governing authority comes only 
from the federal government. 
The Defenders asserted that neither Canada nor British Columbia were in a 
position to arbitrate this dispute because these governments are in a conflict of interest 
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situation in that Canadian courts cannot rule on the jurisdiction of lands and resources for 
which they are contesting. The Defenders asserted that the unresolved controversy over 
the question of Aboriginal title in British Columbia could only be satisfactorily resolved 
by placing the legal and historical facts before a panel of international arbitrators.1 
The British Crown established the legal principle underlying the Defenders' 
petition for third-party settlement in 1704. In that year, there was a land dispute between 
members of the Mohegan First Nation and the British colony of Connecticut. The 
Mohegan Nation argued that the Connecticut courts were unfit to settle the dispute 
because the Connecticut body could not rule on the jurisdiction of land and resources for 
which they were competing. The Mohegans successfully appealed to the British Crown 
by arguing that the Connecticut court was in a conflict of interest situation. To arbitrate 
the dispute, Queen Anne created a Privy Council court in 1704. The Ts' Peten Defenders 
argued that a comparable independent and impartial tribunal was required to settle the 
title dispute between the Ts' Peten Defenders and the governments of British Columbia 
and Canada.2 
Fifty-nine years after the Mohegan-Connecticut land dispute, the British 
sovereign issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 3 This Proclamation expressed many of 
the core principles underlying the assertion that the grounds at Gustafsen Lake remain 
reserved by the British Crown for Aboriginal people. In issuing the Proclamation, King 
George formalized relationships with Native allies, in part to mollify Aboriginal forces 
associated with Ottawa Chief Pontiac, who had taken over several English posts in 
retaliation for British incursion into Aboriginal ancestral lands. 4 The Proclamation 
signified a renewal of close diplomatic, military and economic relationships between the 
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British Crown and Aboriginal allies that proved strategic in the defence of British North 
America from both French and American forces.5 
Although the Ts' Peten Defenders stated categorically that the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 provides a legal guarantee that binds the Crown to protect 
Aboriginal rights in unceded territories in British Columbia, others disagree. The Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 has been viewed from several different historical perspectives and 
its interpretation has been the subject of much controversy. Differing interpretations of 
history, sometimes motivated by political agendas, have led to di fferent interpretations of 
the meaning and substance of the Proclamation of 1763. 
It has long been argued that the Proclamation was not meant to apply to colonies 
such as British Columbia that came into being after 1763. State officials have sometimes 
argued that the present tense employed in that part of the Proclamation that extends rights 
only to "indians with whom we are connected," means that these rights were not meant to 
extend to those Indians with whom the British would come into contact after 1763. This 
argument is problematic in a number of ways. Firstly, despite its present-tense 
phraseology, the Proclamation was later applied during the signing of the numbered 
Treaties between 1871 and 1921. Secondly, as Brian Slattcry observed, "Imperial 
enactments... were normally given a prospective application so as to apply not only to 
colonies and territories held when the legislation was enacted, but also to those acquired 
subsequently, unless this result was clearly excluded. 
The question of where and to whom the Royal Proclamation applies hinges upon 
the interpretation of several key phrases in the decree. In issuing the Proclamation, the 
Crown unilaterally ordered extradition from Aboriginal Hunting Grounds and "affirmed 
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and continued the exclusive use of Aboriginal peoples within the Hunting Grounds." 
The contentious issue then is to determine what geographical area constitutes these 
"Hunting Grounds." As Olive Dickason writes. 
In its words, it [the Royal Proclamation of 1763] applied to those lands 
"to the Westward of the sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea 
from the West and North West," which hardly clarified the situation. It 
included lands within established colonies that had not yet been ceded 
or purchased or set aside for Amerindians. It did not apply to Rupert's 
Land, whatever its boundaries were, deemed to be under the 
jurisdiction of the HBC [Hudon's Bay Company]. . . 8 
Crown officials have often interpreted the above phrases to mean that the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 did not (and still does not) apply to what was then Rupert's Land. 
Despite the assertion that the Proclamation did not apply to land deemed to be under the 
jurisdiction of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1763, when that territory was later 
consolidated into the Dominion of Canada, the principles of the Proclamation were 
applied. Dickason writes that the application of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to 
Rupert's Land, leading to the numbered Treaties may have been based on the view that 
"Treaties were a moral, not a legal, obligation; in practical terms they were viewed as a 
means of avoiding conflict." She summarizes, "In any event, Canada's promise to Britain 
to honour the provisions of the Proclamation of 1763 led directly to the numbered 
Treaties..."'' Because the principles inherent in the Proclamation were applied to Rupert's 
Land when it became part of the Dominion, and after the Royal Proclamation of 1763, it 
follows logically that the Proclamation should also have been applied in British Columbia 
upon its entrance into Confederation. 
Lawyers hired by British Columbia argued that the Proclamation of 1763 did not 
apply to British Columbia in the 1964 court case, Regina v. White and Bob and again in 
1969 when the Nisga'a Tribal Council argued that the Proclamation did apply on the 
16 
Pacific coast. Although the Nisga'a initially lost in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, they appealed their case to the Supreme Court of Canada where six of seven 
judges ruled against the province. Three judges "accepted the Proclamation as extending 
to the Pacific and as affirming pre-existing Aboriginal title as a legal right." 1 0 
The application of the Royal Proclamation to untreatied lands in British Columbia 
ran counter to the notions of racial superiority that were a prominent feature of the British 
Columbian government's rejection of Aboriginal title rights. As Paul Tennant writes in 
Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia. 1849-
1989, Aboriginal rights were often rejected in British Columbia on the basis that "indians 
were too simple and unsophisticated before contact to be regarded as having individual or 
collective rights. This assumption is hostile to Indians, taking them to have been 
primitive creatures with no more rights than other wildlife." 1 1 A second assertion "does 
not deny that Indians may have once had rights, but it denies legitimacy to present-day 
descendents as claimants of those rights." Government lawyers have invoked this 
second argument and emphasized that cultural change and innovation has been so 
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dramatic in changing Aboriginal peoples that guarantees once made no longer apply. 
In strictly legal terms, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has often been interpreted 
to buttress the argument that underlying title remains with the British sovereign although 
settlement is precluded until Aboriginal hereditary chiefs of ancestral territories cede land 
through a Treaty. 1 4 Although the underlying title remains with the Crown according to 
Mr. Justice Strong in his Supreme Court opinion in the 1888 case of St. Catherine Milling 
and Lumber v. the Queen, Paul Tennant qualifies Justice Strong's assumption of British 
sovereignty by stating, 
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The Proclamation does not take its assertion of British sovereignty as 
incompatible with continuing [Indian] land ownership. Precisely the 
opposite is the case. The nations or tribes are clearly recognized as 'in 
possession o f the lands they have used and occupied. British 
sovereignty and continuity of pre-existing Indian land ownership go 
hand in hand. On this principle the Proclamation is unequivocal. 1 5 
There are two other important aspects to the St. Catherine's case. Although earlier 
in the century, the Proclamation was viewed as an instrument that recognized the pre-
existence of Aboriginal rights, "the [judicial] committee [in the St. Catherine's case] 
ruled that Aboriginal title had no pre-existence, but was created, through the 
Proclamation, by the British authorities themselves." Moreover, as the Crown was 
viewed as the creator of Aboriginal rights stemming from the Royal Proclamation, it 
followed that these rights could be viewed as remaining intact only at the pleasure of the 
Crown who maintained the right to unilaterally dispose of them. 1 6 A second important 
implication of the St. Catherine's decision, according to Tennant, is that shortly thereafter 
"British Columbian Indians discovered the Proclamation, took it to mean what it said, 
and proceeded to develop their optimistic faith in British justice." 
In the minds of the Gustafsen Lake Defenders and their legal counsel, there was 
no question as to whether the principles of the Proclamation of 1763 applied. Although 
their interpretation is only one of many, there is no question that there is logic and 
coherence to the position that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has important implications 
regarding Aboriginal title rights at Gustafsen Lake. Because there are no Treaties for the 
vast majority of British Columbia, there is a compelling legal argument that the 
Gustafsen Lake Sundance camp, like the other untreatied lands in British Columbia 
remain "reserved for Indians" according to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which states 
further that: 
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The several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom we are connected, 
and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed 
in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, 
not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them or 
any of Them, as their hunting grounds... And we do further expressly 
conjoin and require all Officers whatever, as well as Military as those 
Employed in the Management and Direction of Indian Affairs, within 
the Territories, reserved as aforesaid for the use of the said Indians to 
seize and apprehend all Persons whatever, who standing charged with 
Treason, Misprisions of Treason, Murders or other Felonies or 
Misdemeanors shall fly from Justice.. . " 1 S 
The Proclamation binds all representatives of the British Crown to defend the 
rights of Aboriginal peoples in lands "not having been ceded to or purchased by us." 
(Lands where no Treaty has been signed are referred to here as "unceded" or 
"untreatied." According the Royal Proclamation of 1763, unceded territories remain 
reserved to the Indians as their hunting grounds.) 1 9 Moreover, those who contravene the 
Proclamation by establishing settlements before acquiring consent from Aboriginal 
hereditary chiefs stand liable according to this same 1763 decree to be charged with 
"Treason" and "Misprisions of Treason." The Ts' Peten Defenders asserted that the 
governments of British Columbia and Canada had clearly contravened the Proclamation 
and should therefore be held accountable for the legal consequences of treasonous crimes 
committed against Native peoples in unceded territories. 
Since British Columbia joined the Dominion of Canada in 1871, Aboriginal 
leaders in British Columbia have made repeated demands for a legal decision regarding 
the specific legal nature of Aboriginal title rights, stemming from the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763. Many Native activists have viewed the Proclamation as a useful legal and 
political tool to push for an expansion or validation of their title rights. In contrast, state 
officials have often attempted to downplay the implications of the Proclamation, 
especially in British Columbia. 
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According to Native activists who have advocated for a clear legal ruling 
regarding Aboriginal title rights, stemming from the 1763 Proclamation, government 
intransigence has been a consistent theme in the history of British Columbia. In The 
Fourth World: An Indian Reality. George Manuel, former president of the National 
Indian Brotherhood, claims, "Throughout the century since the [British Columbia] Terms 
of Union were drawn up the BC land question has been raised through every channel that 
appeared to open from time to time. The response almost invariably was to close that 
channel." 2 0 
It is to the federal government that Aboriginal people in British Columbia have 
petitioned for legal recourse regarding the question of Aboriginal title because of the 
guarantees made by the Dominion Government when British Columbia was consolidated 
into the national framework in 1871. According to these Terms of Union: 
The charge of the Indians, and the trusteeship and management of the 
lands reserved for their use and benefit, shall be assumed by the 
Dominion Government and a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued 
by the British Columbia Government shall be continued by the 
Dominion Government after the Union . 2 1 
Since these Terms of Union bind the Dominion Government to pursue "a policy as 
liberal as that hitherto pursued by the British Columbia Government." it is important to 
determine what the policy was regarding Aboriginal title before 1871. In the context of 
the actions of colonial officials in the years before the 1867 Confederation Act. it appears 
that it was the policy of British Columbia to follow the precedent set in the rest of the 
Dominion that involved securing permission from Aboriginal peoples before settling 
lands consolidated as part of British North America. James Douglas, the first colonial 
Governor of British Columbia, followed the fundamental principle, espoused in the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, that Native people have the right to use and occupy traditional 
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lands or to receive compensation for the loss of these lands. Douglas observed this 
principle in the early 1850's. when he negotiated fourteen Treaties with Native Nations, 
thus confirming that Aboriginal consent should be secured before settlement could 
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legally transpire. Notwithstanding, much settlement did take place in areas not framed 
by Treaty negotiations in the colony of British Columbia, between 1849 and 1871. 
After the Douglas Treaties, no more Treaties were signed with Native peoples in 
British Columbia although there was no repeal of the legal principles inherent in the 1763 
Royal Proclamation. The actions of Douglas indicate that some Aboriginal people did, in 
fact, enjoy legal protection from the Crown. For example, in an address to the Legislative 
Assembly on Vancouver Island on 12 August 1856, Douglas referred to Native peoples 
as wards of the Crown, and proposed to treat them "with justice and forbearance, and by 
rigidly protecting their civil and agrarian rights." 2 3 
When Douglas retired in 1864, and was replaced by Joseph Trutch, the effect was 
profound. Trutch did not recognize Aboriginal rights and title 2 4 and reinterpreted the 
Douglas agreements in order to reduce the land allotment to Native people. 2 5 The Ts' 
Peten Defenders sought redress regarding the actions of Trutch and those that followed 
him who dispossessed Native peoples in contravention of the rule of constitutional law. 
For more than a century before the standoff at Gustafsen Lake, there have been 
repeated assertions by Aboriginal representatives that Canada did not follow its own 
constitutional laws regarding Aboriginal title in untreatied territories in British Columbia. 
In 1913, the Nisga'a Land Committee presented a petition to the Privy Council in 
London, which foreshadowed the demands of the Ts ' Peten Defenders. Nearly half of the 
Nisga'a petition focused on the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and its implications 
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regarding Aboriginal title. In 1916, another attempt was made to have the implications 
of the Royal Proclamation clarified when the Allied Tribes of British Columbia made 
efforts to have the Aboriginal title question addressed by a committee of the British 
government. State officials likely viewed the legal and political arguments stemming 
from the Proclamation of 1763 as a threat to state interests and reacted accordingly. In an 
attempt to prevent the Allied tribes from having a hearing with a judicial committee in 
London, a special joint Senate-House committee was established in Canada (in the words 
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of the Canadian officials) "to have the question settled." 
The Allied tribes' efforts were thwarted when members of the Senate-House 
committee suppressed an important document 2 8 titled, Papers Connected with the Indian 
Land Question 2 9 that supported the Allied Tribes position. 
As Paul Tennant writes, 
There was abundant evidence that Indians had claimed title from the 
beginning and had demanded Treaties as early as 1887 in the north 
coast hearings. The Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 
which the officials had kept away from the Indians, showed that both 
Douglas and colonial secretaries had considered the Indians to have 
title. 3 0 
The suppression of this important document paved the way for the joint Senate-
House committee's decision to reject the Allied Tribes' petition. 
The result of a decade of tireless organizing by Andy Paull and Peter Kelly of the 
Allied tribes was that their attempts to internationalize their dispute were thwarted by 
members of the Department of Indian Affairs and agents of the Crown in 1926. In the 
following year, the Indian Act was amended to prevent the Allied Tribes and all other 
Aboriginal people in Canada from pursuing the question of Aboriginal title. Section 141 
of the Act effectively suppressed legal reckoning with the same issue, which the Ts' 
Peten Defenders raised in 1995. Section 141 made it illegal for: 
Every person who, without the consent of the Superintendent 
General... solicits or requests from any Indian any payment or 
contribution or promise of any payment or contribution for the purpose 
of raising a fund or providing money for the prosecution of any claim 
which the tribe or band or Indians... for the recovery of any claim or 
money for the benefit of said tribe... 3 1 
The 1876 Indian Act created the elected governments that replaced hereditary 
governments. However, in lands where there is no Treaty, (like the Sundance grounds) 
these Indian Act governments have questionable legal authority. The Ts' Peten Defenders 
told RCMP officers who investigated the Gustafsen Lake dispute that Tribal Chief and 
Council governments were in a dubious legal position because the domestic legislation 
(the Indian Act) that established Tribal Council authority conflicted with constitutional 
law (the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and Constitution Acts, 1867, and 1982). They also 
connected the imposition of these Indian Act governments with the larger project of 
subjugating Canada's Aboriginal peoples, which constitute crimes punishable under the 
1948 Genocide convention. 3 2 
The Defenders implored the Mounted Police to defend the sanctity of the rule 
of law by protecting the Sundance camp not only from threats made by ranch-hands 
but also from the legal establishment that denied the exercise of existing Aboriginal 
rights. The Defenders asserted that the Canadian government had broken its own 
laws by failing to honour its fiduciary duty (formal relationship of alliance) with 
Native peoples to defend Aboriginal constitutional rights. 
Although the specific legal arguments made by the Ts' Peten Defenders with 
reference to the validity of Indian Act governments and the specific nature of 
Aboriginal title rights implied in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 have not been 
accepted in all quarters. Aboriginal rights in general have received increasing 
validation in recent decades by a number of court cases. In 1973, the Calder case 
23 
established that Aboriginal rights were not extinguished when British Columbia 
entered Confederation.3 3 In 1984, the Guerin case confirmed that the federal 
government has a "fiduciary responsibility" to safeguard Aboriginal interests and 
rights. According to Section 91, class 24 of the 1867 Confederation Act, this duty 
to honour and affirm Aboriginal rights was defined as a responsibility of the federal 
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government. 
The fiduciary responsibility of the Canadian government to safeguard 
Aboriginal rights as outlined in the 1867 Constitution Act was entrenched in 
Section 25 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, within the 1982 Constitution 
Act. 3 5 
The Defenders made the legal case that it was the duty of the Crown's 
representatives to follow sections 25 and 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act, which 
reaffirmed Aboriginal rights articulated in the 1763 Proclamation. In this context, 
the RCMP remained legally bound to side with their Aboriginal allies at Gustafsen 
Lake against illegal incursions into unceded territory by ranchers as well as by the 
British Columbia legal establishment. 
As the standoff was beginning, the Ts' Peten Defenders outlined the legal 
basis for the assertion that the Mounted Police are constitutionally bound to honour 
the historical ally relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the British Crown. 
In his 8 August 1995 letter to Sergeant Sarrich, Bruce Clark told RCMP Staff 
Sergeant Sarrich that if the RCMP deviated from the honouring of the Ts' Peten 
Defenders' rights they were engaging in criminality: 
My clients and I now turn to you. the police, for protection against a 
legal establishment that in willful blindness has set its face against the 
rule of law. There is no middle ground. You may choose just to follow 
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orders that are criminal or, alternatively, to defend the rule of law 
against those orders . 3 6 
The Ts' Peten Defenders emphasized that since neither the Canadian nor the 
British Columbian government had negotiated Treaties with Shuswap traditional leaders, 
these "settler" governments had no legal legitimacy at Gustafsen Lake. Ts' Peten 
Defender, William Jones Ignace, better known by a translation of his Shuswap name. 
Wolverine, emphasized that promises made to his forefathers in the form of the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 have been re-affirmed by both the 1867 Confederation Act and the 
1982 Constitution Act. Ignace underscored that Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act 
reaffirms the rights of Aboriginal Peoples of Canada. Section 35 of this Act states, "The 
existing aboriginal and Treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby 
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recognized and affirmed." 
In recent years, the Canadian and British Columbian governments have been 
challenged to deal with responsibilities stemming from alliance relationships with 
Aboriginal peoples. Several court decisions have validated legal principles that are 
similar to the legal arguments made by the Ts' Peten Defenders. An important legal 
precedent regarding Aboriginal title was set in 1984, in the Supreme Court of Canada, 
when Chief Justice Brian Dickson ruled that Aboriginal "interest in their lands is a pre­
existing Aboriginal right" 3 8 in Canada both on and off reserves. Similarly, in the 1984 
Meares island case, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a court injunction to 
halt logging on Meares Island to support the NuuChahNulth claim that logging would 
interfere with Aboriginal title and rights. 3 9 Subsequently, in the 1990 Sparrow case, the 
courts recognized and affirmed Aboriginal fishing rights within certain parameters in a 
modern context. 4 0 These court cases have established a pattern whereby Aboriginal rights 
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were acknowledged with a renewed vigour that has continued with the 1998 
Delgamukww 4 1 decision and the 1999 Marshall decision. 4 2 As a result of pressure 
stemming from the success of Aboriginal peoples in the courts between 1973 and 1990, 
British Columbia recognized Aboriginal rights on 14 April 1992 and created the British 
Columbia Treaty Commission to deal with unextinguished Aboriginal title issues. 
Although federal and provincial governments in Canada have been forced to 
acknowledge that there are outstanding Aboriginal title issues in British Columbia, the 
domestic institution created to settle the question has uncertain credibility. The British 
Columbia Treaty Commission Agreement that was signed by federal, provincial and First 
Nations representatives on 21 September 1992 has dubious legal legitimacy for two main 
reasons. First, those negotiating as representatives of Aboriginal communities are usually 
Tribal Council Chiefs whose legitimacy comes from domestic legislation (the Indian Act) 
that may be non-binding in untreatied territories. Moreover, the spirit of these 
negotiations often runs counter to a constitutional pattern of safeguarding Aboriginal and 
Treaty rights in that the Commission seems designed to extinguish Aboriginal and Treaty 
rights in exchange for land and compensation. As a result, Native governments would 
become similar to municipal governments, not sovereign Nations, as some Native people 
demand. 
The critique of contemporary Aboriginal leadership made by the Ts' Peten 
Defenders is not without precedent. In Windspeaker. Dan Ennis elaborated upon the 
historical genesis of a ruling elite in Native communities: 
Once this new breed of leaders, elected through the imposed Indian Act 
legislation, got into positions of power they became exactly like the 
Indian agent: unaccountable to anyone, and prepared to stay in power 
for life at all costs. They practiced favouritism, making themselves, 
their friends and their families rich from the public coffers... Today, all 
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reserves in Canada have a class system. Most have a wealthy class, a 
middle class, a poor class and a desperate class... 4 j 
Political scientist Christopher Mckee explained that the resistance of many Native 
people is rooted in the possibility that settlements stemming from the British Columbia 
Treaty Commission Process may "create a replication of the socio-economic class 
stratification that occurred within many Native communities as a result of the Band 
Council provisions of the Indian Act." "Indeed." notes McKee, "There are signs that the 
legitimacy of some elected Aboriginal leaders is in serious doubt." 4 4 
In his Masters of Arts thesis, defended at the University of British Columbia in 
1997, Michael Smith summarized the discrepancy between what most Canadians knew 
about Aboriginal constitutional rights and the fuller legal and historical issues that were 
articulated in the Gustafsen Lake camp: 
...To a settler public congenitally ignorant of its own ignoble history 
and thoroughly invested, fiscally, politically and emotionally, in 
nationalist creation myths, the [Gustafsen Lake] Defender's repudiation 
of the territorial jurisdiction of the Canadian state and appeals to archaic 
imperial connections were not only anachronistic, but quite simply, 
incomprehensible. Though the Defenders were dismissed as lunatics, 
they were in fact invoking a long and honourable politico-legal 
tradition, running from the eastern First Nations who signed 
innumerable treaties with European powers prior to the nineteenth 
century; to the various delegations of B.C. Native leaders who travelled 
to Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seeking 
resolution of the land question; the Cayuga sachem Deskaheh, who 
petitioned the League of Nations in the 1920's to recognize the 
"independent statehood" of the Six Nations; to the Native leaders of the 
early 1980's who lobbied Westminster to require recognition of 
aboriginal rights as a condition as constitutional partition. Few if any 
attempts were made to thus contextualize the Defender's demands.. , 4 5 
The Ts' Peten Defenders' invocation of this "long and honourable politico-legal 
tradition" was stalled when their legal arguments were clouded by the accusation that 
they were fanatical militants. 
Before the violent conflict at Gustafsen Lake, several Ts' Peten Defenders had 
formed a "sovereignty association" to push the governments and courts of Canada to 
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honour promises made to Native people in the form of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
These activists consulted with Ottawa lawyer, Bruce Clark who was previously involved 
in a highly publicized court battle in the northern Ontario. During the Temagami case, 4 6 
Clark made similar arguments regarding Aboriginal rights stemming from the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763. 
Remarking on the close relationships he formed with several Aboriginal activists, 
including several Ts' Peten Defenders, Clark testified that the Native activists "have been 
my mentors" with whom he had formed a "symbiotic relationship" after they concluded 
that Native law and natural law were one and the same: "Our minds have come together 
in a cultural synthesis." 4 7 Clark asserted that the values of truth and justice underpinned 
the demands of the "sovereignty association" to international third party arbitration of 
Aboriginal title issue. 
Because most Canadians, including the journalists who covered the Gustafsen 
Lake standoff, the RCMP officers who policed it, and the politicians and judges who 
denied the Ts' Peten Defenders' petition for third-party adjudication, have not been 
educated about the significant legal and constitutional rights possessed by Aboriginal 
people in Canada, the efforts of Bruce Clark to secure an audience with the Queen 
appeared eccentric and misguided. Moreover, it was easy for the RCMP and the BC 
Attorney General to deny Aboriginal rights that most assumed did not exist. 
The conflict between the Ts' Peten Defenders and the RCMP captures, in 
microcosm, many aspects of the relationship between Native and non-Native people since 
first contact in North America. The RCMP were informed by cultural and political 
assumptions of supremacy while the Ts' Peten Defenders were motivated by an active 
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involvement with Native spiritualism as well as by an interpretation of Canada's legal 
and political history that conflicted with state and the police assumptions. 
Although it has formed a central part of Aboriginal struggles to achieve self-
determination for over two centuries, the tradition of promises and alliances between 
Aboriginal peoples and the British Crown has not been emphasized in traditional 
accounts of Canadian history. The Ts ' Peten Defenders argued that they were victims of a 
one-sided and misleading version of Canadian history that was crafted to satisfy those 
who succeeded in establishing the colonial project in British Columbia, often at the 
expense of the Indigenous population who were displaced. 
The importance of creating a selective view of history written by the inheritors of 
the colonial project has been underscored by Edward Said, who explained that competing 
versions of history are reflected in the decolonization struggles around the world where 
"narrative plays a central role in determining success." The colonial narrative which 
glorified the Mounted Police and shaped "historical truth" is significant because, as Said 
explained, "The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and 
emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main 
connections between them." 4 9 It is also important to note that, historically, popular 
opinion regarding the RCMP has been constructed in a positive way whereas the 
construction of popular opinion regarding Aboriginal People and "Aboriginal and Treaty 
Rights" has been largely negative. 
One reason for the supremacy of the RCMP position in the popular mind is the 
centrality of the elaborate mythology of the Mounted Police. As Michael Dawson 
observed in his extensive study of the construction of the image of the RCMP, The 
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Mountie: From Dime Store Novel to Disney, "One story that arose from the Mountie 
myth was Canada's careful and fair treatment of the Aboriginal Peoples.""0 At Gustafsen 
Lake, the RCMP cultivated positive relationships with Native spokespeople that were 
most friendly to government and police positions and employed these Native leaders as 
part of a larger strategy of "disinformation."5 1 
The use of propaganda became a standard feature of the RCMP strategy at 
Gustafsen Lake and the RCMP invoked its trustworthy reputation that has been 
developed by virtue of important historical elaborations to influence public opinion 
through the media. As Michael Dawson stated, "The reputation of the RMCP, buttressed 
by cinematic elaboration, fictionalized romanticization, and historical reinvention is one 
of honesty and integrity which resonates deeply with many Canadians. The Mountie is a 
world-wide icon." 5 2 
The actions of the RCMP and the state at Gustafsen Lake should also be viewed 
in the historical context of the repression of the Plains Cree in the nineteenth century. As 
John Tobias wrote, "The record of the Canadian government in dealing with the Cree is 
thus not one of honourable fair-mindedness and justice as the traditional interpretation 
portrays." There were "blatant violations of treaties" and a "political use of the police and 
the courts in a political manner to achieve the goal of subjugating the Cree.. , " 5 3 Only by 
ignoring these facts can one perpetuate what Tobias calls "the myth of Canada's just and 
honourable Indian policy from 1870-1885." 5 4 The role of the RCMP in the 
criminalization of Chiefs Big Bear and Poundmaker for taking part in the hypothetical 
Indian conspiracy to ally with Louis Riel 5 5 foreshadowed use of RCMP muscle to quell 
Native political action at Gustafsen Lake. Moreover, in 1924 the RCMP were sent in to 
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Six Nations territory near Brantford, Ontario to put an end to a challenge to the 
imposition of an Indian Act political system in the place of the traditional system near 
Oshwegen. Although Native traditionalists were invoking the heritage of alliances 
between the Crown and the Six Nations, an armed squad of Mounted Police forcefully 
ousted the protesters. 5 6 
At Gustafsen Lake, Bruce Clark's argument that the Aboriginal title question 
must be settled by an international tribunal was similar to Oshwegen Long house 
traditionalists' lawyer, George Decker who believed that "Ottawa's intransigence posed 
an insurmountable obstacle to the settlement of the status question and that the Six 
Nations would only receive an impartial hearing before an international tribunal." 5 7 The 
international dimension of the claims of both the Six Nations in the 1920's and the 
Gustafsen Lake protesters in the 1990's was both baffling and irritating to the 
government and police. To RCMP officers and to the general public, seemingly arcane 
arguments about constitutional law seemed ill conceived. In both cases, "initial 
complacency" regarding the [substance of the] agitation was transformed into ruthless 
determination to crush it when the chiefs took the question to London and Geneva, [the 
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international community]." 
There is a body of evidence that demonstrates that the state used propaganda to 
suppress the Defenders' legal position at Gustafsen Lake in a way that fits in with other 
previous historical precedents. Ward Churchill placed the actions of the Shuswap 
Slindaneers in the context of what he called, "The agendas of the American Indian 
Movement and the more organic warrior societies which have lately re-emerged in 
several Indigenous nations - as well as armed confrontations at places like Wounded 
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Knee, Oka and Gunnison [sic] Lake" whose "purpose is, quite specifically, to re-assert 
the genuinely sovereign and self-determining status to which our Nations are and have 
always been entitled." 5 9 Churchill makes allegations regarding the "reign of terror" on 
Pine Ridge in the 1970's which are similar to the accounts of Janice Switlo and Splitting 
the Sky regarding actions undertaken by police and military at Gustafsen Lake. Churchill 
states that, the "real mission" of FBI agents at Pine Ridge "was to provoke an armed 
confrontation which would justify the use of overwhelming force to crush the AIM 
encampment." 6 0 As Churchill identifies, in Indians Are Us, 6 1 the information control 
techniques employed by the American Justice Department during the 1973 stand at 
Wounded Knee resemble the use of propaganda at Gustafsen Lake. 6 2 
British Columbia lawyer, Janice Switlo makes an observation about the similarity 
of the state response at Gustafsen Lake to past conflicts: "Throughout history whenever 
the Aboriginal Peoples have made the demand that the Crown live up to failed 
responsibilities and representations made that She 'uphold Her Honour,' the response has 
been to simply send in the RCMP.. ." Switlo referred specifically to "the situation, which 
occurred at Gustafsen Lake" and stated that it "is no different, not unusual as an example 
of our history. Just another example of 'Indian justice. '" 6 3 Switlo examined other 
historical precedents regarding Aboriginal relationships with the police and the state in 
British Columbia and concludes that the erroneous media report of an Indian attack on 
the Hudson's Bay Company's Cadboro Bay Farm in Victoria in 1854 is an "event not 
unlike the result of inaccurate media reporting relying on statements of the RCMP during 
the Gustafsen Lake standoff."64 
Historically, Aboriginal protesters who have pressed the Canadian government to 
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honour existing Aboriginal and Treaty rights have been met with the use offeree by the 
Mounted Police in several instances, in 1980, the Blackfoot Confederacy sent a petition 
to the federal government asking the Crown to honour Treaty promises. The state refused 
to accept the petition and called in the RCMP. The Blood Land Dispute followed, near 
Cardston, Alberta where an RCMP riot squad was deployed and where the Mounted 
Police deployed a special weapons and tactical team to disperse Native protesters. 
Snipers perched on rooftops and elders sustained broken ribs in the conflict that pitted the 
forces of Native activism against the Mounted police. 6 5 An RCMP riot squad who were 
accused of abuse of force by the Kainai News 6 6 quelled a subsequent protest by Blood 
Tribe members. 
The construction and commodification of the popular image of the Mounted 
Police is also important because it gives Canadians confidence that when an RCMP 
officer tells a reporter that Native protesters "are terrorists who are behind five shooting 
incidents" 6 7 and that "there is nothing to negotiate with them," 6 8 he is usually believed, in 
part, because of a familiarity the media consumer has, consciously or unconsciously, with 
the Mountie and what he represents. In his study of the highly vaunted position afforded 
to the Mounted Police within popular culture. Visions of Order: The Canadian Mounties 
in Symbol and Myth. Keith Walden, writes, "Popular art does not elevate its audience to 
new levels of knowledge, experience or ways of seeing. Instead it tells the audience what 
it already knows. Its power lies in repetition." 6 9 Stereotypes regarding the "savage 
Native" and the up-standing Mounted Policeman have been repeated so often that they 
may have been imprinted into the public mind. 
For some analysis on the deeper symbolism at issue in the attempt to discredit 
33 
the alleged "Indian terrorists" at Gustafsen Lake, it is useful to examine the stereotypes 
and assumptions that are operating. In Aboriginal Voices. Miles Morriseau commented 
on the use of ethnic stereotyping by the media in coverage of both the Gustafsen Lake 
conflict and the concurrent standoff at Stoney Point, near Ipperwash, Ontario where an 
unarmed Aboriginal protester was killed by police. In his article titled "Seeing Savages 
Behind Every Bush: How the Media Missed the Full Story behind Gustafsen Lake and 
Stoney Point," he wrote, "The recent events in Gustafsen Lake, BC and Stoney Point 
Ontario [Ipperwash] show how the media can't seem to get enough of the savage/noble 
stereotype while ignoring the fundamental truths about the Native/Colonizer 
relationship." Morriseau linked one-sided historical accounts of past conflicts with the 
events that transpired in 1995 by noting, "In modern-day society the stereotype becomes 
the gun-toting militant (savage) and the peace-loving negotiator (noble savage)..." 
Referring to the Gustafsen Lake Defenders, in particular, he noted, "The group was 
branded "Terrorists, militants, renegades, rebels and criminals," by government officials, 
police, journalists and commentators. The words were modem-day versions of "savage" 
and this represented a point of view that the public was quick to swallow; after all they 
have been eating it for 500 years." 7 0 This work will explore the use of stereotyping as a 
tool of manipulation. 
In Public Opinion. Walter Lippmann sheds light on the process by which public 
opinion can be shaped by those in positions of authority. He coined the phrase 
"manufacture of consent" that was later employed by Noam Chomsky. The film 
Manufacturing consent: Noam Chomsky and the media, directed by Peter Wintonick and 
Mark Achbar, explores the process by which public support is mobilized. In the book of 
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the same name;, 7 1 Chomsky, Wintonck and Achbar examine the use of propaganda in the 
media and allege that powerful special interests in both government and the private sector 
can unfairly influence the media through a process of "manufacturing consent." 
In Public Opinion. Lippmann underscored the threat to democracy posed by the 
use of propaganda by governments. The use of propaganda by the BC Attorney General 
and RCMP spokespeople at Gustafsen Lake can be viewed in the context of Lippmann's 
comment on the role of state officials in the process of advancing propaganda: "Provided 
they think publicity will not strengthen opposition too much... they seek a certain 
measure of consent. They take, if not the whole mass, then the subordinates of the 
hierarchy into their confidence to feel they have freely willed the result..." 7 2 
In Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes. Jacques Eliul identified 
important aspects of the nature of propaganda that provide useful context for analysis of 
the use of propaganda at Gustafsen Lake that will be explored in the conclusion of this 
work. Ellul writes, "Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that 
wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of 
individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and 
incorporated in an organization." In this work, I will demonstrate the application of this 
theory of propaganda to the events that transpired in central British Columbia in 1995. 
With reference to the Gustafsen Lake conflict, the organized group that employed 
propaganda was the RCMP and/or the officials of British Columbia and Canada who 
"meant to bring about the active participation" of police and military soldiers to obey 
orders to initiate a ground assault on the Sundance camp. Likewise "passive 
participation" of the general public, the "mass of individuals" who consumed media 
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accounts of Native aggression, was manufactured to create consent for the siege on the 
Sundance camp. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CATTLE RANCHERS AND SUNDANCERS CLASH: 
"It clidn't matter what I said. They were going to make a show of force and 
set an example1:" 
The events which led up to the declaration of the RCMP that the Ts' Peten 
Defenders were terrorists are described in the notes of Native RCMP Constables who 
entered the Sundance camp on a regular basis in June, July and August 1995. The notes 
of these officers were disclosed to defense lawyers at the trial of the Ts' Peten Defenders, 
which followed the standoff. There are also minutes of RCMP meetings regarding the 
standoff and several copies of RCMP operational plans and internal communiques that 
were disclosed at the trial that show directly what RCMP officers were thinking and 
doing at Gustafsen Lake. Finally, there are transcripts of the court testimony of RCMP 
officers regarding their role at Gustafsen Lake that shed light on the actions of both 
police and protesters. These documents create a very different impression of the genesis 
of the standoff than that constructed in the mainstream media. I have contrasted the 
public statements of the RCMP with the evidence collected at the trial to analyze RCMP 
behaviour and motivation. 
Although the Gustafsen Lake conflict came to have important constitutional 
ramifications regarding attempts to settle Aboriginal title disputes at both domestic and 
international levels, the dispute started quietly. In the early late 1980's, Shuswap 
Faithkeeper Percy Rosette attracted people to Gustafsen Lake for Sundance ceremonies. 
For five years before the 1995 standoff, Rosette and members of a Sundance society 
gathered for this sophisticated religious ceremony on land near 100 Mile House, British 
Columbia, where Lyle James operated a cattle ranch. Between 1989 and 1993, James 
gave his blessing to this ceremony. He and Percy Rosette signed agreements that stated 
that as long as no permanent structures were erected, and the Ts' Peten Defenders left at 
the end of the ceremony, the Sundance ceremonies could take place. 
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Rosette had spiritual responsibilities associated with his role as the Faithkeeper of 
the Sundance as well as political and legal motivations connected with research he had 
done about ownership of the Sundance grounds. According to British Columbia lawyer 
Janice Switlo in Gustafsen Lake Under Siege: Exposing the Truth Behind the Gustafsen 
Lake stand-off. "While working as a researcher for an Indian band within the 
Secwepemc (Shuswap) Tribe, Rosette confirmed that a large area which includes the 
Sundance site, is Indian land." 4 
In addition to his legal and political interest in title to the Sundance grounds, 
Switlo explained that Rosette had a wide range of ceremonial responsibilities at the 
Sundance ceremonies: "As 'Faithkeeper,' not only does he have responsibilities during 
the Sundance preparations and event, he must also take physical and spiritual care of the 
sacred Sundance site and the sacred objects located there that are used in the Sundance 
religion."5 
After the formal agreement between Rosette and James ended after the 1993 
Sundance, Rosette consolidated his presence at the "Ts' Peten burial grounds." 6 These 
grounds, he argued, were ancestral territories taken illegally from his ancestors. Although 
the RCMP would later claim that they considered the dispute unrelated to Aboriginal land 
claims issues, the notes of RCMP Sergeant Ken Porter on 14 June 1995 indicate that at 
least Porter knew about the Shuswap traditionalists' assertion that there are burial 
grounds in the area. 
In addition to his religious commitment to oversee the Sundance, Rosette was 
involved with a group of Native activists who advocated for a definitive Supreme Court 
ruling on the nature of Aboriginal title in their traditional lands. There was a sovereignty 
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association that included William Jones Ignace, often known by a translation of his 
Shuswap name, "Wolverine." Ignace is an organic farmer who had petitioned the 
international community on the issue of Aboriginal jurisdiction several times. 
At Gustafsen Lake, Bruce Clark counselled the protesters that they were within 
their constitutional right to defend the Sundance grounds with guns 9 and supported the 
idea that the promises made to Aboriginal peoples by the British Crown formed a solid 
constitutional foundation for the armed stand at Gustafsen Lake. The existence of a 
relationship of alliance between Aboriginal peoples and the British Crown is a key part of 
the argument put forth by Clark and Ignace. This relationship is also an essential element 
of Aboriginal traditions in both western and eastern Canada and it is therefore logical that 
Mohawk activist Splitting the Sky could identify with similar issues raised by Shuswap 
traditionalists at Gustafsen Lake. 
Splitting the Sky, who was an influential figure within the Sundance camp, is an 
inheritor of the Six Nations, or "Haudoneshonee" tradition that has deep roots in 
diplomatic agreements and military alliances with the British Crown. 1 0 An intense orator, 
he was chosen as the main spokesperson to articulate the arguments forwarded by Clark, 
Rosette, Ignace and Stevens whose efforts on the legal front were proceeding 
methodically and largely unnoticed until the dispute with James and his ranchers 
escalated. 
In the first days of the conflict, the Ts' Peten Defenders did manage to convey 
some of their grievances through the press. On 28 June 1995, Stephen Frasher of The 100 
Mile Press published accounts directly from the Ts' Peten Defenders: 
Rosette and Archie and other Shuswap traditionalists say that the land 
is theirs and has never been ceded or the subject of a legal sale to Dog 
Creek rancher Lyle James. "Someone has issued illegal leases," says 
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Rosette. He claims James has never showed him a deed to the land, or 
who claimed legal authority to sell the land... Splitting the Sky asks, 
"What we want to know is where are the documents for this reserve?" 
There has always been some tension between the Ts' Peten Defenders 
and the rancher over the ownership claim but Splitting the Sky speaks 
about native land claims issues on a wider scale than has ever come up 
here before. Under the banner of "the Shuswap Nation at Gustafson 
Lake," the group has demanded an investigation by the Governor 
General into illegal land deals and intervention by the Queen to hear 
their claims under the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which states 
according to their release that "all unceded territories remain 
unmolested and undisturbed." 1 1 
Although this press report stated the legal and spiritual issues plainly, this type of 
reportage quickly changed when accounts of violence ensued. Within a few weeks, 
Native people who gathered for the annual Sundance at Gustafsen Lake became the focus 
of national attention when reports of gunfire between members of the camp and the cattle 
ranchers made headlines. 
How did violence begin? The alleged owner of the land where the Sundance took 
place, Lyle James, provided his account of the events at the trial of the protesters that 
followed the conflict. James testified that the Sundance took place without his consent in 
1994 and said he was adamant that the ceremony should not take place in 1995. By 
February 1995, James retained a lawyer, who then contacted the commanding officer of 
nearby 100 Mile House RCMP Detachment, Sergeant Sarrich. Sarrich testified that the 
RCMP objective at this time was to have the Sundance cancelled or moved to a new 
location. 1 2 Sarrich then contacted Canoe Lake Band Chief Agnes Snow and Canim Lake 
Band Chief Antoine Archie to aid him in this effort. (Both Canim Lake and Canoe Creek 
Bands form part of a larger body called the Caribou Tribal Council.) 
RCMP Sergeant Sarrich, who handled the dispute in its early months in 1995, 
testified that there were plans to have the Sundance moved or cancelled as early as 
January 1995. 1 3 Sarrich stated that from the outset that he had the view the protesters' 
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arguments lacked substance. Sarrich also discussed the situation with James' lawyer and 
discussed the prospect of pressing charges against the Defenders. Sarrich's testimony 
demonstrated that he did not take any of the political or religious arguments raised by the 
Ts' Peten Defenders seriously. In fact, he stated in his testimony of 19 August 1996, that 
he viewed the people at the Sundance camp as being militants looking for a cause to 
create a violent confrontation.1 4 
From February 1995 forward, there were clear lines of demarcation drawn. Most 
RCMP officers sided with Band Council officials in an attempt to discredit the protesters' 
message that neither the governments of British Columbia and Canada nor the Tribal 
Council governments had jurisdiction over the Sundance grounds. In accounts provided 
to the media, RCMP media liaison officers Sarrich, Ward and Montague consistently 
portrayed Rosette and the Ts' Peten Defenders as aggressive malcontents and ignored the 
substance of their demands for third party adjudication of their land dispute. The RCMP 
position was strengthened when the Ts' Peten Defenders received little or no support 
from mainstream Aboriginal organizations across Canada. 
The Ts' Peten Defenders represented grassroots Aboriginal activists who view 
their federally funded Tribal Council governments as collaborators with government 
efforts to stifle Aboriginal self-determination.1 5 To the general public, though, the 
assertion that the Ts' Peten Defenders were "outside agitators" seemed compelling when 
Aboriginal people who were portrayed as authentic community leaders offered little or no 
support to the camp. The "terrorist" threat was reinforced by denunciations from Tribal 
Chiefs in the 100-Mile house area such as Agnes Snow, who stated, "In speaking to the 
people from our community, if there should be any defending of our territory, it should 
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be coming from us, not these outsiders." 
Although Sarrich and several high ranking RCMP officers characterized the Ts' 
Peten Defenders as militants from the outset, there was another view that came from the 
Native Constables who entered the Sundance camp. RCMP Constables Charlie Andrew, 
Bob Wood, and George Findley were assigned to investigate the Gustafsen Lake dispute 
after Lyle James reportedly uttered threats while he and his ranch-hands served an 
eviction notice to the Ts' Peten Defenders on 13 June 1995. The notes of officers, 
Andrew, Wood, and Findley indicate that these officers were more concerned about the 
threat of violence coming from ranchers than from the Ts' Peten Defenders, especially 
after reports that the ranchers threatened members of the Sundance camp while the 
ceremony was on-going. 
Although the protesters were portrayed as terrorists, court testimony and notes 
made by these Native Constables - who undertook negotiations with the Sundance camp 
as well as the ranchers - show that the Ts' Peten Defenders had two main concerns. The 
first was religious. They wanted to make sure that the Sundance could run its course from 
2 July to 16 July. The second was broader and both political and legal in nature and 
involved the articulation of a political-legal tradition with deep roots in Aboriginal 
communities throughout Canada's First Nations. The Ts ' Peten Defenders alleged that 
they had the rule of law on their side because of promises made to them by the British 
Crown and the constitutional entrenchment of rights stemming from those promises 
dating back to the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
The legal and historical assertions made by Sundance camp spokesperson Splitting 
the Sky and their lawyer, Bruce Clark, were considered quixotic by most RCMP 
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negotiators, the Attorney General of BC, the Solicitor General of Canada, as well by the 
vast majority of the Canadian public who read the over-simplified news reports of the 
incident. Instead of exploring the substance of the Ts' Peten Defenders' legal assertions, 
RCMP media liaison officers dismissed the Ts' Peten Defenders outright. For example, 
Sergeant Sarrich told media that, "Our position is that they're terrorists, and there is 
1 n 
nothing to negotiate with them." 
Although the public perception was that the camp was a hostile place, Shuswap 
RCMP Constable Charlie Andrew testified that during his many visits to the Sundance 
camp he was treated with dignity and no threats were made against ranchers, the police or 
the community. He stated that there was an open invitation to discuss the matter in a 
peaceful manner even during his final visits to the camp. There was, however, a 
controversy about a fence that the Ts' Peten Defenders reinforced "to prevent cows from 
desecrating the Sundance site and sacred burial grounds," 1 9 which had caused both 
frustration and danger to personal safety during the previous year's Sundance: 
They [the Ts ' Peten Defenders] explain that they have erected a fence 
along an old fence line around the perimeter of their sacred grounds to 
keep cattle from wandering through and defiling the sacred grounds. 
Within the enclosure is the Sacred Arbor, where the actual Sundance 
ceremonies are held, the council lodge campsite and an ancient burial 
ground. He maintains that a parcel about 28 sq. miles was originally 
intended to be put into a reserve for the Shuswap people, but that 
survey markers have been long ago tampered with and destroyed so 
that now there is no record of it. 2 0 
The ranchers argued that this fence obstructed important operations of the cattle 
ranch and also alleged the Ts' Peten Defenders were bothering tourists who were 
camping in the area. However it was the opinion of Sergeant Porter on 22 June 1995 that 
the Ts' Peten Defenders "probably won't bother any outsiders as long as cowboys don't 
bother them." 2 1 Regarding operation of the ranch, Porter noted the Ts' Peten Defenders 
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had "invited cowboys to come in and remove cows" to prevent loss to James. 
The RCMP contradicted Porter's observation that the Ts' Peten Defenders' 
presence was benign in a report written in late August when Superintendent Len Olfert 
organized a media campaign designed to convince the public that the Ts' Peten 
Defenders had become a terrorist threat and alleged "There has been disruption to the 
operation of the ranch." 
The notes of Constable Bob Wood corroborate the testimony of Constable 
Andrew and disprove the allegation that the protesters were the aggressors. In fact, in 
June and July, officers seemed more concerned about aggressive action from the ranchers 
after James served the eviction notice. Wood's notes of 1230 on 13 June state, "Lyle 
James advised by Cpl. Hicks not to harm anyone... recommended James follow lawyers 
direction and obtain a court injunction." 2 4 
Wood's notes of 25 June 1995 indicate that the day-to-day activities in the camp 
involved preparations for the Sundance and characterize the camp as a peaceful and 
solemn place: 2 5 
All quiet in camp - No problems with campers or ranchers. Informed 
John [Hill, also known as Splitting the Sky] and Ernie Archie [that] 
Lyle James is going to move his cattle from Gustafsen Lake. Both 
agreed there is no problem with this. John spoke with both Sgt. 's and 
explained the purpose of the Sundance and period of dates from July 2-
16 when people would be meeting for ceremony. John and Ernie plus 
two others... were cutting wood for sweat lodge fires. Constable Wood 
invited by John to attend and view actual Sundance ceremony. 2 6 
In early June, RCMP officers recorded evidence of aggression from James' ranch-
hands. On 16 June, the Ts' Peten Defenders claimed that a drunken ranch-hand 
threatened them as he rode through the camp on horseback and warned that an invasion 
by the RCMP was imminent. 2 7 Although James denied that his ranch-hands made 
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threatening overtures when he was present, he did concede that one of his employees 
entered the Sundance camp one night after drinking. According to Lambertus: 
The incident was well - documented during the trial. One of the ranch-
hands, apparently after consuming alcohol, allegedly rode to the camp 
late one night on horseback, yelling and making a commotion that 
woke everybody up. He said that the ranch-hands and the police were 
going to raid the camp and burn it down. The scene was witnessed by 
non-Native people who were camping nearby, who later testified in 
court that the incident did occur. 2 8 
Constable Wood investigated the Ts' Peten Defenders' allegation and in his notes 
on 24 June 1995 at 1430, he refers to a "statement obtained [from] campers yesterday" 
that said there were "no problems... During conversation, they [the non-Native 
vacationers] related a story of drunken cowboy ride[ing] through the camp last Friday. 
This substantiates the story told by the Ts' Peten Defenders at the talks last Saturday. 
Lyle James will be told to talk to his men." 2 9 Another note of concern regarding the 
potential for violence from the ranchers was noted by Constable Andrew on 17 June 1995 
who wrote, "Member advised James that this was not the time or place to start moving 
people off this land with force." 3 0 
Throughout June and July 1995 there were several conflicting reports regarding 
the exchange of gunfire and the utterance of threats near the Sundance grounds. In 
Constable Findley's notes of 15 June 1995 he refers to a "shooting at forestry workers" 
attributed to the Ts' Peten Defenders. He writes: "Lyle James, owner of the property is 
demanding these Natives get off his property or he will move them off with the help of 
his cowboys." 3 1 
No charges were ever laid in connection with the alleged shooting at forestry 
workers although press reports often indicated that the Ts' Peten Defenders were clearly 
responsible for them. According to the notes of Sergeant Sarrich on 5 July, Sundancer 
49 
Ernie Archie told a witness that "The shot at the forestry workers was an accident." 
Although no one was injured, the incident was exploited by British Columbia Reform 
Party leader Jack Weisgerber in his attempt to raise support for police action against the 
Ts' Peten Defenders according to the populist dictum that became an oft-repeated mantra 
repeated by BC Attorney General Ujjal Dosanjh, the police and the general public during 
the standoff: "There is one law for all Canadians." 3 3 
The call for an RCMP operation to remove the Ts' Peten Defenders may have its 
origin with members of the Reform party, including then-British Columbia ML A Jack 
Weisgerber. The demand of Reform party politicians that the RCMP should remove the 
Ts' Peten Defenders without hesitation was recorded by RCMP officers who were 
concerned that outside parties were pushing James to use force to remove the Ts ' Peten 
Defenders before the Sundance ceremony finished. In his notes of 21 June 1995 at 1825, 
Constable Andrew wrote, 
Findley advised that Peter Epp informed him he was a member of the 
Reform Party and good friends with [Reform Party leader] Jack 
Weisburger, also a Reform Party member or leader. It is possible that 
the two A/N people are pushing Lyle James' buttons in the background, 
we are assuming this at this time. It is very possible that Lyle James is 
getting pressure from different groups to start or cause a confrontation 
at Gustafsen L a k e . 3 4 
The calls for action to remove the Ts' Peten Defenders made by the Reform party 
echo many of the public sentiments of citizens who later staged public protests near 100-
Mile House. These people supported the RCMP and urged the police to remove the 
campers, by force, if necessary bearing signs that proclaimed, "We support the police." 3 5 
There was little interest in the Sundancers' legal position from state officials or the 
general public in the interior of British Columbia during the siege. Most viewed the Ts' 
Peten Defenders as initiators of violence, despite their claims to the contrary. 
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Although the ranchers played down their role as aggressors, the claim of the Ts' 
Peten Defenders that one of James' men brandished a bullwhip during the June eviction 
attempt was later confirmed. In his testimony on 22 July 1996, Lyle James' son. Dale 
admitted that a bullwhip was produced by another ranch-hand, Scott Bernard. The Ts' 
Peten Defenders alleged that the ranchers also called them "red niggers." Dale James 
testified that ranch-hands walked through the Sundance grounds, took the stove and the 
door of a structure within the encampment and walked through the Ts' Peten Defenders' 
tent. 
In his testimony on 16 July 1996, Lyle James disagreed with the characterization 
of the RCMP that he was using a "confrontational approach" and claimed that when 
serving the eviction notice his cowhand was just playing with his bull-whip. In particular, 
James disagreed with Corporal Hicks' statement that James was determined to "burn, 
bulldoze the entire camp if necessary." 3 7 Nonetheless, James' testimony did indicate that 
the ranch-hands had aggressive intentions when he confirmed that someone said they 
were prepared to use force to break up the camp. He claimed this was said by some 
ranch-hands who were a bit "hotheaded" and "said things he wished they hadn't." 
Few accounts of the threats made from James and his ranch-hands appeared in the 
mainstream media reports. In contrast, there were reports, largely based on statements 
made by Attorney General Dosanjh and RCMP spokesmen, that downplayed the legal 
issues raised by the Ts' Peten Defenders and emphasized the threat of violence from the 
Natives. 3 9 RCMP commanders dismissed the Aboriginal rights issues, treated the Ts' 
Peten Defenders as lawbreakers and tried to stifle the Sundance. According to the notes 
of Constable Andrew, there was a co-ordinated effort on the part of some RCMP officers, 
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in particular Sergeant Sarrich, and some Tribal Council Chiefs to have the Sundance 
moved or cancelled. 4 0 
Throughout the conflict and even more vociferously at the ensuing trial, the 
Gustafsen Lake Defenders called upon the RCMP to fulfill their fiduciary duty to protect 
Native people from incursions into their unceded territories. They argued that the Queen 
and her Royal Police force were bound by a nation-to-nation relationship of alliance 
enshrined in agreements dating back to 1763 and re-affirmed in the Constitution. 
When Percy Rosette made frantic calls to the RCMP for help in 1995, he was 
hoping that the RCMP would objectively arbitrate the dispute. Splitting the Sky and 
Jones Ignace, who were the camp spokespeople, often quoted lengthy passages from the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763, which referred to the duty of the British Sovereign to 
protect Native people. In the view of the Ts' Peten Defenders, they needed protection 
initially from the ranchers but more broadly from a legal and political system that denied 
them title rights stemming from the 1763 Royal Proclamation. 
Although RCMP officers alleged the Ts' Peten Defenders had no coherent issues, 
there were direct discussions between Ts' Peten Defenders and RCMP officers regarding 
the specifics of the Ts' Peten Defenders' legal and constitutional position and their 
historical struggle for cultural, spiritual and political autonomy. For example, Constable 
Findley made extensive notes about the history of the land at Gustafsen Lake during a 
discussion he had in the camp with David Archie and Splitting the Sky. The following 
synopsis of his notes of 12 July 1995, shows that the RCMP were given direct exposure 
to the real historical and constitutional issues at the heart of the Sundancer's stand: 
[Sundancer] David Archie: described [Aboriginal] history - before 
colonial times Shuswap people subsisted through hunting, fishing, 
berry-picking. The area was a trade route to Canim Lake and the North 
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Thompson Area. In 1832 there was the Blackdome Inter Tribal 
Agreement according to which 2000 sq. mi. of territory near Black 
dome mountain to east side of Green Lake was reserved. In 1864 the 
Douglas Reserve was negotiated between Governor Douglas and the 
Canoe Creek and Dog Creek Indian bands which laid out 300 000 acres 
as far east as Neilson Lake. Many Natives lived year round, and remain 
in the area today. In 1865 Joseph Trutch "declared Natives non-
citizens" and "passed ordinance that natives could not buy, sell or pre­
empt land" and "down-sizedreserves... from 300 000 acres to 14 000 
or 5% of the Douglas Treaty." In 1870 Natives were excluded from 
partnership in Confederation. In 1862 small pox hit. Trutch thought 
Natives would go extinct. In 1858 whites had come into ranch after 
failing in gold rush and married some natives. Under Trutch, Natives 
were given 10 acres per family although whites got 160 acres. In 1858 
was the first owner of James Cattle ranch. Between 1920 and 1940, 
"Natives were not allowed to sell or buy agricultural goods off reserve" 
Natives were urged to sell reserve land if they were in dire straights by 
the government of the day. 4 1 
Part of the exchange where Findley discussed these issues with the Sundance 
camp was captured on film and appears in the documentary film Above the Law (Part 
One). 4 2 The video-taped exchange ends with Findley's comment: "Throw in alcohol and 
residential school and it aint hard to understand the loss of land and family breakdown of 
the Native people." 4 3 Importantly, this report, that Findley handed to his superiors, 
explained the context to the Ts' Peten Defenders' claim that they were victims of 
"genocide." Moreover, Findley advised against RCMP action to remove the Ts' Peten 
Defenders and stated specifically: "Recommendation: Do not take police action to 
remove [them because] public support from local Native bands would or could shift in a 
hurry." 4 4 The concern of Findley that if the larger historical side of the Ts' Peten 
Defenders' message was received Native bands might support their armed struggle is 
very significant. Instead of encouraging, or at least allowing, a debate regarding the 
historical and legal issues at hand, the RCMP chose to proceed with a propaganda 
campaign designed to discredit the Ts' Peten Defenders and to prevent the issues raised 
in Findley's report from becoming the issues of public debate. In the end, very few 
Native people heard a clear articulation of the legal and historical issues that were at the 
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heart of the Ts' Peten Defenders' stance. Although many came out in support of them 
after their trial, the Ts ' Peten Defenders received little domestic support in the summer of 
1995, at least in part because of the intense campaign of media manipulation that 
discredited the protest. 
Following Findley's report there were more reports of gunfire. Tensions were 
running high on both sides and according to the notes of Sergeant Porter on 20 July 1995, 
"James [was] getting pushy." 4 5 In response, the Ts' Peten Defenders began drafting press 
releases under the name of the "Defenders of the Shuswap Nation." They called upon the 
Governor General to investigate the status of the land and demanded "The land policy of 
the Department of Indian Affairs in the Shuswap Nation is to be exposed; an audience is 
to be arranged with the Queen and then Privy Council of the UK at which the Treaty 
obligations of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the policy of protecting unceded 
territories are renewed." 4 6 
As tensions escalated the protesters argued they would view any incursion into the 
camp as an act of war. They drafted a press release and stated plainly, "Any further 
attempts to forcibly invade the Defenders' camp will be met with resistant force." 4 7 As of 
19 June, the Defenders were preparing for an assault by the RCMP they felt was 
imminent. Throughout the standoff, the Ts' Peten Defenders argued that they were in an 
armed but self-defensive posture and that they would stand down as soon as the Solicitor 
General of Canada sent their petition for third-party adjudication to Crown officials in 
London, England. 
At the subsequent trial, one of the Gustafsen Lake Defenders' defense counsel, 
George Wool, who was an RCMP officer before becoming a lawyer, summarized the 
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events of June and July that set the tone for the police response. He outlined "findings of 
fact" related to the background of the standoff: "In the early 90's it was known that 
Native people were meeting for a Sundance, not a standoff, not a sudden terrorist act." 
"Fact," stated Wool, 
This is a "red neck area" where Native people live separate and apart. 
Barry Holden testified there was never a problem... Native people 
helped out fishermen in the area. [Then] in June 1995, Mr. James 
decided to go into this area he believed his ranch. He had been advised 
to get a court order, and follow civil process but he didn't which was 
what probably started this whole thing. Thirteen ranchers went into 
what was then a peaceful camp. There was no standoff at that time... 
[Wool noted the rancher's admission that it was a] bad decision to crack 
the bullwhip. 4 8 
Wool told the court that James' attempt to evict the Ts ' Peten Defenders was the 
aggressive action that escalated the conflict: "In my view [the eviction attempt] starts the 
whole process... Next Ron Tonelli [a ranch-hand] rides into the encampment claiming 
horses have been shot and fires a shot. [Then] a drunken cowboy, Lindsay Turnbull rides 
into the camp making threats and yelling, 'You better get out of here.' The media doesn't 
cover this... and anyone would have viewed this as a threat." Wool referred to these as 
"the facts that set the stage." 4 9 
While the Native Constables maintained good relationships with the Ts' Peten 
Defenders, other Constables continued to be concerned about the possibility that James 
might start moving on the Sundance camp. On 20 July, RCMP Superintendent Len Olfert 
wrote in his notebook that a "lawyer from James Cattle [is] saying 'take them out." ' 5 0 
Olfert also notes James still had "No eviction order." Nevertheless, "James is pushing for 
action." 5 1 
In the two weeks following Olfert's observations about James wanting to "take 
out" the Ts' Peten Defenders there were two more unconfirmed reports of shots being 
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fired. On 26 July 1995, there was a report that two fisheries officers were encountered by 
six men who said they were from the Sundance camp. According to an article later 
published in the Vancouver Sun, as these officers were leaving shots were fired into the 
area. 5 2 According to the notes of Sgt. Porter there was a report of witnesses "hearing 
shots" but these people were "not shot at." 5 3 Nevertheless, support from the federal 
Reform Party for an RCMP operation was redoubled by these reports which blamed the 
Ts' Peten Defenders for initiating shooting incidents, and on 27 July Sarrich "had 
discussions with Phil Mayfield (Refonn MP) and Lyle James." 5 4 
The conflict between the ranchers and the Ts' Peten Defenders could have 
remained a local issue. There was no clear evidence that the Ts ' Peten Defenders initiated 
shooting incidents in June and July. RCMP negotiators counseled against the use of 
RCMP force. 
Although the press remained more interested in accounts of violence, some Ts' 
Peten Defenders maintained faith that the Canadian courts might hear their constitutional 
challenge and vindicate their claim to underlying title of the Sundance grounds. Their 
lawyer, Bruce Clark, told them that a breakthrough was possible on 12 September 1995. 
Clark hoped that the Supreme Court would reverse earlier precedents on the question of 
title with reference to the Delgamukww case 5 5 and open the question of Native 
jurisdiction in unceded Aboriginal territories to fuller discussion and legal examination. 
With this hope in mind and still fearful of encroachment from ranchers and the RCMP, 
the Ts' Peten Defenders decided to reinforce their camp with provisions and called for 
help from both Native and non-Native sympathizers. 5 6 As the conflict wore on, the Ts' 
Peten Defenders called on their supporters to protect them physically by coming to the 
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camp. They also implored supporters to counter the backlash against them that stemmed 
from the political pressure and media reports that they argued were based on propaganda 
designed to inflame public opinion and manufacture consent for an attack on their camp. 
After alleging that the Ts' Peten Defenders were terrorists, the police, the military 
and the provincial government pushed forward with their effort to remove the protesters 
although they lacked direct evidence linking the Ts' Peten Defenders to the shooting 
incidents. Although Dosanjh maintained that Gustafsen Lake "is not a political issue" 
and was unrelated to Aboriginal title issues, the fundamentally discordant legal 
interpretations between the Ts' Peten Defenders and state officials were evident to Native 
Constables who attempted to maintain peaceful negotiations with both ranchers and Ts' 
Peten Defenders in June and July. For example, Andrew's notes on 18 July 1995 state 
that "John Dock [Splitting the Sky] said that some ML A made a statement on the radio 
that he would seek a court order in the Supreme Court and have the people removed from 
the site by the police. John Dock then said if the police enforce the court order that will 
mean war against them and he himself is prepared to die for the cause." 5 9 According to 
Andrew's notes of 18 July 1995, Splitting the Sky, who handled many of the inquiries 
from police and media in June, July and August also said, "They [the Ts' Peten 
Defenders] want the dispute to be resolved in a peaceful manner. They do not want any 
type of confrontation with anyone. John Dock said they want the Prv/Fed government to 
sit down and resolve the issues at hand." 6 0 Splitting the Sky was one of the main players 
at the Gustafsen Lake episode and his articulation of the Ts' Peten Defenders 
constitutional position set the tone for the negotiations which ensued. 
The Ts' Peten Defenders' response to reports of Native aggression was largely 
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unknown to the Canadian public as the standoff edged towards violence and bloodshed. 
Reports of violence from within the Sundance camp, which originated with the RCMP, 
dominated media coverage. For example, the RCMP claimed that weapons seized from 
people associated with the camp, approximately forty kilometres away, confirmed 
suspicions that the Ts' Peten Defenders were dangerous criminals. 6 1 Although there was 
no confirmation of these reports, RCMP officers discussed whether they should invade 
the camp immediately or whether they should go to the media first.6 2 
On 20 August, Canadian Press reported on the seizure of weapons purported to be 
associated with the Sundance camp: "In one of the latest incidents, two fisheries officers 
[from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans] found two heavily armed natives beside 
the Fraser River on 11 August." The article emphasized the RCMP account of the dispute 
and dismissed the protesters as illegal squatters by stating, "A small group of natives 
squatting illegally [italics mine] on a private ranch about 90 km southwest of this Cariboo 
community has shot at a Mountie and threatened Department of Fisheries enforcement 
officers, a senior RCMP officer told a news conference." 6 3 
Although the reportage of this arrest set the stage for the RCMP claim that the Ts ' 
Peten Defenders were terrorists, Sergeant Sarrich later admitted in court that he had no 
direct evidence that the weapons seized and presented to the media as belonging to the 
Ts' Peten Defenders, had ever been inside the camp. Sarrich also testified that he 
associated the guns with the Ts' Peten Defenders despite reports from Constables Wood, 
Andrew and Findley that no guns had yet been seen in the camp. 6 4 
Following the weapons seizure by Fisheries officers, RCMP Constable Ray Wilby 
testified that he met with Porter and Olfert and was ordered to do a "discrete 
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reconnaissance" of the camp. This "discrete reconnaissance" team of camouflage 
"Emergency Response Team" (ERT) members surrounded the camp in the early morning 
darkness with high calibre weapons including 9mm Saucer handguns, 9mm submachine 
guns M-16 rifles and ,308sniper rifles. The heavily armed RCMP Emergency Response 
Ream (ERT) entered the Sundance grounds around 0400 on the morning of 18 August. 6 6 
According to the Canadian Press report of the incident, an "RCMP patrol went 
into the area and came across a young native in battle dress, police said. Within seconds 
of the encounter, the native fired a shot at a member with the bullet narrowly missing his 
head. The native fled into a heavily wooded area." 6 7 The RCMP told the press that the 
firing of this shot at the heavily armed Emergency Response team - that surrounded the 
camp in the middle of the night - constituted an act of terrorism by the Ts' Peten 
Defenders. 6 8 However, the Ts' Peten Defenders argued that they had good reasons to fire 
what they argued was simply a warning shot because they had a legitimate fear that their 
camp was being attacked. As stated above, ranchers had warned that such an invasion 
was imminent. Rosette asked reporters, "If someone came sneaking into your house with 
a SWAT team, what would you do? You'd have to defend yourself. This lake, and all this 
land, belongs to the Indian people." 6 9 
James Pitawanakwat told the press that the accounts of forestry officials and 
RCMP being shot at were incorrect. He also claimed the shot fired at the Emergency 
Response Team was a warning shot into the air and stated, "They are going to say 
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anything to the press to make us look bad in the public eye." 
Even lower ranking RCMP officers later questioned the logic of inserting the 
heavily armed "reconnaissance" team who wore camouflage face paint and carried high 
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calibre weapons. 7 1 At the Gustafsen Lake trial, George Wool asked Constable Andrew 
about the concern that the "reconnaissance dressed in dark clothing might cause a 
confrontation," 
Wool: In your mind, you were concerned of what might happen if 
people in dark clothing were sneaking up on the encampment right? 
Andrew: Yes, I was. 
Wool: You were concerned because somebody in the camp might 
mistake these people in military or dark clothing as aggressors, right? 
Andrew: I believed they were - if they were detected there might be a 
confrontation." 7 2 
Even Sergeant Sarrich who had little sympathy with the Ts' Peten Defenders' 
position agreed, in his court testimony, that inserting the ERT in the middle of the night 
may have been a recipe for disaster, and that if he was a camper, it might occur to him to 
shoot back. 
Sergeant Porter also questioned the actions of his superiors in August 1995 and 
said he "didn't agree with a lot of things" the RMCP did at Gustafsen Lake. Wool pressed 
him for specifics and hypothesized, "What bothered you, Ken Porter, was that you were 
uncomfortable about using things like ERT team, heavy-duty weaponry, going in there 
and putting on a big show, isn't that true?" 
Porter answered, "I guess there was a certain amount of apprehension on my 
part." 
Wool also explored the nature of the seemingly heavy-handed media campaign at 
the Sundance grounds. In particular, Wool asked Porter if he felt it was unethical for the 
RCMP to fly in journalists to attend the press conference on 11 August 1995 where the 
Ts' Peten Defenders were portrayed as terrorists. Specifically, Wool asked Porter if he 
was "uncomfortable with the idea of having Sgt. Montague and this jet full of journalists 
fly into Williams Lake and put on a great big media show before any roadblocks or 
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investigation. That's it isn't it?" 
Porter answered: "1 don't know that I was uncomfortable with it. It was not my 
idea... I was caught up in it." He summarized, "The long and short of the whole thing is, 
it wasn't my show. " 
"That's right," said Wool, "It was Superintendent Olfert's show, true? 
"True," Porter replied. 7 4 
It was RCMP Superintendent Olfert who, despite the lack of concrete evidence to 
link the weapons seized by fisheries officers to the camp, organized the elaborate 11 
August press conference that marked the beginning of the most concerted attempts of the 
RCMP to discredit the Ts' Peten Defenders. The RCMP displayed weapons to reporters 
and alleged that a serious terrorist threat was developing. An RCMP operation plan 
drafted on 22 August, stated, "As a direct result of the DFO [Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans] seizure, a decision was made to initiate planning for a search of the Gustafson 
[sic] Lake site." 7 5 
After spotting the heavily armed ERT team in the bushes in the early morning 
hours of 18 August, Percy Rosette made frantic calls to the RCMP asking for help. 
Constable Wood, who maintained good relations with the Ts' Peten Defenders, made a 
record of this phone call. According to his notes, he received a call from Rosette who 
made a complaint that "There are 4-6 whites in camouflage in the bushes with guns. 
Coming at them." Wood advised Rosette, "Police will attend ASAP as we are busy with 
another complaint at present." 7 6 The RCMP did not follow up on Percy's complaint. 
Rosette received no support from Native Constables, who were promptly pulled 
back. The RCMP denied that it was they who were in the bushes, which escalated fear in 
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the camp that ranchers were following up on threats of vigilante action. The Native 
officer who received Rosette's plea for help and set out to investigate his allegation that 
there were camouflaged men lurking in the woods was pulled off the case. More 
importantly, in his testimony Olfert admitted that RCMP tapes of the phone conversation 
with Percy Rosette were destroyed. 7 7 As such, it is possible that there existed other 
evidence that supports the allegation that the RCMP engaged in a campaign of 
"disinformation and smear." 
Native officers later stated they felt betrayed by their commanders. They argued 
that the higher-ranking officers were determined to use force to settle the dispute and 
ignored the advice of the three Native RCMP negotiators who recommended that no 
police action was necessary. According to Wood, there were only five people left in the 
camp by 18 August and it was his opinion that they would leave peacefully. 7 8 At the trial, 
George Wool stated, "Historically the RCMP is not very well-trusted, that is why the 
Native Constables were brought in... [Because of]... residential schools, Native people 
have been cheated, lied to, and double-crossed." Wool explained, "A Native person feels 
no one cares" and alleged this is a central part of the "sad history of B C . " 7 9 
Until the insertion of this ERT team, RCMP negotiators Wood, Findley and 
Andrew played the role that made the Mounted Police famous in history books and dime 
novels. 8 0 They were arbiters who were trying to facilitate a peace agreement between all 
parties in a dispute that was winding down. The Sundance had come to a close and Wood 
had determined that "It was down to five individuals" who remained. Then, according to 
Constable Wood, "Something changed. The RCMP made up their minds. They were 
going to use force." 8 1 
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At this point, the tone of the RCMP operation changed from investigation to 
provocation and the officers went from being observers to enforcers of laws that the Ts' 
Peten Defenders argued did not apply to the Sundance grounds. Wood, Andrew and 
Findley were pulled from the case, allegedly to protect their own safety. Constable Bob 
Wood, one of the Native Constables who was pulled off the case denied Sergeant 
Montague's assertion that safety concerns were behind the decision to remove the Native 
Constables. In contrast, Wood suggested that the RCMP strategy was to abandon 
negotiations and to use force to remove the protesters. "My God," Wood said, "We were 
there for two months, daily, so I don't know what his reasoning was." 
Wood also asserted that the RCMP rejected clear recommendations from he and 
other officers and that the use of force was not required to end the conflict. In the words 
of Constable Wood, "It didn't matter what I said. [After 18 August ] they no longer 
wanted the Native police officers involved. They were going to make a show of force and 
set an example. Somebody above the level of Constable made a decision that the 
Emergency Response Team was going to go in. And nothing was going to change their 
mind." 8 3 Wood has since quit the force and has come out publicly to criticize the 
decision 8 4 to use Canada's federal police force to "set an example" to those Aboriginal 
people who would challenge the prevailing legal, political, and constitutional status quo. 
Despite the questionable and provocative nature of the late night insertion of 
RCMP officers who surrounded the camp, after a shot was returned from the camp, the 
RCMP used the incident to step up their attempts to discredit the Ts' Peten Defenders. 
Under the command of Superintendent Olfert, the RCMP staged a press conference 
where they denied that Ignace, Rosette, Clark, Splitting the Sky and the rest of the Ts' 
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Peten Defenders had valid or even comprehensible political grievances. 
At this point, the standoff quickly escalated into a military siege after the 
Emergency Response Team drew fire from the camp. 8 6 The RCMP stepped up their 
efforts to discredit the Ts' Peten Defenders. They employed a propaganda technique 
George Wool referred to as "policing by publicity," in an interview with Aboriginal 
Peoples Television Network (APTN) aired in May 2000. 8 7 As the standoff escalated, the 
Mounties employed propaganda-like publicity techniques to manufacture consent 8 8 for 
their plan to remove the Ts' Peten Defenders. Wool told APTN that "policing by 
publicity" has become a customary strategy employed by RCMP officers in the last ten 
years to ruin the credibility of suspects whom the RCMP have identified as criminals. 8 9 It 
would appear that the Gustafsen Lake Defenders were singled out by the RCMP for such 
treatment. For example, on 19 August, Superintendent Olfert held a press conference in 
nearby 100 Mile house in which he called the people in the camp, at this time only a 
handful of people, "terrorists." 9 0 
After the removal of the Native negotiators from the conflict, the RCMP designed 
a media strategy to prepare the public for their assault on the camp. RCMP officers' notes 
and operational plans detail the nature of this plan. A document prepared by Porter and 
Wilby under the direction of Olfert described the intent of the press conference: "On 19 
August we orchestrated a joint media conference featuring speakers from DFO, RCMP, 
Cariboo Tribal Council and Lyle James himself. The objective of this conference was 
twofold. Firstly to warn the public of the presence of this radical group and their weapons 
and secondly to set the stage for a direct police response."91 [italics mine] 
According to the notes of Assistant RCMP Commissioner Dennis Brown, within 
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twenty-fours hours of the 19 August press conference, RCMP officers in Kamloops were 
"putting together a plan to go in and get them [the Ts' Peten Defenders] out." Based on 
the reports of aggression from the camp that were yet unsubstantiated, RCMP 
commanders began planning for a military assault on the camp that they acknowledged 
could be lethal. According to the same entry in Brown's notes, on 20 August at 1245 
"The use of firearms is definitely a possibility and we may need our protective type of 
devices from the military to ensure that our personnel are not hurt. The C O . 
[Commanding Officer] commented and 1 agreed that we need to clean them out entirely 
and not have any hanging issues similar to what happened at Oka." (See Appendix 2) 
The dispute initially pitted the ranchers against the Ts' Peten Defenders and 
seemed in many ways a dark variation on the classic theme of conflict in the North 
American west of "cowboys versus indians." The RCMP stepped in for the cowboys 
and the Ts' Peten Defenders took the familiar role of antagonist. After the insertion of the 
ERT squad on 18 August and the heavy-handed press conference of 19 August, the 
RCMP role changed from negotiator to enforcer. In the week that followed the insertion 
of the ERT squad and the dismissal of the Native Constables from the case, the RCMP 
began drafting operational plans that called for a "ground assault" on the Sundance 
camp. 9 4 (See Appendix 3) Tensions mounted and trust melted as the RCMP sealed off the 
camp and cut off their communications by jamming their radiophone. 
Based on evidence collected from trial disclosure, I conclude that when the 
RCMP addressed the media they downplayed the threat of violence from Lyle James and 
his ranchers. Although it was clear that the Ts' Peten Defenders were making a principled 
legal stand, police and state officials exaggerated the aggressiveness of the Ts' Peten 
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Defenders. 
18 August 1995 was a key turning point. Trust between the protesters and the 
police deteriorated after the RCMP deployed a heavily armed Emergency Response 
Team in the early morning hours without the knowledge of RCMP negotiators. These 
Native Constables were then removed from the case after advising that no police action 
was necessary. 9 5 After 18 August 1995, the RCMP employed propaganda techniques to 
discredit the Defenders by calling them "terrorists." Public support for the RCMP 
increased as condemnation for the Ts' Peten Defenders resulted from media reports that 
echoed misleading RCMP press release accounts. 
Moreover, there is evidence that at least some evidence was destroyed. If tapes of 
a conversation between Percy Rosette and the RCMP were destroyed it is possible that 
other key evidence that the RCMP felt might be damaging was destroyed. 
1
 See Brown, Above the Law 2 
" For a description of the ceremony from the 1995 Sundance Chief, see interview with Splitting the Sky in 
independent documentary film, Above the Law 1. directed by Mervyn Brown, 1997 
3
 There were two agreements. The first acknowledged that an annual Sundance could take place beginning 
in 1989. The second agreement was entered into the Gustafsen Lake trial as See Exhibit 132. See also 
transcript of Lyle James' testimony, 16 July 1996. This second agreement reads: "This permission is 
granted on a one-time only basis for the period of 15 July to 31 July 1993 and does not constitute 
permission to occupy property at some other time this year or in any other year." Regina v. Mary Pena, 
Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia. New Westminster Registry 
4
 Switlo, Gustafsen Lake Under Siege, p.93 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 See Report submitted to Gustafsen Lake Defence Team by Valerie Van Clieaf, 26 July 1996. See also 
letter from Janice Switlo LLB to Manuel Azevedo, 10 August 1996, Xerox copy. 
7
 Sergeant Porter's notes, 14 June 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
8
 See Ben Mahony, interview with LiT Wat Elders in "The Case Against the Courts," Terminal City. #203, 
August 1997 
66 
9
 Reasons for Judgement of the Honourable Mr. Justice Josephson. Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry, 30 July 1997, p. 16 
1 0
 Allen, Robert S, His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian policy in the defence of Canada. 1774-1815, 
(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1993) 
1 1
 Steven Frasher, "Is Gustafsen Lake a sacred site? or more?" 100 Mile House Free Press. 28 June 1995 
1 2
 RCMP Sergeant Sarrich's testimony, 14 August 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry. 
1 3
 RCMP Sergeant Sarrich's testimony, 15 August 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
1 4
 See Sergeant Sarrich's testimony, 19 August 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
1 5
 See Ben Mahony, Terminal City, no. 183, 21-27 March 1997, "Whose Land Is it?: Jailhouse Interview 
With Wolverine," See also Splitting the Sky, From Attica to Gustafsen Lake 
1 6
 Sherryl Yeager and Justine Hunter, "Indian rebels plan to 'leave in body bags, '" Vancouver Sun. 22 
August 1995, Page A l 
1 7
 Cited in, Brown, Above the Law 2 
1 8
 Constable Charlie Andrew, Transcript summary of testimony 24 July 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, 
Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry. 
1 9
 Switlo, Gustafsen Lake Under Siege, p.94 
2 0
 Steven Frasher, "Is Gustafsen Lake a Sacred Site? or more?" 100 Mile House Free Press. 
28 June 1995 
2 1
 Notes of Sergeant Ken Porter, 22 June 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
2 2
 Ibid. 
2 3
 See report prepared by Sgt. Porter and Constable R. Wilby under the Direction of Superintendent Len 
Olfert, O/C Kamloops Sub/Division, 22 August 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
2 4
 Constable Wood's notes, 13 June 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, New Westminster Registry. 
2 5
 See speech by Flo Samson, at Simon Fraser University, Harbourfront campus, 18 November 1997, See 
also Shelaugh Franklin, "Sundancers Need Your Support Now," Terminal City. May 1997 and Ben 
Mahony, Telephone interview with Suniva Bronson, 26 February 2001 
2 6
 Constable Wood's notes, 24, 25 June 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, New Westrninster Registry 
2 7
 See Tsilhquot'in National Government, Ts ' Peten: The Standoff At Gustafsen Lake in 1995: As 
Depicted in RCMP Records and Press Reports of the Time. Spring 1997, submitted to Defense lawyer, 
Manuel Azevedo, 29 May 1997, Office of the Deputy National Chief, Tsilhquot'in National Government, 
102-383 Oliver Street, Williams Lake, BC, V26 1M4, Phone 250-392-3918, see also Defenders press 
release, 17 June 1995 
2 8
 Lambertus, Terms of Engagement p. 100 
2 9
 Constable Wood's notes, 24 June 1995 at 1430, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court 
of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
3 0
 Constable Andrew's notes, 20 June 1995 as recorded in "RCMP continuation Report Occurrence No. 95-
528," Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster 
Registry 
3 1
 Constable Findley's notes, 15 July 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
3 2
 Sergeant Sarrich, "Notes of Gustafsen Lake Involvement," disclosed to the Gustafsen Lake Defence 
Team, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster 
Registry 
3 3
 Quote attributed to Ujjal Dosanjh in Paul Chapman, "RCMP on warpath Shot fired at Mountie by 
Natives 'an act of terrorism,'" Vancouver Province. 20 August 1995 
3 4
 Notes of Constable Andrew, 21 June 1995 at 1825, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
3 5
 Bruce Clark, Justice In Paradise, p. 166. See also, Vancouver Sun. 29 August 1995, Final Edition, A l 
67 
3 6
 See transcript of Dale James' testimony, 22 July 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
3 7
 Testimony of Lyle James, 16 July 1995, Regina v. Maiy Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
3 8
 Testimony of Lyle James, 18 July 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
3 9
 Paul Chapman, "RCMP on warpath, Shot fired at Mountie by natives 'an act of terrorism,'" Vancouver 
Province. 20 August, 1995 
4 0
 RCMP continuation Report, Occurrence Number 95-528, 20 June 1995 (Andrew is describing the events 
of 17 June at 1845), Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New 
Westminster Registry 
4 1
 Edited version of RCMP Constable George Findley's notes, 12 July 1995, This conversation is cited in 
full also in Switlo, Gustafsen Lake Under Siege, p. 103 
4 2
 Brown, Above the Law 1 
4 3
 Ibid. 
4 4
 Edited version of RCMP Constable George Findley's notes, 12 July 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket 
X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry. This conversation is also cited 
in full also in Switlo, Gustafsen Lake, p. 103 
4 5
 See Porter's notes, 20 July 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
4 6
 Ts ' Peten Defenders press release, 18 June 1995 
4 7
 Ts ' Peten Defenders press release 19 July 1995, "Defenders of Sacred Shuswap Sundance Grounds 
Preparing for RCMP Assault" 
4 8
 George Wool, summation, 10 July 1997, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
4 9
 George Wool, summation, 10 July 1997, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
50 Notes of RCMP Superintendent Len Olfert, 20 July 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
5 1
 Notes of RCMP Superintendent Len Olfert, 20 July 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
5 2
 See Vancouver Sun. 12 August 1995 
5 3
 See RCMP Sergeant Ken Porter's notes, cited in Tsilhquot'in National Government, Ts' Peten 
5 4
 "Record of Sergeant Sarrich's Involvement at Gustafsen Lake," disclosed to Defence team at Gustafsen 
Lake Trial, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster 
Registry 
5 5
 See Bruce Clark, Justice in Paradise, p. 240, paragraph numbered 3, (extract) from affidavit sworn 8 
September 1998 by Bruce Clark and filed in the legal proceedings Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bruce 
Clark; b) ibid., pp.364-367, (extracts in greater detail) from court transcript of proceedings before the 
Supreme Court, 12 September 1995. Bruce Clark adds: "Please note that the affidavits were not challenged 
as to their truth either by way of cross-examination upon an affidavit or any affidavit in reply denying that 
truth. E-Mail correspondence between Ben Mahony and Bruce Clark, 15 Nov 2000, 23:21:06 
5 6
 The Protesters' press release of 19 July 1995 included the following request: "That every individual 
reading this urgent press release is asked to call the RCMP at (604) 395 2456 and express their concern 
over the potential for violence against the occupants of the Sundance grounds in Shuswap territory. We 
invite all Ts ' Peten Defenders to come to Gustafson Lake and ensure that this Sundance will be held as 
planned to sustain our inheritance and religious freedom. Donations of food, camouflage clothing, radio 
and communications equipment, camping gear, etc. are welcome and appreciated. RELIGIOUS RIGHTS, 
LAND RIGHTS, WATER RIGHTS, FISHING RIGHTS, HUNTING RIGHTS - This is what we stand for. 
The Defenders of the Shuswap Nation" 
5 7
 See Notes of Superintendent Hall, 12 August 1995, See also Holly Horwood, "Cops kept mum as rebels 
called - natives feared skulking men racists: lawyer," Vancouver Province. 28 January 1997, where 
Horwood writes that the court also heard that: " - Porter's notes of 18 August, state: 'Execute the warrant 
ASAP," an apparent reference to police beliefs that a BC Supreme Court order existed authorizing a search 
of the camp. No such order exists. - A preliminary plan written largely by Porter, to assault the camp 25 
68 
August, refers to 'links' between encampment members and 'several shooting incidents.' No direct 
connection has been established between the accused and previous shooting incidents. Justice Bruce 
Josephson cautioned jurors that opinions on earlier violence 'may be misguided or just plain wrong.' 
5 8
 Vancouver Province. 30 August 1995, Final Edition, A6 
5 9
 Constable Charlie Andrew's notes, 18 July 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
6 0
 Ibid. 
6 1
 Carolyn Lewis, "RCMP ready to move on armed native squatters," Edmonton Journal. 20 August 1995, 
Final Edition, A3 
6 2
 See Superintendent Rick Hall's entry in RCMP Continuation Report, 12 August 1995, Regina v. Mary 
Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry: On 12 August, 
RCMP Superintendent Hall noted, "OC [Operations Command] want to go to the media [but] Sgt Sarrich 
disagrees: T oppose this as I see it as setting the stage for grand-standing on the part of the camp. My 
strong belief is that we send in a team to make arrests without word to anyone before hand... We agree to 
disagree with the OC winning but the following day he changes his position and we work towards an 
expanded OPS [operational plan]. '" 
6 3
 Carolyn Lewis, "RCMP ready to move on armed native squatters," Edmonton Journal. 20 August 1995, 
Final Edition, A3 
6 4
 See testimony of RCMP Sergeant Sarrich, 19 August 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, and New Westminster Registry. 
6 5
 See testimony of Constable Raymond P. Wilby, 27 August 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket 
X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
6 6
 Ibid. 
6 7
 Carolyn Lewis, "RCMP ready to move on armed native squatters," Edmonton Journal. 20 August 1995, 
Final Edition, A3 
6 8
 Paul Chapman, "RCMP on Warpath Shot fired at Mountie by natives 'an act of terrorism,'" 
Vancouver Province. 20 August 1995 
6 9
 Paul Chapman, "RCMP on Warpath Shot fired at Mountie by natives 'an act of terrorism,'" 
Vancouver Province. 20 August 1995 
7 0
 Sherryl Yeager and Justine Hunter, "Indian rebels plan to 'leave in body bags, '" Vancouver Sun. 22 
August 1995, A l 
7 1
 In his testimony on 29 August 1996, Wilby, Constable Raymond P. described the weaponry used by the 
Emergency Response Team, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 
New Westminster Registry 
7 2
 Testimony of Constable Andrew, 24 July 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court 
of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
7 3
 Summary of testimony of Sergeant Sarrich, 14 August 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
7 4
 Testimony of Sergeant Ken Porter, 27 January 1996, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
7 5
 See Kamloops Sub'Division Operational Plan, Gustafson Lake. File: 95KL-334 - Kamloops 
Sub/Division, 22 August 1995, Prepared by S/Sgt. K. Porter, Cst. R. Wilby, Under the Direction of Supt. 
Len Olfert, p.5, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New 
Westminster Registry 
7 6
 Notes of Constable Wood at 0730, August 1995, (Date not recorded but seems to be 18 August), Regina 
v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry. 
7 7
 "Police Wanted 4000 Troops at Gustafsen," Vancouver Province. 8 January 1997 
7 8
 Interview with Bob Wood, in Brown, Above the Law 2 
7 9
 George Wool, transcript of his address to the court, 10 July 1997, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket 
X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
8 0
 See Michael Dawson, The Mountie: From Dime Novel to Disney. (Toronto: Behind the Lines, 1998) 
p.25 
8 1
 Interview with Bob Wood, in Brown, Above the Law 2 
8 2
 Brown, Above the Law 2 
8 3
 See Brown, Above the Law 2 
69 
See interview with Aboriginal Peoples Television Network, "Contact," May 2000, See Also, Brown, 
Above the Law 2 
8 5
 See Paul Chapman, "RCMP on warpath, Shot fired at Mountie by natives 'an act of terrorism,'" 
Vancouver Province. 20 August 1995 
8 6
 Paul Chapman, "Shot fired at Mountie by natives 'an act of terrorism,'" Vancouver Province. 20 August 
1995. The fist line of the article reads: "The RCMP declared war yesterday on a heavily armed band of 
natives they say are terrorists." 
8 7
 See Aboriginal Peoples Television Network, "Contact," May 2000 
8 8 Peter Wintonick and Mark Achbar, Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the media. (Montreal: 
Black Rose, 1994) 
8 9
 See also Lambertus, Terms of Engagement, p. 89 
9 0
 See testimony of Sergeant Sarrich, 16 August 1995, Ray Wilby. 27 August 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, 
Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry 
9 1
 See Kamloops Sub'Division Operational Plan, Gustafson Lake. File: 95KL-334 - Kamloops 
Sub/Division, 22 August 1995, Prepared by S/Sgt. K. Porter, Cst. R. Wilby, Under the Direction of Supt. 
Len Olfert, Regina v. Maty Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster 
Registry 
9 2
 Notes Of A/Commissioner Brown, Notes to File, File #: 95KL-334/95E-6812, Sunday 20 August 1995, 
1245, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster 
Registry 
9 3
 Ibid. 
9 4
 See Kamloops Sub'Division Operational Plan, Gustafson Lake. File: 95KL-334 - Kamloops 
Sub/Division, 22 August 1995, Prepared by S/Sgt. K. Porter, Cst. R. Wilby, Under the Direction of Supt. 
Len Olfert, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster 
Registry 
9 5
 RCMP Constable George Findley's notes, 12 July 1995, Regina v. Mary Pena, Docket X043738, 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, New Westminster Registry. This conversation is also cited in full also 
in Switlo, Gustafsen Lake: Under Siege, p. 103 
70 
CHAPTER THREE 
AN AMBUSH REPORT AND MILITARY INTERVENTION: 
"The war's already on, get it over with:1" 
"If the RCMP don't do it, they should bring the military in to clear them out," 
said Daryl Laverdiere of 100 Mile House. "The war's already on, get it over 
with." 
- Comment made during citizen protest during the Gustafsen Lake standoff. 
The RCMP recorded their strategies to quell dissent at Gustafsen Lake in 
operational plans that were disclosed at the Gustafsen Lake trial. This operational plan 
and the revisions that followed as the standoff escalated detail the plan to remove the Ts' 
Peten Defenders in a "ground assault."3 (See appendix 3) The notes of several officers 
also clarify that the RCMP were planning a military assault on the protest camp when the 
RCMP alleged they were ambushed. In this chapter, I present evidence regarding this 
incident in the form of court transcripts and disclosure, video footage, media reports and 
independent forensics analysis. I contrast this evidence with RCMP public statements and 
conclude that RCMP statements made regarding the alleged ambush are insupportable. 
After the RCMP stated publicly, at their 19 August press conference, that the Ts' 
Peten Defenders were "terrorists," the tone of the conflict changed markedly from a 
trespassing dispute to an armed conflict. Native RCMP constables were removed from 
the case and the RCMP drafted an operational plan that outlined their strategy to move on 
the camp with the aid of the military. The rationale for the "ground assault," described in 
their operational plan of 22 August 1995, was that the Ts ' Peten Defenders had initiated 
terrorist activity.4 
On 22 August 1995, RCMP officers drafted an operational plan that alleged that 
the RCMP "have established links between the perpetrators" of "several shooting 
incidents" and "the camp at Gustafson Lake." 5 Specifically, the 11 August 1995 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans weapons seizure and the shot fired at the ERT team 
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on 18 August were referred to as "events [which] confirm the presence of weapons and 
indicate there is at least a small group of terrorists on the site that are prepared to use 
these weapons." 6 Although they still had conducted no comprehensive investigation that 
linked the Ts' Peten Defenders with these alleged aggressive actions, the RCMP stepped 
up their campaign to discredit the Ts' Peten Defenders. Sergeant Peter Montague told the 
press plainly that "This [native protest] is terrorist activity."7 
The efforts of Sergeant Montague and other RCMP officers to control information 
at Gustafsen Lake were captured on RCMP videotapes that the police recorded for the 
purposes of training.8 (See Appendix 4) Excerpts from these controversial videotaped 
recordings were shown to the court where the Ts' Peten Defenders were prosecuted and 
have more recently been shown on national television. The systematic nature of the 
RCMP smear campaign was exposed in the documentary film, Above the Law 2. This 
independently released film was shown on Aboriginal Peoples Television Network 
(APTN) in several broadcasts in May 2000. The film featured several revelatory excerpts 
from the RCMP recordings of the RCMP's own back-room discussions. In one excerpt, 
an officer refers to the command level plan to "profile these hoods [Ts' Peten 
Defenders]... They want to bring discredit out there on these fucking guys; show them 
what they are to the press. And the O.C. is in line with that; they want to do it in a very 
co-ordinated way." 9 In another excerpt from the same meeting, an officer asks, "Is there 
anyone who can help us with a disinformation and smear campaign?" Montague later 
remarks, "Smear Campaigns Are Our Specialty." 1 0 
While police spokespersons worked to discredit the Ts' Peten Defenders, RCMP 
commanders continued to work diligently to secure approval for the use of military 
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hardware from reluctant officials in the upper echelons of the Department of National 
Defence. In the week between the staging of the RCMP press conference on 19 August 
and the alleged ambush of RCMP officers on 27 August, RCMP officers made initially 
futile attempts to secure endorsement for the use of 13-tonne Armoured Personnel 
Carriers from the military for use in their operational plan to move on the camp. The 
operational plan prepared by officers Wilby and Porter on 22 August, under the direction 
of Olfert, outlines the use of military vehicles, although the RCMP had not yet received 
clearance to use them: "At present, the RCMP does not have the resources to safely enter 
the area and enforce the law. To facilitate execution of this warrant the site will be 
secured by Emergency response teams utilizing military Armoured Personnel Carriers." 1 1 
As of 23 August 1995, approval for the use of the Department of Defence 
weaponry had not yet been secured. Intense negotiations ensued as the RCMP and the 
Attorney General tried to convince the military to endorse the use of Department of 
National Defence (DND) forces and equipment. The reluctance of DND officials to 
participate is evident in a communique disclosed at the Gustafsen Lake trial. This 
document carries the stamp of the Chief of Staff and Director General of Military plans 
and operations and demonstrates the reluctance of DND officials to get involved in the 
conflict. The author outlines the need to "Emphasize to Major General Addy that the CF 
[Canadian Forces] does not want to play in BC (that includes loaning vehicles, training 
RCMP drivers unless absolutely necessary.)" In the same document there is a reference to 
a meeting in Regina on 23 August 1995 that notes the participants of this meeting "are 
very aware (Fournier [Deputy Solicitor General]) that CF do not want to participate in 
any way." 1 2 
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In the record of a meeting of 23 August 1995, the potential legal problems 
regarding the RCMP request for military approval are outlined in a document from the 
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. One participant asks if "Military personnel have 'all 
the powers of constables?' Answer. No! There is no framework for this particular request 
approval. We need an order-in council designed to place [sic] that framework. ... CF 
armed assistance - No." 1 3 
Although it was decided on 23 August that an Order-in Council would be required 
to send the military into Gustafsen Lake, that determination changed within two days. 
The situation shifted on 25 August at 2355 when Brown, 
received a call from Deputy Commissioner Beaulac. He is meeting with 
Justice Department, Solicitor General, PCO [Privy Council Office], 
etc., and it was decided an Order in Council is not needed only an 
MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] between us and the military. 
He requested the Attorney General deal with the Solicitor General as he 
is currently going to the Minister of Defence and this is causing 
difficulties. 1 4 
Regarding the use of a low level administrative instrument, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), to turn the military on the Ts' Peten Defenders, Dr. Anthony Hall 
wrote: 
In my estimation the commitment of the country's machinery of 
foreign defense into a conflict within Canada's borders constitutes the 
very high end of the kind of decision that requires very definite and 
clear lines of political accountability. I find it absolutely 
unconscionable, not to mention arguably illegal, for the federal 
government to hand over its instruments of war to Mr. Dosanjh in this 
way [through a Memorandum of Understanding]. This issue alone, I 
believe, is more than enough to justify the need for an independent 
judicial inquiry. 1 5 
While RCMP officers stepped up their campaign to discredit the Ts' Peten 
Defenders and to secure military weaponry to remove them, military officials in 
Edmonton and Ottawa expressed serious doubt about the legalities of the operation, and 
initially, denied the request. More importantly, military commanders speculated that the 
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militancy of the Ts' Peten Defenders was being exaggerated and that the effect of the 
RCMP media strategy was to escalate the dispute. The RCMP operational plan of 22 
August refers to the video of the Ts' Peten Defenders that was shown on CBC television 
on 19 August that "shows armed natives dressed in camouflage clothing some of which 
are carrying assault weapons. The video depicts Splitting the Sky instructing unidentified 
Ts' Peten Defenders in guerrilla warfare." 1 6 
Although the RCMP used the violent images in the video to buttress their claim 
that the Ts' Peten Defenders were preparing for guerrilla warfare, military officials 
downplayed the seriousness of the militant images portrayed. In DND documents 
disclosed at the Ts' Peten Defenders trial, an official concluded, "This was staged for 
media attention." 1 7 
RCMP Assistant Commissioner Brown recorded the reluctance of the military to 
get involved at Gustafsen Lake on 23 August at 1028, when he noted that his 
Commanding Officer [CO] "advised that the military has turned down our request and 
referred to Privy Council Office (PCO)." Although the military had not given consent 
for the use of their Armoured Personnel Carriers, the RCMP pushed forward with their 
plan to use them, according to Brown, who recorded in the same note, "The CO wants to 
have us immediately identify eight people to train to drive the [military] bisons. He also 
wants us to keep track of all newspaper clippings that are being published on this 
affair."19 Less than two hours later, Brown wrote, "Inspector Guy advised that there will 
be training [of] nine of our people at Chilliwack starting tomorrow. The training would 
go on for two to three days. It would be a very intense bare bones training to allow them 
to operate the bison transporters. He further advised Media Relations would collect all the 
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newspaper clippings." (See appendix 2) This quote is significant for two important 
reasons. First, it shows that the RCMP were preparing for the "ground assault" by 
conducting training with Canadian Forces armaments although they had no legal sanction 
to employ them. Secondly, it shows that the RCMP were closely monitoring media 
coverage to maintain control of the imagery and information coming out of the Gustafsen 
Lake confrontation. 
The concerted effort of the RCMP to control the flow of information coming out 
regarding the conflict is underscored in the statement of one officer (captured on the 
RCMP training tape), "I can assure you that we're going to manage information and I 
don't give a shit what the cost is. It's going to be done and if we have to hire people to do 
it.. ." 2 1 The possibility that the RCMP hired, or planned to hire journalists to implement a 
"disinformation and smear campaign" is indicated in another chilling remark that 
foreshadowed the willingness of the RCMP to initiate a lethal assault on the camp: 
Commander Olfert remarks, "What we're doing here is damage control for when people 
have to be killed." 2 2 A note made by Brown indicates that the RCMP media strategy 
regarding "damage control" was architected largely by RCMP media liaison officer 
Sergeant Peter Montague and was later massaged by a media consultant flown in from 
Ottawa. 2 3 It is unclear who paid this consultant and whether it is standard practise for the 
RCMP to hire media experts as part of their policy of "policing by publicity" or the 
employment of "disinformation and smear" techniques. 
The aim of the RCMP seemed to be to simplify the episode into easily 
quantifiable categories where the police were identified as defenders of peace, order and 
private private property while the Ts' Peten Defenders were maligned as criminals. The 
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efforts of various officers to curtail the media from broadcasting the true demands of the 
Ts' Peten Defenders are recorded in the notes of Inspector Bass. He documented RCMP 
attempts to prevent the media from reporting on phone conversations between Native 
negotiators and Wolverine and discussions between Wolverine and RCMP negotiator 
Dennis Ryan. According to Bass, "Dick Smith called and advised that the media had 
intercepted 2 calls - Mercredi/Wolverine, Ryan/Wolverine and were going to report the 
context. Smith requested I contact Crown [state officials] and see if we could stop it." 
As of 23 August, police efforts to discredit the Ts' Peten Defenders and contain 
their efforts to gain the support of Aboriginal communities and the human rights 
community worldwide were proving successful. The Vancouver Sun ran an editorial 
titled, "The Thugs of Gustafsen Lake and our moment of Truth," in which the Ts' Peten 
Defenders were maligned as "thugs" who "are heavily armed, confrontational and 
illegally occupying private property." 2 5 
While the "smear campaign" continued and police action was being planned, the 
Ts' Peten Defenders remained clear in their position that they would leave the camp if an 
audience was arranged with the Queen's representatives in Canada or abroad. On 23 
August, Brown noted that the Ts' Peten Defenders "now wish to speak with the Governor 
General of Canada and no one else." 
A day later, on 24 August, Percy Rosette reiterated the demand for third party 
adjudication in a hand-written letter entered into the Gustafsen lake trial as Exhibit A024: 
The Sch [Shuswap\Secwepemc] people who remain true to the Creator 
and the land of our ancestors seek a peaceful resolution to a [situation] 
which has been going on for 139 years. Domestic laws which we have 
had no hand in signing do not apply here. The legal precedents 
protecting our rights have been heard. We agree to lay down our arms 
(as indigenous peoples) after receiving a gur[antee] of diplomatic 
immunity from prosecution for all members of this camp, and 
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audiences with our rep. Bruce Clark and the Queen's Privy Council and 
Governor General." 2 7 
Although the Ts ' Peten Defenders made their demands clear, the media focussed 
on the wilder conspiracy theories that some members of the camp flirted with. On 24 
August, in a Vancouver Sun article titled, "Rebel Indians fanatics: militants seized by cult 
9 8 
mentality: New World order influence on Natives at Gustafsen Lake" - the Ts' Peten 
Defenders were portrayed as a group of paranoid millenarianists. In this article, the 
hostility of British Columbia state officials to the Ts' Peten Defenders was redoubled by 
the allegation of British Columbia Premier Mike Harcourt that the Ts' Peten Defenders 
were "fanatics" who were "seized with a cult mentality." The report tied the protesters 
directly to "Ottawa conspiracy theorist, Glen Kealey." Harcourt also associated the Ts' 
Peten Defenders' goals of American New World Order extremists and "a belief 
Armageddon will be in the year 2000." 3 0 
On 24 August, a different Vancouver Sun article reported that the "rebels" were 
not interested in negotiating, according to Sergeant Sarrich. 3 1 He characterized the Ts' 
Peten Defenders legal and historical position as an unrealistic stumbling block to the 
negotiation process: "If they were going to be all one-sided and dwell on the Magna 
Carta and the Proclamation of 1763, there was no point in advancing a meeting..." 
News reports, some of which alleged that "the rebels had children in the compound and 
were using them as human shields" 3 3 contributed to intense hostility against the Ts' Peten 
Defenders. The Vancouver Sun article also noted that RCMP had to create a "response to 
the public calls for action [on the protest camp]" 3 4 which indicates that there was 
increasing support for a police assault on the Ts' Peten Defenders. Reports that the Ts' 
Peten Defenders were criminals who used children as human shields further toxified the 
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relationship between the camp and both the media and the police. 
Although Ovide Mercredi did not share the Ts' Peten Defenders' constitutional 
position, several Tribal Council Chiefs in British Columbia requested that he arbitrate the 
dispute. 3 5 He entered the camp several times in the ensuing week. 3 6 As Grand Chief of 
the Assembly of First Nations, Mercredi represented those chiefs who the Ts ' Peten 
Defenders argued had no jurisdiction in untreatied territories. There was a clear divide in 
terms of strategy in achieving the goals of Indigenous self-determination between 
Mercredi and Wolverine. 3 7 While Mercredi focused on domestic solutions to Aboriginal 
rights issues Wolverine sought international channels of arbitration. Wolverine told 
reporters at the camp: "We are talking about accessing the Privy Council and the courts. 
We're not talking about a local issue. 3 8 As such it is not a surprise that Mercredi rejected 
the request of those in the camp that he endorse their application for resolution of the 
standoff through international mechanisms. The Ts' Peten Defenders' appeal for 
international third-party adjudication went over the head of the National Chief and 
invoked truly international methods of arbitration. 
Although the Ts' Peten Defenders made specific legal demands for third-party 
adjudication of the Gustafsen Lake dispute, the press wildly oversimplified their position. 
On 26 August, the Vancouver Sun reported that the protesters demanded that Mercredi 
sign a document "authorizing the lawyer [Bruce Clark] representing armed native rebels 
to argue on behalf of all Canada's aboriginal people." Mercredi emphasized, "The use of 
force and violence has never been condoned by our First Nation Chiefs in our collective 
form" and added that the "Cariboo Tribal Council has condemned the armed group's 
actions." 3 9 Mercredi was portrayed as a representative of the calm and reasonable Natives 
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who were contrasted to the reckless "militants" within the camp. Although his attempts to 
bring the Ts' Peten Defenders out of the camp were not successful, the RCMP kept him 
involved in their efforts to settle the standoff through negotiation. (It is important to note 
that this negotiation strategy was accompanied by an operational plan to invade the camp 
when or if that negotiation process failed.) 
While Mercredi attempted to arbitrate, the RCMP proceeded with their attempt to 
bring the military into the Sundance grounds. On 25 August, according to Brown's notes, 
Dosanjh agreed to write to the Solicitor General and request the use of military 
equipment from the National Defence Minister. 4 0 As events unfolded, Dosanjh came out 
in full support of the RCMP operation 4 1 and became a key political and legal liaison 
between the RCMP and military and state officials. 
Press reports describing the events of 25 August indicate there was an escalation 
of tensions. The Vancouver Sun reported that "RCMP officers began blocking roads to 
the Gustafsen Lake site, which the 30 or so native Indians and their supporters staging the 
occupation have vowed to defend with their lives... RCMP have said they will clear the 
site." 4 2 In public, the RCMP portrayed the Ts' Peten Defenders as obstinate and violent. 
However, their own intelligence sources indicated the Ts' Peten Defenders were actually 
in a defensive posture. For example, in his notes of 25 August at 2045, Olfert reported 
that Mercredi "feels they [the Ts' Peten Defenders] are afraid of the police and really do 
not want to do battle." 4 3 
Despite evidence that the Ts' Peten Defenders were not inclined towards battle, 
the RCMP proceeded to cut off communications to the camp and isolated them from their 
supporters and their lawyer. 4 4 On the same day, Olfert also noted there were still legal 
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and political hurdles to cross before the RCMP could proceed with their plan to remove 
the Ts' Peten Defenders with the aid of the military. Olfert noted that although the BC 
Attorney General and the federal Solicitor General were "on side," [for a plan to remove 
the protesters] on 25 August, "lawyers have cold feet." 4 5 
As events edged towards the report of a violent outburst on 27 August 1995, 
RCMP officers received conflicting messages about their permission to use military 
hardware. On 25 August, Brown noted, "The military have agreed they will drive the 
vehicles that we are requesting." 4 6 In contrast, on the next day, Brown noted that military 
use of the APC's had been put on hold by D N D 4 7 although an "approval in principle had 
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been reached on our request." Brown stated further that "[Solicitor General] Herb Gray 
is going to the P. M. [Prime Minister] and apparently he will sign on behalf of the 
Defence Minister... Military will start to move their equipment very soon." 4 9 According 
to Brown's notes of 26 August 1745, "There is misunderstanding and they have not 
located the Minster of Defense, if we need to move in quickly, Herb Gray would get 
authorization to do ahead." 5 0 
By 2000, the same night (26 August), the military vehicles were under RCMP 
command, although no clear evidence of violence from the Sundance camp had 
been established. Brown wrote, "The military vehicles are under the command of the 
C O . as of 20 00 [26 August] ." 5 1 Further attempts of the RCMP to control the media 
were recorded in the second part of the same entry in Brown's notes: "Peter Montague 
has to tighten up on what he says to the media." 5 2 
Unlike most journalists during the standoff, William Johnson of the Montreal 
Gazette looked seriously at the substance of the legal position advanced by the Ts' Peten 
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Defenders and questioned the logic of the plan to remove the Ts' Peten Defenders by 
force that had been circulating widely. 5 3 On 26 August, he wrote: "Why risk force? Their 
[the Ts' Peten Defenders'] argument is based on law. The Supreme Court of Canada 
refused to hear their case. Could not a solution of restraint be found to settle their claim? 
It is far too soon to reach for the guns." 5 4 Because of the negative reporting regarding the 
Ts' Peten Defenders and their lawyer, Johnson wrote that when he went about contacting 
Clark for an interview he "expected to encounter a nut, a fanatic, someone out of touch" 
but actually found him a "man of intelligence who has researched his subject, thoroughly, 
[and] has come to the startling conclusion that Canada's legal and judicial system with 
respect to Indians is unconstitutional." 5 5 Johnson took the long view towards the standoff 
and the problems which underlined it in another column titled "Lasting solution to Indian 
conflicts will take many years," in which he stated "The settlement which we must 
reach for a just peace in this land will not be written with gun smoke." 5 6 
The tone of Johnson's plaintive plea for "cool heads" and caution on the part of the 
police contrasted with the tone of a vast majority of the mainstream press reports. The 
Vancouver Sun, report of the same day, for instance, mocked the position of the Ts' 
Peten Defenders, ignored their legal position altogether, referred to Wolverine as 
"incoherent," and dismissed the group as a "few fanatics." Similarly, Vancouver Sun 
reporter Elizabeth Aird blamed the Ts' Peten Defenders for their own bad public relations 
and acknowledged that the protesters were being dismissed by the media: "The 
unfortunate consequence of the rebels' garbled message is media coverage just this side 
C O 
of snide and public reaction just short of a smirk." 
When friends and supporters of the protesters saw media coverage of the conflict 
83 
they feared for the worst as they saw the discrepancy between their own view of the issue 
and the "spin" that was broadcast across the nation. On 26 August 1995, a Ts ' Peten 
Defenders support group called Settlers in Support of Indigenous Sovereignty (S.I.S.I.S.) 
posted their side to the story to the Internet. They warned: 
A Canadian Wounded Knee is imminent. The media reports you are 
getting are most likely very distorted. Even CBC, As it Happens, 
usually an exemplary news show, only interviewed the American 
owner of the 18 000 acre ranch, Lyle James, and the BC Attorney 
General. There was NO other view expressed. The attorney for the 
Sundance Defenders, Bruce Clark, was not asked for comment. 
According to the Toronto Globe and Mail, only two firearms have been 
seen at the camp, and "knives and machetes." How many firearms 
would there be at a picnic held anywhere in the interior of British 
Columbia? Knives and machetes? Give me a break. There has been NO 
reference made in the media that I know of, about the sons of Lyle 
James shooting at the encampment several days ago. 5 9 
The Ts' Peten Defenders' fears that an attack was imminent were legitimate in 
light of evidence that emerged at the Gustafsen Lake trial, which demonstrated that the 
RCMP were preparing to invade, even before the allegation of aggression on 27 August. 
According to Brown's notes, on 25 August, at 2355, "Stephen Owen called along with 
Maureen Maloney [and were on] a conference call to the C O . and myself. The C O . gave 
them 2 alternatives - #1 - do nothing, #2 - go in and clean it out." 6 0 The RCMP were 
waiting to see the results of Mercredi's attempt to bring the standoff to a peaceful end 
before they pushed forward with the ground assault on the Ts ' Peten Defenders. 
According to Brown's notes on 27 August at 1124, "The peace consultation process 
would be exhausted when Mercredi says he cannot do anymore... The main issue is can 
Mercredi talk them out, if not, he should leave and we will get on with our operational 
plan." 6 1 
Although he entered the camp several times, Mercredi received an apparently cool 
reception from the Ts' Peten Defenders when he decided not to sign their petition for 
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third-party (international) arbitration of the dispute. Although Mercredi felt he was 
making some progress, he complained that RCMP actions had hampered his efforts to 
convince the Ts' Peten Defenders to surrender. In his notes of a meeting with Dosanjh 
and Superintendent Johnson, Deputy Commissioner J.D. Farell made a note of the 
"allegation by Ovide Mercredi that the RCMP had interfered with his work by cutting of 
[the] communications of [the] natives in compound as well as by over-flying with a 
helicopter." Despite Mercredi's grievances, the RCMP moved forward with their 
planning to assault the camp: Farell writes that the "gist of [this] meeting is that [all] 
agree that we will exhaust all possible negotiating options... Once however, that 
agreement was reached, the ops [operational] plan would be a police issue." 6 4 
Judging by the tone of RCMP meetings on 27 August, the RCMP were preparing 
to take the afore-mentioned option "#2 to - go in and clean it out." 6 5 They had finally 
received endorsement to use DND hardware as outlined in their operational plan and 
seemed poised to meet the demands of the Reform Party and the citizens groups who 
called on the RCMP to move on the camp. At noon on 27 August, Brown emphasized, 
"The military vehicles are under the command of the CO as of 2000 the night before. 
This was given by Major General Addy." 6 6 On 27 August, at 1220, Brown noted that 
"The C O . put on a conference call with Superintendent Olfert. We reviewed the meeting 
with Attorney General this AM. Everyone is on-side..." 
Within three hours of the discussion to move on the camp in what surely would 
have been a controversial move, there was a report that alleged that the Ts' Peten 
Defenders took offensive action against RCMP officers. According to the police, the 
confrontation took place when RCMP officers escorted forestry workers to move trees 
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the natives were falling that were over the road some distance from the camp. At 1515, 
Brown received word that the Ts' Peten Defenders had initiated an attack on these RCMP 
officers: "Attorney General called and advised me [Brown] that BCTV has just reported 
that the officers had been shot at Gustafsen Lake. He wants to get confirmation. At 1520, 
Brown, "Called Insp. Guy he advised that Emergency Health Services have reported that 
two members were shot and that they were wearing bullet proof vests." 6 9 
The Canadian Press account of the incident reported, without qualification that 
"Indian rebels fired a hail of bullets that hit two RCMP officers working near an armed 
camp on private ranchland yesterday." The report did not carry the customary 
qualification "RCMP allege" or "RCMP state" and added to the public perception that the 
Ts' Peten Defenders were escalating the standoff. The report stated "The officers were 
not injured but the shooting escalated a tense and unstable standoff in B.C.'s remote 
interior, dampening hopes for a peaceful resolution." 
The Vancouver Province reported, "The flak jackets they [RCMP officers] were 
wearing protected them from serious injury, or death, when they were each hit by one 
bullet. An RCMP Suburban station wagon was destroyed by what police spokesman Sgt. 
Peter Montague called '"a multitude' of hits from semi-automatic weapons." The 
Vancouver Province quoted RCMP spokesperson Peter Montague who stated, "We were 
ambushed... Our vehicle was severely disabled. All the tires were shot out, all the 
7 1 
windows." 
According to the RCMP, trees that had been felled across the road leading into the 
Sundance site were being cut by forestry workers under RCMP supervision when persons 
from the Defenders' camp opened fire on the police vehicle. To those who accepted the 
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account at face value, the report of an Indian ambush of RCMP officers reinforced the 
public perception that the standoff was a law and order issue and that the Ts' Peten 
Defenders were terrorists as the RCMP alleged. 
A Globe and Mail report on 28 August constructed the Ts' Peten Defenders as the 
perpetrators of violence in their headline, "Mounties Hit in Indian Standoff: Bulletproof 
7 9 
vests save fleeing officers; BC Minister Calls For Surrender Without Amnesty." The 
lead was an unqualified recycling of the RCMP version of the incident: "Two police 
officers were hit by bullets but not injured as a standoff between armed Indians and the 
RCMP erupted into violence yesterday and politicians demanded unconditional 
7"^  
surrender." The mythical image of the fair-minded Mountie - the voice of restraint and 
even generosity - was perpetuated in another excerpt in this article that stated, "The 
shots came just as the Mounties announced they would allow national Native leader 
Ovide Mercredi to return to the rebel camp for a third consecutive day." 7 4 
Although the media stressed the good will of the RCMP who "allowed" Mercredi 
to enter, Mercredi later argued that the RCMP hampered his negotiating efforts by 
double-crossing him and precipitating the shooting incident. Mercredi stated that the 
RCMP sabotaged his negotiating efforts by implementing their tactical plan while he was 
still in the camp. 7 5 According to the notes of Olfert, Mercredi also "expressed the 
concern of the occupants that if they surrendered their weapons they would all be 
killed." 7 6 
The significance of the alleged ambush was summarized by Superintendent Olfert 
who stated, "This is the biggest RCMP operation ever. Sunday [27 August] changed 
everything. 7 7 Accordingly, public support for a lethal raid on the camp was bolstered after 
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the reporting of the ambush. Dosanjh told the press, "The shooting crystallizes in 
everyone's mind this issue is a law-enforcement matter and has nothing to do with 
aboriginal land claims." 7 8 
By repeating derogatory terminology associated with the protest and denying its 
legal credibility, Dosanjh and the RCMP spokespeople cultivated public support for the 
RCMP plan to use military force at Gustafsen Lake. Dosanjh told the Vancouver 
Province, the "RCMP [now] have the mandate to "dislodge these individuals, to end the 
illegal occupation and eliminate any danger to public safety" 7 9 He stated plainly, "RCMP 
have a tactical plan to flush out the rebels." 8 0 
Responding to inquiries from the Vancouver Sun. Dosanjh "refused to comment 
when asked if the army had been called in. [However] Montague denied the army is 
involved."8 1 This quote is significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates the 
willingness of state officials to support the RCMP plan to assault the camp. Secondly, 
based on the overwhelming evidence disclosed at the trial it appears that Sergeant 
Montague lied to the press when he said that the RCMP had not asked for military 
support. For example, the operational plan 8 2 drafted on 22 August, (See Appendix 2) 
clearly outlined the intent to use the military. A formal request was made for the use of 
military hardware on 25 August by Dosanjh (See Appendix 5) three days before the 
Vancouver Sun carried Montague's denial. Moreover, the military was in nearby 
Kamloops waiting final orders, where they could not be detected for several days before 
Montague's claim that the military were not involved." 8 3 As Jeff Lee wrote after he 
secured information "contained in secret documents declassified and released to the 
newspaper, [Vancouver Sun] by the department of national defence under Access to 
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Information laws, 'By August 21, [almost a week before Montague's denial of military 
involvement] the military had created Operation Wallaby, was gathering intelligence 
daily for briefings to Ottawa and had begun a plan to use search-and-rescue-marked 
Buffalo aircraft to secretly airlift Bison crews in from Alberta. '" 8 4 
Regarding the reportage of the alleged ambush, important facts were missing from 
most media reports of what was portrayed as an unprecipitated outburst from the 
Sundance camp. Important contextual facts missing from most media reports are as 
follows: there was no warning when the RCMP officers approached the camp; the RCMP 
had cut off the phone line to the camp; the Defenders, according to RCMP notes, were 
living in fear of an RCMP invasion on the camp and had stated plainly that they would 
use force to resist such an attack. On the basis of these facts, established by RCMP's 
officers notes, it can be argued that the RCMP actually initiated the incident by 
approaching the protesters while they were felling trees near the camp. Although the 
RCMP allege that the instigators of the violence of 27 August were the Ts' Peten 
Defenders, it is clear that the RCMP were preparing for a ground assault on the camp. It 
is also important to bear in mind the aforementioned comment recorded by Olfert that 
"They [the Ts' Peten Defenders] are afraid of the police and really do not want to do 
battle." 8 5 
More importantly, at the trial of the Ts' Peten Defenders, the RCMP could not 
substantiate their story of an ambush. There are several inconsistencies between the 
RCMP accounts of the incident and the evidence that emerged. First, although RCMP 
forensics analysis determined that some of the damage done to the RCMP suburban was 
done by a 9mm bullet, no 9mm handgun was ever found in the camp. 8 6 Moreover, 
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although the RCMP had twenty-four hour surveillance capabilities and shot "wescam" 
video footage on a daily basis, there is no video record of the ambush. 
When questioned about the blank section of the "wescam" footage that could have 
recorded verifiable proof of the RCMP account of the "ambush," Montague lamented that 
the equipment had malfunctioned and called the allegation that the ambush story was 
fabricated, "preposterous." Montague emphasized the honesty and up-standing family 
8 7 
values of Officer Molendyk, the target of the alleged Indian ambush, who some of the 
Ts' Peten Defenders had accused of fabricating the incident. 
Many of the Defenders assert that based on the evidence available, the RCMP 
shot the vests themselves. Defense lawyer Manuel Azevedo stated that after the trial 
ended it was still not clear what happened on 27 August. Although RCMP officers 
alleged they were under fire from several different locations during the ambush, in his 
"Will Say" statement submitted to at the Gustafsen Lake trial, Constable Lome C lei land 
said, "He did not see any person[s] firing at them." 9 0 Speculation that the ambush story 
was "concocted" increased when trial observers closely examined the fantastic story told 
by Officers Clelland and Molendyk of the alleged ambush: One officer claimed he threw 
the indicting evidence - the bullet that allegedly hit him - out the window in the heat of 
the moment. Constable Clelland testified that shots were coming at him so fast he could 
not turn his vehicle around. The RCMP account of the incident is fantastic and somewhat 
unlikely. The behaviour of the alleged RCMP victims is illogical. The driver of an RCMP 
suburban is alleged to have driven backwards for several hundred metres 9 1 down a 
narrow road while shooting out both the driver's side window as well as the passenger 
window such that he was firing across the body of his colleague. Meanwhile, he alleged 
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they took rounds of ammunition from both sides. 
According to a forensics analysis report done by one of the Ts' Peten Defenders 
supporters during the Gustafsen Lake trial, "Not only would it require super-heroic 
dexterity to achieve but, M-16's eject spent casings to the right. That would mean plenty 
of hot casings flying around the cab of the vehicle in close proximity to Molendyk's head 
or face." 
The report went on further to state: 
No real investigation was done, nor conclusions reached. There was no 
critical analysis nor any pathology reports to analyse. No attempt was 
made to identify the spent rounds recovered from the vehicle, or to 
identify the weapons, which fired them. There were a number of rifles 
recovered from the camp, but they were neither tested nor 
fingerprinted... The examination was severely compromised by an 
unusual press conference. Only six hours after recovering the vehicle, 
[several days later] Media Liaison Officer, Cpl. John Ward hosted 
members of the media at the garage where the examination had just 
begun. Dust and debris were wiped off the vehicle for the press 
conference, presumably to make the bullet strikes more discernable for 
the cameras. This is not proper forensic procedure. It is not even proper 
police procedure - releasing unconfirmed information about a violent 
crime before an investigation has even begun. 9 2 
The report concludes with the statement, "There is no evidence supporting the 
RCMP's claim that the Sovereigntist's ambushed the officers in the Suburban, but there 
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is much material and circumstantial evidence pointing to a shoddy RCMP frame-up." 
The Defenders claim that the RCMP account of an "Indian ambush" was wildly 
exaggerated although they did admit to returning fire. 9 4 What is clear is that there are 
discrepancies between what the RCMP told the press and what the evidence supports. 
The likelihood that the RCMP could have instigated aggression on 27 August, as the Ts' 
Peten Defenders alleged, is supported by the indication in RCMP Inspector Moulton's 
notes on the day of the ambush that one or more of the Ts' Peten Defenders are "to be 
shot on sight." 9 5 Moreover, there is clear evidence that the RCMP were engaged in a 
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smear campaign against the Ts' Peten Defenders in video-taped discussions that were 
recorded during their backroom planning discussions. The comment, "How you want to 
massage that is totally up to you" 9 6 is consistent with the tone of other RCMP discussions 
captured on video which show RCMP manipulating information. 
It is clear from viewing video-tape of RCMP discussions at Gustafsen Lake that 
the RCMP took great liberties in explaining the particulars of the alleged ambush to the 
public. An excerpt from the RCMP training tape casts doubt on the RCMP account of the 
incident. A conversation between Media Liaison Officer Sgt. Peter Montague and an 
unidentified man on the evening of the alleged ambush depicts Montague appearing 
concerned that the forestry workers who were near the ambush site might talk to the press 
about aspects of the incident that conflict with the RCMP version. Montague is portrayed 
as fearful that the forestry workers who witnessed the incident are: 
... gonna put out like a news to their employees to discuss which 
employees were in there and what had happened and it would hit the 
media you know. 
Unknown: Oh yeah, their families... 
Montague: Yeah, but I think that if any type of that information gets 
out there people... in other words, if they become available to the media 
they may say things there that we wouldn't want out. 
Other: Yeah, cause they're just gonna set their people... they'll be 
barraged, you know, with calls and eh... and yeah, you know they're 
gonna start commenting on our people, our equipment, what they're 
seeing, what they heard... cause... Jesus! 9 7 
At a meeting held at Kamloops, Sub/Division Headquarters, and the day after the 
ambush was reported to the press, RCMP officers discussed co-ordinating an inter-
provincial effort to control information regarding their activities at Gustafsen Lake: 
The shooting on Sunday was an incredible lesson to be learned by 
everyone of what importance it is to increase our communication. We 
must develop a strategy, which encompasses all western Canada 
uniformed members. This must be done on an intelligence-sharing 
basis. We can't tell anyone when "D" Day is... We need a media 
strategy developed. We need to have the public's understanding based 
on feedback. 9 8 
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The two main issues of concern implicit in this discussion were controlling the 
media to placate the public, "based on feedback," and secret planning for an attack on 
the camp on " ' D ' day." 
What is most significant about the alleged ambush is that evidence collected by 
the police was so weak that they laid no charges stemming from the incident. The RCMP 
had ample opportunity to establish such a link between the ammunition that struck the 
bullet-ridden vehicle they showed to the press gallery and the camp. The fact that the 
RCMP alleged that damage to the Suburban was done in part by 9mm ammunition" 
corroborates the hypothesis that the RCMP fabricated evidence by shooting at the 
Suburban as the officers involved in the shooting carried 9 mm weapons. Moreover, no 
forensics evidence linked members of the camp to the shooting and Constable Clelland 
"did not see any person firing at them." 1 0 0 
As Splitting the Sky wrote, 
During the trial the Crown produced a forensics expert who states that 
the holes in the suburban had to be produced by a 9mm calibre shell. 
Evidence produced in court of the alleged guns used by occupants 
totalled 17 hunting rifles and one A-K47 converted to single shot. 
Molendyk and Clelland had fully automatic weapons. An M16, which 
used a .233 calibre bullet [like the one that damaged the RCMP 
vehicle] and an MP5 sub-machine gun which uses a 9mm calibre [like 
the ones that the RCMP alleged were shot at them] found in a clip that 
holds 30 shells. 1 0 1 
Although most reporters recycled the RCMP account of the ambush as fact, 
William Johnson, of the Montreal Gazette questioned the story from the start. In his 
column, "Report of 'ambush' in 'Hail of Bullets' Just Doesn't Stand up," Johnson 
observed that the accounts of the so-called ambush in the Ottawa Citizen and the Globe 
and Mail were "vivid" but that he had his doubts about the one-sided reportage: 
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Something, perhaps my grey hair, tells me that the story of an 
"ambush" in a "hail of bullets" fired by semi-automatic weapons 
doesn't stand up. When an ambush involves crossfire from two sides on 
unsuspecting targets the story told by the Mounties - one would expect 
that someone would get hurt. If there is no wounded Mountie to 
photograph and show the pictures of, if there is no bullet-tom clothing 
to hold up at a press conference, I begin to sense that there is more or 
less to the "ambush" story than what reporters so confidently 
reported. 1 0 2 
"Professionalism would have required that the reporters add, 'According to an 
RCMP official,'" said Johnson. "Here you have a confrontation, a war of nerves, a 
propaganda campaign in a remote area of British Columbia. Reporters should not take 
sides and decide who is right." 1 0 3 
The co-operation of the some media with the police is evident in an episode 
described in a transcript of the RCMP video log of 27 August at 700: "[A journalist] 
George Garret is playing a taped interview with Bruce Clark for police briefing. Garret 
states he will hold back release of the news until the police give their OK - unless he is 
scooped by other media." 1 0 4 Garret later concluded that the RCMP were using him in an 
attempt to discredit Clark. Garret stated: "I later found out... that it was Mike's [Dr. 
Webster's] psychology to involve Clark - to have him go in - and they anticipated that he 
would come out with guns blazing, so to speak - that he would be an antagonist. What 
they wanted to do was let Clark self-destruct.. . " l 0 5 
After the reports of the ambush hit the mainstream media, public support for the 
RCMP to remove the "thugs" at Gustafsen Lake increased. The Attorney General who 
endorsed the use of military weaponry styled both Mercredi and himself as calm and 
moderate and praised Mercredi for his condemnation of the "ambush." According to the 
Vancouver Sun. Mercredi stated, "The fact that two police officers were shot at is a 
criminal act. It is an act of attempted murder." 1 0 6 Dosanjh contrasted Mercredi's approach 
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with the recklessness of the Ts' Peten Defenders and stated that although "he appreciated 
Mr. Mercredi's efforts, he doubted the holdouts would listen to him any more than they 
would to a non-native." 1 0 7 
Although a few close observers were aware of the already-existing enmity 
between traditional elements like the Ts' Peten Defenders and the Indian Act Chiefs who 
Mercredi represented, the lack of widespread knowledge of this fact alienated the Ts' 
Peten Defenders from popular support. The image of Mercredi - a Native leader who was 
viewed by some federal politicians as too radical to work with - condemning the "rebels" 
was a powerful image that likely stirred up popular opinion against the Ts' Peten 
Defenders. 
In direct contrast to the increasing tide of public support for the RCMP, the 
Union of BC Indian Chiefs issued a statement on 28 August 1995, that alleged the Ts' 
Peten Defenders were victims of state-sanctioned violence and propaganda: 
.. .The RCMP, the Attorney General and the media have gone to great 
lengths to discredit the Shuswap Ts ' Peten Defenders and their 
supporters at Gustafsen Lake as dangerous fanatics in order to justify 
the use of armed force to remove them from the Sundance grounds... In 
trying to discredit and isolate the Ts ' Peten Defenders, the RCMP and 
Attorney General are laying the groundwork for bloodshed-needless 
bloodshed. The positions expressed by the Ts' Peten Defenders on their 
nation's sovereignty and aboriginal title are not 'extremist.' They are 
shared by many Indian peoples across this province. British Columbia 
is unceded Indian land... Our peoples demand justice and recognition 
but whenever they stand up for their rights they are subjected to the rule 
of law and police state tactics. 1 0 8 
A letter of support was also written by former US Attorney General and well-
known human rights advocate, Ramsey Clark who wrote to Dosanjh: 
to urge you [him] to pursue non-violent means of addressing the issues 
raised by the present confrontation... There is no justification for the 
use of force, or for conduct by law enforcement that might provoke 
violence. The emotionalized state of mind of all involved is clear. With 
the RCMP calling the Indians "thugs" and "terrorists" and promising 
force, the risk they will employ excessive, deadly force, causing 
bloodshed and loss of lives is overwhelming unless restraint is 
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ordered... I urge you to act immediately to defuse a dangerous situation, 
to begin dialogue and to seek arbitration of all issues perhaps by an 
independent and impartial panel compromised of no Canadians and no 
Indians. 1 0 9 
Ramsey Clark recommended that a third-party dispute mechanism, like the one Clark 
argued was legally required, be created to settle the underlying title dispute at Gustafsen 
Lake. Ramsey Clark also appealed to Dosanjh and the RCMP to use restraint. In contrast, 
Dosanjh chose to manufacture consent for a lethal raid on the camp by discrediting the 
protest. 
The efforts of the RCMP and the state were so successful in cultivating hostility 
to the protesters that citizens gathered to demonstrate their condemnation of the 
Sundancers and to issue their support for a raid on the Sundance camp. Popular opinion 
can be gauged by the reaction of citizens who protested near the road into the Sundance 
grounds. Some of these protesters endorsed an RCMP operation to remove the Ts' Peten 
Defenders by force, even if it resulted in loss of life. One protester told the Vancouver 
Sun, the "chance that someone might get killed shouldn't stop the RCMP from storming 
it. The war's already on, get it over with" 1 1 0 The report emphasized that there was 
strident support for an RCMP invasion on the Sundance camp: "Trucks and cars 
responded to the placard that read 'Honk If You Support the RCMP. '" One of the 
protesters demanded to know why the RCMP had not moved in on the camp yet and 
arrested the protesters. 1 1 1 
Three days after the reporting of the "ambush," the Ts' Peten Defenders formally 
stated their allegation that the ambush was fabricated. On 31 August, the Vancouver Sun 
reported, "Police allowed Clark into the camp hoping he'd broker a peace plan. Instead 
he came out after several hours of talks armed with an explosive affidavit from Tronde 
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Halle, a freelance camera operator who's been staying in the camp... Halle's affidavit 
charges 'persons unknown' with firing warning shots into the air and says there was 'fire 
from the police directly at persons from said Indian encampment.' He said "return fire 
was directed at the police." 
Clark held up a .223 shell casing at the press conference where he read out Halle's 
affidavit which stated that, "There is no weapon at the Gustafsen Lake Indian 
encampment that is capable of firing a .223 shell ." 1 1 3 Clark also said he thought he had 
helped negotiations "by making available to the public the other side of the story." 1 1 4 
In court, Clark elaborated on his discussion with the Ts' Peten Defenders inside 
the encampment regarding the "ambush." He described the Ts' Peten Defenders' 
disbelief when he told them it had been reported that they ambushed RCMP officers. 
Clark testified that later at court he was shocked at the laughter he heard as the Ts' Peten 
Defenders joked about the absurdity of the RCMP account. 
... I expressed a concern about this ambush business because it was so 
prevalent in the national media... it seemed so dramatically 
inconsistent with John Stevens' instruction... their reaction was to 
laugh. They found this very funny, and 1 was taken back by that 
reaction... And they basically started chipping in and telling me, "It 
didn't happen. You've been conned, man" and they started just 
explaining to me. . . that it was a set-up, that as far as they were 
concerned, they heard about it. The first knowledge they had was when 
they heard it in the media... they had this newspaper article - which, as 
you will have seen, this is Exhibit C to that affidavit, and which the 
newspaper report says (reading) RCMP on the warpath and the Indians 
are terrorists. 
And they explained to me that they get this article, and all the stuff 
they're listening from, the media basically is communicating to them a 
situation where the RCMP is going to kill them. They feel they are 
going to be murdered and that this - their - their death, which they 
seem prepared to face, - I mean, not "seem prepared," are definitely 
prepared to face. And so they - to support their position in explaining 
to me, they say, "We have a tape of - of what happened that day..." and 
Mr. Halle has his camera, and apparently he has videotaped some of the 
events. And basically what - what they - what they - what they 
indicate, that this tape will demonstrate to me is that they're nowhere 
near the road where this so-called ambush took place, that these events 
are right in the periphery or their encampment, and they're not going 
anywhere, that there's a huge amount of gunfire coming at them, and 
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the idea that they're running through the bush and ambushing, it's just 
completely absurd to them. They say, "If you look at this tape, what 
you'll basically see is we fire warning shots, as we always do, we get 
met with a complete barrage, a hail of bullets, and we fire warning 
shots back just to let them know that we're still here ." 1 1 5 
The Ts' Peten Defenders alleged that they were forced into a self-defensive but 
armed position because they had information that the RCMP were planning a raid on the 
camp. One of the reports where the RCMP allege that the Natives are "terrorists" was 
reportedly monitored on radio by the Ts' Peten Defenders and it convinced them that they 
were the target of an imminent police invasion. According to Clark, "The RCMP 
'declaration of war' was heard at the camp a few days before the exchanges of gunfire he 
had described." 1 1 6 In this context it is not surprising that gunfire erupted when the RCMP 
came close to the Sundance camp to remove the trees that the Defenders had felled on the 
morning of 27 August. 
Chief Mercredi, although he rebuked the Ts' Peten Defenders for taking up arms, 
argued that the RCMP should have heeded his advice and kept their distance from the Ts' 
Peten Defenders. Mercredi stated, "Our assessment that violence would occur if police 
advanced on the camp was correct. Violence has occurred."" 7 Mercredi also stated that 
the police felt pressured to move forward with an invasion. It would appear that the 
RCMP were so successful in manufacturing consent 1 1 8 for a police assault on the camp 
that there was public demand for a move on the camp. Mercredi identified that hostility to 
the Ts' Peten Defenders in the non-Native community motivated the RCMP plan to 
invade the Sundance grounds: "They told me [Mercredi] that they have to go ahead for 
two reasons - one, they don't want to set a precedent. And two, they are saying white 
public opinion demands i t ."" 9 
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Attorney General Dosanjh denied that there were any extenuating circumstances 
to the report of shots fired from the Sundance camp and continued to discredit the Ts' 
Peten Defenders, over-simplify the evidence, and recycle RCMP accounts of Native 
aggression. In response to those who stated, after the standoff, that the media had 
provided a one-sided account of the standoff that relied on police sources, he responded, 
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"There is no other side to this story. There is only one side to this story." Dosanjh 
spoke as if conclusive evidence had been established regarding the aggressions from the 
Sundance camp. He referred to the self-declared Defenders as "those who occupy 
illegally private land and then shoot at police officers at sight and hunt them and actually 
aggressively pursue them to k i l l . " 1 2 1 Dosanjh endeared himself to growing anti-Native 
sentiment that ran rampant during the standoff by stating, "Its not part of the Aboriginal 
rights to pick up AK 47s and start shooting at police officers." 1 2 2 Dosanjh positioned 
himself to the public as the protector of "innocent people who might inadvertently enter 
the area and be shot a t . " 1 2 3 He also misrepresented the situation by stating, "We 
[Dosanjh and the RCMP negotiators] have bent over backwards to solve this 
peacefully." 1 2 4 
It is likely that Dosanjh, as Attorney General and the Chief Law Officer of British 
Columbia contravened the principles of due process by categorically stating that the Ts' 
Peten Defenders had illegally occupied private land and had attempted murder at 
Gustafsen Lake. He essentially pronounced the protesters guilty before they had the 
opportunity to state their case in court. Moreover, the substance of his accusations (that 
were phrased as pronouncements of guilt) have been flatly contradicted by evidence that 
it was the RCMP who used excessive force at Gustafsen Lake. 
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The heavy-handed attempts of the RCMP to control information that emanated 
from Gustafsen Lake continued as the standoff escalated and were accompanied by 
similar measures from military officers. On 31 August 1995, at 0840, Brown noted, "The 
C O . advised that he spoke to Major General Addie [sic] who told him the Chilliwack 
Times is going to run an article about the APC's we have staged at Kamloops. Major 
General Addie has instructed the Acting Base Commander at Chilliwack to approach the 
editor of The Times and have him kill the story as it would put lives in jeopardy." 1 2 5 
The criticisms made by the Caribou Tribal Council early in the standoff created a 
virtual closed loop of public condemnation outside of which the Ts' Peten Defenders 
tried, unsuccessfully, to articulate their constitutional position and their fear of an 
invasion. Even politicians who were not viewed as traditional allies of Native people 
were able to point to the rejection of the protest by the Caribou Tribal Council as 
evidence that the protest was an unprincipled terrorist action. Fraser Valley East Reform 
MP Chuck Strahl stated, after the 27 August alleged ambush, "Let's call a spade a spade. 
These people have no support from the Cariboo Tribal Council and certainly no support 
from those involved in any treaty negotiation. They are cowardly thugs, pure and simple, 
and should be reacted accordingly." 1 2 6 
The paranoia in the camp should be seen in the context of the very real hatred that 
was articulated in public debate and also in the context of the wide discrepancy between 
what the RCMP were reporting and what evidence currently available shows was 
happening on the ground. 
Because the media reported, often without qualification that, RCMP officers were 
ambushed and shot in the back and that Mercredi condemned the shooting, support for 
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the Ts' Peten Defenders did not materialize. The uncritical reports of a Native ambush 
were too much for even the most liberal leaning citizens, especially when accompanied 
by Mercredi's denunciation. Dosanjh inflamed public sentiment with the statement that 
127 
"Political negotiations are no longer an option." 
The ambush report gave the reactionary elements in British Columbia 
communities ammunition with which to attack the so-called "rebels" and forced Mercredi 
to choose sides in a standoff that became characterized as a serious armed confrontation, 
not an issue of Aboriginal rights. Public opposition to the Ts' Peten Defenders, especially 
in central British Columbia, was evident is the comment of community representatives 
such as John Morrison of the BC Cattleman's Association who dismissed the Ts' Peten 
1 
Defenders as "an aggressive, taunting, armed group of militants." As Ovide Mercredi 
stated, the RCMP emphasized that hostility to the Ts' Peten Defenders in the non-Native 
community led to pressure to invade the Sundance c a m p . 1 2 9 
Shortly after the alleged ambush incident, RCMP officers appear on their training 
tape, deeply disgusted with Bruce Clark for undermining the account given by the RCMP 
to the media. Clark had been expected to lead the campers out but emerged with evidence 
that the RCMP had instigated the shooting on 27 August. Bruce Clark was disliked so 
intensely that RCMP Sergeant Dennis Ryan stated that Superintendent Len Olfert wanted 
to "Kill this Clark and smear the prick and everyone with h i m . " 1 3 0 (After the statement 
became public in 1997, during the Gustafsen Lake trial, Olfert claimed there were 
extenuating circumstances but did not deny making the statement.) 
As the Battle of Gustafsen Lake escalated towards the report of more violence 
on 4 September, the RCMP took the media spotlight by showing evidence of alleged 
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Native aggression while the Sundance camp remained sealed off behind police lines with 
no access to the outside world and with little opportunity to tell their side to the story. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RCMP ALLEGE A SECOND ATTACK: 
"There is a small group, 6 warriors, that will not give up -
it will require the killing of the hard-liners:"1 
On 5 September 1995, the RCMP alleged publicly that they were pursued and 
shot at by the Ts' Defenders on the previous night. Pertinent evidence regarding this 
incident was disclosed at the Gustafsen Lake trial in the form of the minutes from RCMP 
officers meetings, RCMP operational plans, officer's notebooks, communications 
between RCMP commanders, state officials and military officials and a revelatory RCMP 
forensics report. The record of continued requests for the intervention of the Department 
of National Defence is of particular importance because this request was premised upon 
an allegation that the Defenders shot at RCMP officers that is contradicted by subsequent 
forensics analysis. These documents demonstrate that between 27 August and 6 
September the RCMP continued to use "disinformation and smear" techniques. 
In this chapter, I shall explore trial evidence that demonstrates that the RCMP 
account of the shooting on 4 September 1995 was false and that the RCMP forwarded an 
erroneous account of this incident to both the military and the press. 
A week after the report of the 27 August ambush, the RCMP displayed a bullet-
ridden vehicle to the press that they alleged had been damaged by gunfire from the 
Sundance camp during the "ambush" a week earlier. The press conference functioned to 
counteract criticism that had come from Montreal Gazette columnist William Johnson, 
who questioned the Mounties' account of the ambush, in part because the police had not 
collected physical evidence to show that they were victims of hostile fire.2 (Johnson's 
critical comments on the RCMP's actions were carried in several newspapers across 
Canada.) 
After the alleged ambush on 27 August, the demonization of the Ts' Peten 
Defenders in the press continued while the RCMP pushed for endorsement from the 
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military for the use of its armoured personnel carriers, for more aggressive purposes. 
Eventually, the RCMP requested the use of military APC's not only for escorting officers 
but also for patrolling around the camp. 3 As outlined earlier, there is overwhelming 
evidence that the ambush of 27 August 1995 was concocted by the RCMP. This evidence 
was not available to most Canadians, even those who questioned the RCMP account. 
When the RCMP showed the bullet-ridden vehicle to the media, they hoped to lend 
credence to their request for further military assistance. At this press conference, the 
RCMP made an impressive display to the media of the "shot-up, unmarked RCMP 
vehicle'" two police officers were allegedly forced to abandon after being fired upon nine 
days previously at Gustafsen Lake." 4 The article that described this evidence of the 
"Indian ambush," in the Vancouver Sun reported that "another major development," "was 
the end of relations between RCMP and the native Indians' lawyer Bruce Clark." 5 
In the three days that followed the alleged ambush, (before he entered the camp 
and emerged with a controversial affidavit) the RCMP included Clark in their negotiating 
efforts. Clark hoped that if the Ts' Peten Defenders constitutional demands were sent 
directly to the Queen's representative, the Governor General, the core jurisdictional issue 
could be addressed. The RCMP operational plan for 31 August, however, did not identify 
the jurisdiction issue as a factor and simply outlined the design to effect the surrender and 
arrest of the Ts' Peten Defenders with the help of Clark: "This surrender option hinges 
upon the intercession of Mr. Bruce Clark who is presently acting as an intermediary for 
the subjects, to firstly [sic] convince them to surrender and secondly, to assist in their safe 
and orderly removal and arrest."'" 
Clark claimed the RCMP betrayed him because they submitted his letter regarding 
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the camp's demands for third-party adjudication to the provincial Attorney General, who 
rejected it, instead of submitting it to the Governor General as per his agreement with the 
RCMP. 7 In refusing the Ts' Peten Defenders' request for third party adjudication as per 
the 1704 Mohegan decision, Dosanjh failed to honour the Crown's fiduciary 
responsibility to Aboriginal peoples. Although his rejection of the Ts' Peten Defenders' 
demands helped Dosanjh gain popularity, legally speaking, his actions contravened the 
constitutional principles the protesters' outlined. 
After their disagreement over the submission of the protesters' demand the police 
publicly denounced Clark. Sergeant Montague said the RCMP "will no longer have 
anything to do with him" and described Clark's contribution to negotiations as "zero." 8 
Montague's vociferous denunciation of Clark is not surprising as this harsh 
condemnation came four days after Clark failed to convince the Ts' Peten Defenders to 
exit the camp with him. Instead, Clark accused the RCMP of broadcasting 
misinformation regarding the shooting incident of 27 August, when he came out of the 
Sundance camp with an affidavit that alleged the RCMP had shot first. 
Montague told the press "We expected him [Clark] to go in there and accomplish 
a peaceful negotiation. Instead he came out with what he came out with [the allegation 
that the police had started the shooting on 27 August]." 9 Clark was soon singled out for 
police retribution and was denounced as a "prick" by the RCMP in training footage 
captured in Above the Law 2. In a back room meeting, RCMP officers decided that it 
would be a "good strategy" to "kill this Clark" 1 0 A fellow officer concurs by calling this 
"a good tactic." 1 1 The media complied by maligning Clark while praising the patience 
and temperance of the RCMP, who were presented as if they ignored opportunities to 
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shoot at aggressive militants. Few reporters or pundits questioned the notion that Clark 
and his Native clients were extremists. 
The attempts to discredit Clark in the media and the personal threats made by the 
RCMP are a powerful example of the negative coverage that is afforded to those who 
oppose the RCMP and challenge the larger bedrock ideological assumptions that give the 
governments and the police political and legal power and legitimacy. Clark was maligned 
after he provided legal analysis which undermined provincial and national jurisdiction in 
most of British Columbia and also after he contradicted RCMP accounts of an "Indian 
ambush." 
After Clark left the Sundance camp, tensions between the Ts ' Peten Defenders 
and the RCMP ran high. Wolverine maintained that the Ts' Peten Defenders had 
constitutional law on their side while the RCMP discussed whether to abandon 
negotiations and proceed with an assault on the camp. Two males who walked out of the 
camp on 30 August told RCMP officers who interviewed them, "Camp occupants are 
1 -y 
worried about an attack, they are almost paranoid about the [RCMP] helicopter." They 
also contradicted the claim that surfaced several times throughout the standoff that the 
Ts' Peten Defenders were holding hostages and stated, "Camp occupants are altogether. 
No dissension. Anyone who wants to leave is free to go." 1 3 Although the RCMP had 
information that the Ts ' Peten Defenders were in a paranoid and defensive posture, 
commanders appeared to be preparing for a lethal assault on the camp, according to the 
notes of RCMP Chief Superintendent Murray Johnston. He noted, "Len [Olfert] strongly 
feels that there is a small group, 6 warriors, that will not give up - it will require the 
killing of the hard-liners." 1 4 
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As the RCMP prepared for the possible "killing of the hard-liners," they tightened 
the perimeter around the camp, and proceeded with their plan of containment. On 1 
September 1995, officers installed trip-wire and stationed several heavily armed 
Emergency Response Teams close to the camp. The "ERT Operational Plan" of 1 
September described the plan to "insert ERT and support personnel by helicopter" and 
"to ensure this road [near the Sundance camp] is impassable by subjects inside the 
camp." The aim was to contain the Ts' Peten Defenders by cutting down several large 
trees just outside the Sundance camp. After felling trees, the RCMP used an advanced 
technological device described as a "perimeter security alarm" on "the encampment side 
of the barricade." The RCMP operational plan also outlined the use of "sensor/early-
warning devices" and mentioned that "aerial observation support will be provided by 
Wescam during the entire operation." 1 5 (See appendix 7) According to the notes of 
Sergeant Gates, on 2 September, the "Strategy of containment [was] under way" that 
included the use of trip wire and "1000 rounds Ml 6 tracer ammo." 1 6 
The security perimeter that the RCMP laid around the Sundance camp was 
prepared with the help of military officers, including Sergeant Mike Schlueter. After the 
standoff, Schlueter pressed a three million dollar law suit against the federal government 
because one of the explosives he handled near this security perimeter blew off part of his 
hand. Schlueter asserted that he wasn't told the grenades' charges were halved from the 
normal 3.5 seconds. Therefore, when he tried to set up a trip-wire, the grenade blew off 
part of his right hand. He required a graft using skin from his left arm. 
In a telephone interview in January 2000, Schlueter emphasized that carelessness 
and anxiety in the military force that surrounded the Sundance camp could easily have 
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resulted in death. Schlueter described one incident he referred to as a "mad minute," a 
reference to episodes where American soldiers in Vietnam became unhinged and engaged 
in reckless and aggressive behaviour. While patrolling around the camp, soldiers 
panicked and fired indiscriminately in 360-degree circles while he screamed at them to 
hold fire. Schlueter cited lack of training as the cause for the reckless and dangerous 
behaviour of these soldiers, many of whom were inserted into what they were told was a 
dangerous terrorist situation with little psychological preparation or proper military 
training. 1 7 He said that many soldiers were given less than a half hour of training before 
they were sent into a "guerrilla operation." 1 8 In a statement given in November 1995, 
Schlueter also said that the possibility that the reckless behaviour of poorly trained 
officers caused "friendly fire," (the firing of shots by military soldiers that hit their own 
personnel) was high. 1 9 
As the RCMP narrowed this perimeter around the camp by placing explosives 
around the Sundance camp, the Ts' Peten Defenders warned that they would retaliate if 
RCMP officers continued to close in. It is likely that the reckless discharge of many 
rounds of ammunition just outside the camp, as outlined by Schuelter, heightened 
tensions and reinforced the perception within the camp that an RCMP attack was 
imminent. 
Mistrust of the RCMP is evident in the record of the exchange between Wolverine 
and Sergeant Ryan on 3 September where Wolverine explains that some of the Ts' Peten 
Defenders will be leaving the camp to get water supplies while also emphasizing the Ts' 
Peten Defenders' legal framework: 
Wolverine: There ain't going to be a crime scene because the only 
criminals are you people. You people are the trespassers on our 
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land. We're only protecting it. So when we get to the International 
Court of Justice we'll find out who the real squatter is here... 
Ryan: I think it's good that you're keeping your people in a responsible 
position and we're doing the same out here. I think that's good. It's a 
real good [sic] thing to happen. 
Wolverine: Well, we have to get water a little bit away from our camp 
here because our well is not in yet, and we have to get some water from 
another source, and I'd hate like hell for somebody on the ERT team to 
try to ambush some of our boys because, as it is, this is really going to 
bring it on. 2 0 
The next major report of shooting occurred the day after Wolverine's warning that 
ERT members should keep their distance from the camp. Late in the night on 4 
September (on the early morning of 5 September) the RCMP alleged that the Ts ' Peten 
Defenders stalked them during the night and fired several rounds at police officers. 
RCMP Corporal John Ward told the media that "Four RCMP officers came under 
fire from armed natives from the Gustafsen Lake camp." He went on to say that "Shots 
were fired at them and a number are thought to have struck the vehicle" and that the 
officers were "actively pursued by persons from the armed camp and only great restraint 
on the part of the officers prevented what could have been a very serious incident." 2 1 Four 
military Armoured Personal Carriers (APC's) were sent in, supposedly to extract the 
officers to safety. Corporal Ward assured the press that the APC's were being used 
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"strictly in the defensive posture." RCMP Radio reports received at the RCMP's 
command post and published in the Vancouver Sun alleged, "Shots were fired at them 
[the RCMP officers] and a number are thought to have struck the vehicle." 2 3 
There are two important aspects to the RCMP account of the "stalking" incident. 
The first is the issue of shots fired; the second is the statement that APC's were sent in to 
extract officers from the alleged attack from the Ts' Peten Defenders. 
Regarding the shots that were allegedly fired by the Ts' Peten Defenders, there is 
strong forensics evidence that contradicts the story told by the RCMP. Although a 6 
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September 1995 RCMP operational plan states that a bullet was lodged in the headliner 
of the Victoria ERT (Emergency Response Team) Suburban there is strong evidence to 
contradict the claim. The police vehicle was said to be fired upon by the Ts' Peten 
Defenders on September 4. This revised RCMP plan, which was sent to the military in an 
attempt to convince the DND of the need for an expanded use of the APC's alleges that a 
"bullet [fired on 4 September] narrowly missed the head of the Victoria Team Leader." 2 4 
(See Appendix 8) 
The forensics expert contracted by the RCMP to examine this evidence 
summarized his findings in a report titled, "Examination of Victoria ERT Suburban." 2 5 
(See Appendix 9) In his report he flatly contradicted the account provided to the press, 
and the specifics of the alleged shooting that were sent to the military, lie explained that 
he was requested: 
.. .to examine a vehicle attached to the Victoria Efmergency] 
Rfesponse] Team, which supposedly had come under fire from Natives 
attached to the encampment at Gustafsen Lake.. . Victoria ERT 
members pointed out damage to the exterior rear view mirror on the 
passenger side front door.. .[because] the Victoria ERT members felt 
that the mirror had been struck by a bullet which had then deflected up 
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and into the vehicle, piercing the headliner of the cab. 
After a thorough discussion of possible bullet trajectories and a description of the 
damage the vehicle had sustained, he stated, "No sign of any foreign object was found in 
the hole of the headliner." More importantly, he concluded, 
Opinion: it is my opinion that neither the damage to the mirror, and the 
hole in the headliner is consistent with being struck by a bullet or any 
similar object... For an object to strike this mirror support and deflect 
to the position of the hole in the headliner, it would have had to pass 
through the neck/head region of a person sitting in the passenger seat... 
I would suggest that the damage to the mirror back is more consistent 
with being hit by a vertical object such as a tree branch. The damage to 
the support arm and window frame would be consistent with a metal 
object such as a rifle barrel resting between the arm and the window 
frame. As for the hole in the headliner, it gave me the appearance of 
being torn by a shaip object such as the front sight of a rifle. 2 7 
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The forensics investigator's conclusions contradicted the account provided in the 
operational plan revision submitted by Moulton, approved by Hall and Olfert, that 
included a cover letter written by RCMP Deputy Commissioner, J.D. Farell 
(Commanding Officer of "E" Division) and faxed to Major General C. Addy on 7 
September. 2 8 (See appendix 8) 
Evidence and testimony from the RCMP forensics experts at the trial conflicted 
with press reports of the events so completely that at sentencing hearings George Wool 
stated plainly, "On 4 September, the RCMP said there was a shooting, we now know 
there wasn't." Everything [all the trial evidence] fits in with a smear campaign." 2 9 During 
sentencing hearings on 10 July 1997, Wool pressed the RCMP for an official media 
retraction of the assertion that the protesters' stalked RCMP that had been based on 
RCMP accounts of the 4 September incident. 
The second important point in the police account of the 4 September incident is 
the claim that the APC's were sent in to extract officers from the alleged attack from the 
Ts' Peten Defenders. In light of the evidence that the RCMP were not hit by gunfire as 
they alleged, it seems clear that the RCMP exaggerated the need for the APC's and 
misinformed the public by stating that the RCMP were in a strictly "defensive posture." 
Strong evidence that the RCMP fabricated aspects of their press release regarding 
this incident is presented in training film contained in Above the Law 2. In a revealing 
scene three officers discuss the wording of the press release that will go out regarding the 
4 September incident. Three officers discuss how to establish "a good reason to deploy 
these things [APC's]." One officer suggests asserting that the RCMP came "under 
surveillance" from the Ts' Peten Defenders. Another officer is concerned that an account 
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of RCMP officers coming "under surveillance" will not be severe enough to convince 
public opinion that the APC's were required: 
Officer 1: You want to say under surveillance? As opposed to uh.. . 
cause you've got to have another reason for deploying these things and 
if it's just under surveillance... 
Officer 3: It's pretty aggressive. I think it's pretty inflammatory... 
Officer 2: Actively pursuing? Pursuing? 
Officer 1: Yea, actively pursuing, yep, that's good. Yeah, actively 
pursuing our police officers. OK. That's good. 3 0 
The RCMP rationalized the use of their APC's with reference to the alleged 
aggression from the Sundance camp on the night of 4 September and the press responded 
sympathetically: "Monday's attack on police... has led the RCMP to deploy four 
31 
Armoured Personnel Carriers into the area." This last sentence is most important as it 
makes plain that the report of this "stalking" incident, the alleged "active pursuance" by 
the Sundanccrs, was the pivotal episode "which led the RCMP to deploy [DND] 
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Armoured Personnel Carriers into the area." 
The press employed the framework presented by the RCMP that indicated the 
police were on the defensive and private property was at risk. The general public was told 
that the 4 September shooting incident "led to police cancelling a plan to allow Shuswap 
elders into the Gustafsen camp Tuesday.""' The Ts' Peten Defenders were depicted as 
standing in the way of substantive negotiations. "They showed great restraint," said 
Corporal John Ward of the decision by the members of the emergency response team not 
to fire on "armed native Indians" who were said to have pursued police until officers took 
up "defensive positions" away from the camp. 3 4 In this report, the decency and calm of 
the Mounties was contrasted to the savage aggression attributed to the Ts' Peten 
Defenders. 
Like the alleged ambush on 27 August, there were those who questioned the 
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RCMP account of 4 September shooting. RCMP negotiator Sergeant Wylie recorded in 
his notes that one of the Ts' Peten Defenders' supporters, "heatedly accused the RCMP 
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of 'orchestrating the shooting incident.'" Wylie noted that many supporters "accused 
the RCMP of hypocrisy ('talking out of both sides of our mouths'). They complain that 
on the one hand the RCMP says they want a peaceful resolution to the problem, yet on 
the other hand the RCMP is showing their shot-up vehicle to the media, the Attorney 
General's office has made a reference to the number of hostages in there and APC's were 
used while attempting to deal with the camp occupants." 3 6 
One of the Ts' Peten Defenders' own press releases, which went largely ignored 
accused the media of employing "slanderous, racist, inflammatory pictures and narrative 
with emphasis on warriors in camouflage clothing being called terrorists." The release 
also stated, "The legal and traditional Native position must be discussed in its proper 
context and the scare and intimidation tactics used by the government and the media must 
be shown for what they really are - that [they are] being [used] to manipulate the public 
into thinking they are under attack." 3 7 
Four days before the report of the shots fired, Olfert apparently concluded that 
there were several Defenders who will require killing. 3 8 According to the notes RCMP 
Chief Superintendent Murray Johnson on 1 September, Olfert stated, "There is a small 
group. 6 warriors, that will not give up - it will require the killing of the hard-liners:" 3 9 
Olfert's statement demonstrates that the RCMP was prepared to declare war on members 
of the Ts' Peten Defenders camp. Although the media focussed on exaggerated and 
possibly fabricated reports of aggression from within the protesters' camp the RCMP was 
prepared to kill Native activists whose main demand was for third-party settlement of 
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their title dispute. 
Despite reports of Native aggression on 27 August and 4 September, there was 
still conflict between the police and the military about what role DND armaments and 
forces would play in the standoff. Although military officials had endorsed the use of 
their armaments for transporting officers, it was not clear that the military endorsed the 
use of the APC's for offensive manoeuvres. On 6 September, one RCMP officer noted 
that the "Military doesn't see the use of the Bisons as we do - Plan A - Patrolling and 
other use not authd. [sic] as Op Plan had to be approved by DND.. . ' , 4° 
Notes of RCMP officers of 7 September indicate that the RCMP were still 
devising an assault on the camp while negotiations continued. In the notes of a meeting 
with Olfert, Hall, Moulton and Edwards and Kembel, on 7 September, Brown noted, 
"The elders are set to go in as a group at 0900 on 8 Sept. 95. If they don't meet with 
success, then a plan will have to be made to take the renegades by force if necessary." 4 1 
Despite reluctance from the military to deploy the APC's for patrols around the 
camp, the resolve of the RCMP to use force appeared to increase according to Brown 
who noted on 9 September that Superintendent Johnston advised that Superintendent 
Olfert wants to get more proactive and "take down the red truck and occupants if they 
can." 4 2 With the RCMP intent on aggressive action and the Ts ' Peten Defenders 
remaining staunch in their defence of the Sundance grounds, the standoff moved towards 
the report of the exchange of thousands of rounds of fire between the camp and the 
RCMP on 11 September. 
The documents disclosed at the Gustafsen Lake trial, (See Appendices 5 and 6) 
demonstrate that the RCMP was in constant contact with the British Columbia Attorney 
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General who requested military intervention on the behalf of the RCMP. To buttress their 
claim that military support was required, the RCMP and Attorney-General Dosanjh 
alleged that aggressions were committed by the Ts' Peten Defenders on 27 August and 4 
September. It appears clear that the police accounts of these incidents were incorrect and 
that military intervention was endorsed based on false information. 
The 4 September shooting is critical because an account of this shooting was sent 
from the RCMP to the military as part of the police effort to convince the military to 
approve the request for an expanded use of the APC's. On 7 September, RCMP Deputy 
Commissioner Farell faxed a request for more expanded military assistance based on the 
seriousness of the alleged Native aggression on 27 August and 4 September that were 
erroneous. He wrote, "It is impossible to overemphasize the necessity for such support. 
On 2 occasions [27 August and 4 September], the ERT Suburbans have been 
compromised by hostile gunfire. On both occasions, the absence of loss of life has been 
solely serendipitous."4"' (See Appendix 8, page 3) 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RCMP PRESSURE THE CBC: 
"CBC Radio's journalistic independence had been breached... the CBC had 
been manipulated in order to help the police:"1 
In the days that followed the report of the 4 September "stalking" incident, RCMP 
negotiators maintained radio-phone negotiations with the Defenders. The protesters 
remained firm in their position that the conflict would end as soon as the Canadian 
Governor General or the British Crown addressed important legal arguments. Wolverine 
maintained that he was prepared to defend his life for the sake of the legal principles at 
the heart of the Battle of Gustafsen Lake. 2 
Eight days after the reports of gunfire late in the night of 4 September, the 
detonation of RCMP explosives and an ensuing gun-battle raised tensions. On 12 
September, Ts' Peten Defenders OJ Pitawanakwat and Suniva Bronson drove over an 
RCMP explosive device that was planted in the road leading from the Sundance camp. 
The RCMP detonated this device as they lay in bushes near the road. Bronson and 
Pitawanakwat escaped the explosion while the RCMP shot through clouds of smoke from 
the explosion, missing the protesters but killing the camp dog in the process. In the 
exchange of gunfire that ensued, Bronson. a twenty-eight year old non-Native, was struck 
in the arm by a police bullet. There were no police injuries.3 
Graphic footage of this incident was later shown on CBC TV on 21 April 1997 
during the Gustafsen Lake trial. As a result, there has been pressure on the RCMP and the 
military to describe exactly what explosive was used to detonate the truck. The use of a 
device that appeared to be a land-mine on Canadian citizens at the Battle of Gustafsen 
Lake is particularly controversial in light of Canada's leading role in advancing an 
international ban on the use of land-mines.4 
Twenty-four hours after the use of the device that the RCMP referred to as an 
"explosive charge," 5 and the reports of a dangerous fire fight,6 the RCMP pressured the 
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CBC to co-operate in an RCMP media strategy. Montague phoned the head of radio news 
in British Columbia and alleged that the Ts' Peten Defenders had hostages whose release 
depended on the RCMP gaining access to the airwaves to broadcast a message from 
Chief Antoine Archie of the Canim Lake Tribal council. 7 Montague demanded access to 
CBC airwaves to air this message in Shuswap that was said to be a demand made by the 
Ts' Peten Defenders in negotiations in exchange for "surrender." 
In 1999, serious questions regarding the propriety of the RCMP using seemingly 
heavy-handed tactics to gain access to the public airwaves were asked by Dr. Anthony 
Hall and CFUV (University of Victoria) radio-host John Shafer to the CBC Ombudsman. 
The dynamics of the "surrender" broadcast event are described in a report from CBC 
Ombudsman David Bazay that follows here. Bazay conducted an investigation into the 
incident by interviewing CBC reporters who covered the standoff as well as Jeffery 
Dvorkin, who was the Managing Editor of CBC Radio News during the standoff. 
On 24 November 1999, Bazay sent an eleven-page report on this investigation to 
Dr. Hall. It follows here in edited form: 
Dear Prof. Hall: 
Here, at last, is my response to the questions you and John Shafer of 
Victoria have raised about the CBC's coverage of the events at 
Gustafsen Lake. 
.. .Mr. Shafer raised questions about CBC Radio's decision to 
comply with the RCMP's request to have a local Indian chief broadcast 
a special message into the camp on 13 Sept. 1995. He asked, "Is this 
consistent with standard practice." I put the question to Jeffrey 
Dvorkin, Vice-President of News at National Public Radio in the 
United States, who as the then Managing Editor of CBC Radio News 
authorized the broadcast. Mr. Dvorkin told me that this broadcast was a 
mistake, and that CBC Radio's journalistic independence had been 
breached. Here's his version of what happened: He says he received a 
telephone call from the then Director of Radio in Vancouver, informing 
him that the RCMP's Sgt. Montague had made an urgent request to 
broadcast a special message into the camp. His understanding was that 
a hostage-taking was under way: 'The DOR [Director of Radio] in 
Vancouver was told by Sgt. Montague that lives were at stake and that 
only by broadcasting this special message would lives be saved. Sgt 
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Montague put a great deal of pressure on the DOR to comply. I had five 
minutes to make a decision about a situation I could not verify. I made 
the decision that CBC Vancouver could broadcast the special message 
believing the RCMP that 'lives were at stake.' Mr. Dvorkin said this 
proved to be untrue, and he wrote a letter to the RCMP commissioner 
'to protest against the manner in which the CBC had been manipulated 
in order to help the police.' I should make clear here that neither CBC 
Radio nor CBC TV ever broadcast any report that the Gustafsen Lake 
standoff had become a hostage-taking incident. 
Here's how 'The National' reported on the radio broadcast, which 
occurred on a day when a spiritual leader from South Dakota visited the 
camp: 
Reporter: Shortly after the spiritual leader was flown into the camp at 
Gustafsen Lake came news of another development. Another person 
voluntarily left the camp and was taken into police custody. He came 
out as a show of good faith because the people in the camp now had a 
demand. 
Sgt. Montague: And that demand was that if the occupants heard from a 
respected chief of the Shuswap nation, whether it was a person who 
supported them or not, with a particular message, that they were 
prepared to lay down their arms and come out and come out 
immediately. 
Reporter: Shortly after, that message was broadcast on CBC Radio, the 
only station picked up in the camp. 
Radio Announcer: This message comes from Chief Antoine Archie of 
the Canim Lake Band. 
Chief Archie: People who have come out of Gustafsen Lake have not 
been mistreated. They have been treated with respect. If the rest of the 
camp come out, they will be treated with dignity and respect.' 
.. .CBC Radio examined the propriety of this broadcast in its 
media program, 'Now the Details,' on 17 Sept. 1995. Among those 
interviewed were Sgt. Montague, who claimed that the surrender 
message was suggested by someone from the camp, and Mr. Dvorkin, 
who accused the RCMP of manipulating the CBC. 
.. .The other controversy... was the RCMP's release of the 
names and criminal records of people supposedly inside the camp. Sgt. 
Montague was later quoted as saying this was done deliberately to 
smear the reputations and to destroy the credibility of the protestors as 
part of what he described as 'psychological warfare.' ...The RCMP's 
handling of this incident figures prominently in one scholar's 
continuing study of the media coverage of the 1995 Gustafsen Lake 
standoff. Sandra Lambertus is conducting a comprehensive study as a 
doctoral thesis at the University of Alberta... In an interview, Ms. 
Lambertus says the RCMP developed a sophisticated strategy designed 
to bring the media under its control. She says, 'The effects of the 
media strategy were magnified with the RCMP operational initiatives at 
Gustafsen Lake, many of which followed standard operating 
procedures.' For example, by setting up barricades and sealing off the 
camp, she says, the RCMP became the gatekeepers and thus many 
news stories were published and broadcast 'without journalistic 
witnessing.' In her view the barricades provided police with the 
opportunity to dominate interpretation of the standoff. 'There was no 
way to confirm if the RCMP were giving the full story - or the degree 
to which it was sanitized or exaggerated - or if they were giving any 
part of the story at all.' The RCMP could give out information, or 
withhold it, at will. The media became vulnerable to the police and 
their discretionary power to control and limit new information. The 
police defined what was 'news. ' 8 
The haste and heavy-handedness with which the RCMP carried out their 
strategy to gain access to the CBC airwaves is indicated by the treatment of CBC radio 
reporter Conway Fraser. Fraser told the Vancouver Province that the RCMP approached 
him out of the blue and asked him to go with them. At first, Fraser said, the RCMP were 
so secretive that, "They wouldn't even tell me where we were going or what we were 
doing... I wondered if I was being arrested."9 But once it was explained, Fraser and CBC 
management agreed to interrupt national programming four times between 1500 and 
1600 to broadcast a message from Chief Antoine Archie of the nearby Canim Lake 
band. 1 0 
Although Montague asserted that the broadcast was crucial because there was a 
"hostage-taking situation" court evidence contradicts this. The notion that there were 
hostages is directly refuted by the minutes of a meeting at the RCMP 100 Mile House 
Command Centre on 4 September at 1630, attended by between Ken Gates, Len Olfert, 
Verl Shockey, Earl Moulton and Dennis Ryan. Moulton states, "There is no indication 
that anyone is being held against their will in the camp." 1 1 According to the minutes of 
this meeting, the RCMP did not suspect that there were people in the Sundance camp 
being held against their will. Moulton stated further, "If the camp takes hostages, it is felt 
that it would destroy their credibility and would eliminate flash points [of] concern across 
Canada." 1 2 These comments echo the observation of Brown, who wrote. "There is no 
indication there are any hostages in the camp at this time." 1 3 (See appendix 2) 
The RCMP claimed that the "surrender" message was part of a request from the 
Sundance camp. This has been proven false. One of the Ts' Peten Defenders' supporters 
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told the Vancouver Sun on 14 September 1995 that one of "the latest stumbling blocks 
that prevented[ed] a peaceful end to the standoff was "the objectionable use of the word 
'surrender' in Archie's broadcast." 1 4 
Similarly, in a transcript of the negotiations between Marlow Sam (one of the 
Native negotiators) and the camp, Wolverine states, 
.. .One of the things in the broadcast is what we hear on the radio is that 
we are about surrendering, we never said those words. All I said is that 
uh we give you guys three days to get this in, in the international 
community, to the Privy Council of Great Britain... because we'll be 
using national, international and constitutional laws..." 
[The police response]: "Okay, we never had anything to do with saying 
anything about surrender... 1 5 
Another taped conversation between the RCMP and camp members corroborates 
the protesters' claim that they did not request the message. The following exchange is 
between Officer Wylie and a protester referred to as "Male 2" in the logs of negotiations: 
"Wylie: Art it's Sean here. Can uh, just so that you people are aware 
it's going to be broadcast on the radio every fifteen minutes... 
Male 2: Yea, who's going to be on the radio every fifteen minutes'? 
Wylie: Antoine Archie. 
Male 2: Oh, Okay... that sounds good. Uh, do you have any idea what 
(undecipherable) going to be saying? 
Wylie: I have, I have no idea. It's just uh that they're uh supporting 
what's happening"' 6 
After brief and problematic deliberations, and under extreme pressure from the 
RMCP, CBC executives decided to allow the Mounted Police to broadcast the message 
by Antione Archie, whom the RCMP alleged the Ts' Peten Defenders would respect. The 
RCMP claimed (and the press reported) that Archie was an esteemed chief of the 
Shuswap Nation. 1 7 In contrast, RCMP internal reports, a record of conversations between 
the RCMP negotiators, and camp members as well as court testimony have made it clear 
that the Ts' Peten Defenders did not respect Antoine Archie. For example, acrimony 
between the campers and Archie was recorded in an RCMP continuation report of 21 
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August, 1995 ! 8 where officers noted that the campers rebuffed Chief Antoine Archie 
when he tried to enter Sundance grounds with Sergeant Sarrich.1'' 
In his account of the standoff. Splitting the Sky directly refutes the claim that 
Archie was a respected chief in the eyes of the camp. He states, "There wasn't one ounce 
of respect from any of us for Mr. Archie." 2 0 He also explained that one reason for the ill 
will was that "Antoine Archie, one of the local Band Chiefs, along with Agnes Snow and 
21 
others, had publicly denounced us as outsiders." 
A journalist interviewed (under the understanding that he or she would remain 
anonymous) by Lambertus confirmed that Archie had little respect from the Ts' Peten 
Defenders and their small support group that gathered near police lines. This reporter 
observed the reaction of the Ts' Peten Defenders' supporters when they realized that it 
was Antoine Archie - who they knew well as an antagonist of the camp -- who was to 
make the Shuswap broadcast they had hoped was legitimate: 
They thought he [Archie] was a patsy for the cops... And it [the 
message] sort of didn't work. It got everybody riled up. Got the other 
side just saying he wasn't the spokesman for the - for that side. He was 
basically a - sort of a - sort of like a - status quo kind of Native. Status 
quo with the treaty process... the talk after at the gas station [where the 
Ts' Peten Defenders held their poorly attended press conferences] was 
they were upset that "this can totally backfire and make the dispute-
getting [sic] worse... This is not the guy." 2 2 
The allegation that people were being held against their will was especially 
powerful. There is evidence that officials in Dosanjh's office may have set the tone for 
the accusation that there were hostages in the Sundance camp: RCMP Sergeant Wylie's 
notes of 5 September 1995 explain. "The AG's office has made a reference to the number 
of hostages in there." 2 3 
Although most of the press reports echoed the RCMP account of the incident, the 
130 
Vancouver Sun included the critical remarks of some of the protesters' supporters in a 
report, published four days after the broadcast (after the standoff had come to a close): 
The fragile negotiations nearly collapsed Wednesday when the RCMP 
knowingly used a Shuswap chief the rebels did not respect to broadcast 
a message on local radio saying they would not be hurt if they 
surrendered, said Hill [Splitting The Sky]. The use of Canim Lake 
Band Chief Antoine Archie appeared to be an attempt by the RCMP to 
inflame the squatters because Archie has been opposed to the group's 
position from the start, Hill said. In a telephone interview Monday, 
[Arvol] Looking Horse backed Hill's claim that the group did not know 
Archie would make the broadcast, which they [the RCMP] said was the 
group's last demand in return for a surrender. He said he was in the 
middle of a ceremony in which the Ts' Peten Defenders said they 
would come out after three days when the radio broadcast was made. 
"They never gave me enough time," Looking Horse said of the police. 1 
was shocked when I heard (the broadcast). They did not tell me what 
they were going to do... 2 5 
The notion that the RCMP knowingly used a spokesperson that they knew would 
antagonize the Ts' Peten Defenders is consistent with the allegation of members of the 
Tsilhquot'in Nation who submitted a comprehensive seventy-four page report titled Ts' 
Peten: The Standoff At Gustafsen Lake in 1995: As Depicted in RCMP Records and 
Press Reports of the Time 2 6 to defense lawyers on 29 May 1997, near the end of the 
Gustafsen Lake trial. Representatives of the Tsilhquot'in Nation argued that the RCMP 
were looking to frustrate the negotiation process while giving the appearance of acting in 
good faith so as to manufacture consent for the use of force on the camp as their 
perimeter closed in upon with each failed diplomatic stroke: "Whenever negotiations 
showed any sign of succeeding, they [the RCMP] did something to subvert the process." 
Moreover, "Every mediator and every negotiating group who went to the camp were 
extremely critical of the RCMP's behaviour, every one except the first, self-appointed 
group and the delegations led by Chief Agnes Snow. 2 7 
Agnes Snow was an opponent of the legal strategy pursued by the Ts' Peten 
Defenders in that she was a supporter of the British Columbia Treaty Commission that 
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the protesters vehemently rejected. As Chief of the neighbouring Canoe Creek Tribal 
council. Snow entered into negotiations with the Treaty Commission on 15 December 
1993. Antione Archie is also a signatory to this document. Therefore, in the eyes of the 
Ts' Peten Defenders, both Archie and Snow were associated with the "collaborator class" 
of Indian Act leadership. 
Many news reports reinforced the notion that the Ts' Peten Defenders were 
untrustworthy and had gone back on a promise to surrender. In contrast, the perception 
that the RCMP were patient was reinforced when the media reported the RCMP claim 
that they were co-operating in every way with the Ts' Peten Defenders in an attempt to 
bring the standoff to a peaceful conclusion. For example. The Canadian Press echoed the 
RCMP account: 
The lengthy armed native standoff at Gustafsen Lake appeared close to 
a bloodless conclusion yesterday when aboriginal renegades agreed to 
surrender if their safety was assured. About two dozen squatters who 
had vowed to fight to the death said they would drop their guns and 
walk out to police surrounding their remote camp if they heard a 
"respected chief" assure them on radio they would not be harmed. 2 8 
The national press corps reported that the message was a demand from the 
"squatters" in the camp. The press simply reported that a 40-second message by Canim 
Lake Chief Antoine Archie that urged the protesters to come out unarmed and assuring 
them they would not be mistreated was broadcast twice on CBC Radio. But as the Globe 
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and Mail reported, there were no signs of surrender in response to the message. The 
report implied that the Native people were still uncooperative and by implication 
unreasonable in not honouring their side of an alleged agreement to surrender in 
exchange for the message from Chief Archie. The press questioned why the "renegade 
aboriginals" did not follow up on the promise to surrender. The Canadian Press report 
constructed Archie as an ally and protector of the Ts' Peten Defenders and quoted his 
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statement on the CBC radio broadcast, "[If] the rest of the camp come out they will be 
treated with dignity and respect... The RCMP have pledged their support for this. I will 
30 
personally be at the RCMP station or wherever to greet you on your arrival." 
Reports of the incident gave the impression that a negotiating impasse was about 
to be overcome by the dramatic breakthrough regarding conditions for surrender. The 
Vancouver Sun headline read "High hopes for end to stand-off dashed as deal struck with 
rebels falls through." 3 1 
As part of his investigation into the incident, Bazay spoke with Dr. Sandra 
Lambertus whose doctoral research regarding Gustafsen Lake was in the process of being 
completed. Her general comments about the RCMP media strategy at Gustafsen Lake are 
consistent with the particular conclusions I draw here regarding evidence that the RCMP 
manipulated the media in their handling of the 13 September CBC radio broadcast. In her 
Ph.D. thesis. Terms of Engagement: An Anthropological Case Study of the Media 
Coverage of the 1995 Gustafson Lake Stand Off, Lambertus described the virtual media 
blackout that existed at Gustafsen Lake as the RCMP constructed barricades to keep 
journalists and the public from the Sundance camp: 
The establishment of the barricades provided the RCMP with a near-
hegemonic control over the definition of the situation in the camp to the 
media, and prevented the people in the camp from having a media 
voice or a witness... the barricades contributed to conditions of 
reporting that increased the potential for distorted media coverage of 
the event and the people involved. 3 2 
One journalist suggested that even prior to the erection of the RCMP barricades 
there was "a real concern that this would lead to bloodshed. And so tension grew through 
the thing. You had the sense (certainly through Montague) that it seemed a point of pride 
- that they [RCMP] couldn't be seen to be backing down from this challenge to their 
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authority... It became a bit of a concern that you could have some sort of state-sanctioned 
slaughter..."3-
Al though RCMP press conferences received prominent attention from the media, 
Lambertus noted that there was another source of information which contrasted with the 
official air that emanated from the RCMP press conference room. Supporters of the Ts' 
Peten Defenders offered an alternative interpretation of the standoff. She writes, "In 
contrast to the RCMP definition that the conflict was a law enforcement issue... the 
frame offered at this venue [a nearby gas station] was that the dispute at Gustafsen Lake 
was connected to the resolution of Aboriginal land issues in BC. Nonetheless this content 
had only limited appeal for the mainstream gathering news. Also the service station 
venue implied a loss of status for the information disseminated." 3 4 Whereas the police 
and selected Native leaders who represented and defended the dominant cultural 
economic and political system were often quoted in an unqualified fashion, supporters of 
the Ts' Peten Defenders were dismissed in large part because they had no institutional 
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authority and seemed to posses little social and cultural currency. 
Regarding the evidence that the RCMP abused their power and reputation for 
fairness, it is important to review the highlights of Bazay's investigation undertaken in 
response to "questions about CBC Radio's decision to comply with the RCMP's request 
to have a local Indian chief broadcast a special message into the camp on 13 September 
1995." Bazay summarized the most damaging aspects of the RCMP behaviour regarding 
the broadcast of the message on 13 September by reporting that Jeffrey Dvorkin "told me 
that this broadcast was a mistake, and that CBC Radio's journalistic independence had 
been breached." Regarding Montague's assertion that lives were at stake with reference 
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to the broadcasting of the message from Chief Archie, "Mr. Dvorkin said this proved to 
be untrue, and he wrote a letter to the RCMP commissioner "to protest against the 
manner in which the CBC had been manipulated in order to help the police." 3 6 
Dvorkin himself was interviewed four days after the broadcast on CBC radio 
along with Conway Fraser, Montague as well as Robert Hunter, the executive who made 
the final decision to broadcast the message. 3 7 In response to the host who asked, "Did the 
people's broadcasting corporation become the RCMP Broadcasting Corporation last 
week in British Columbia?" Dvorkin stated that he felt the CBC had become "agents of 
the RCMP." He said that because of Montague's claim that there were "lives at stake," 
"We didn't have any choice in the matter." 3 8 Dvorkin added, "I hope there will be strong 
protests made... toward the RCMP." 3 9 To date there have been few such protests and 
little evidence that the CBC has confronted the seriousness of the breach of journalistic 
integrity that occurred on 13 September 1995. 
Montague has flatly rejected the notion that the RCMP had taken over the 
airwaves or that there was any favouritism or manipulation. When asked if he thought the 
CBC would comply with his request he stated, "We didn't even give it a second 
thought." 4 0 
Lambertus conducted a series of anonymous interviews with journalists who 
covered the Battle of Gustafsen Lake. Many of these reporters voiced serious concerns 
about the possibilities for RCMP manipulation that the situation held after the RCMP 
barricades went up. In particular these journalists "considered the [13 September] 
broadcast "absolutely overt manipulation of the media." 4 1 Excerpts gathered by 
Lambertus that convey this concern are as follows: "[Montague] just does not understand 
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the role of the media in a democratic society. Media acts as a check on the police -
pestering the police is a good thing. Montague doesn't understand this - doesn't think it's 
a problem to take over access to resources. He just doesn't get it, and that scares me.. . " 4 2 
Another stated, "The RCMP referred to the incident as an example of how media and the 
RCMP co-operated. I 'm not so sure. We knew we were getting a controlled version of 
reality - but no other reality was legally possible." 4 3 
Given the seriousness of the breach of CBC ' s journalistic independence that 
occurred when Montague pressured the CBC to take part in their disinformation and 
smear tactics, further reflection and change within the CBC is required to prevent a 
similar breach in the future. To whom are the police accountable for the type of breach of 
journalistic independence that occurred at Gustafsen Lake? Similarly to whom, if anyone, 
are journalists answerable? The CBC ombudsman's report makes it clear that the RCMP 
engaged in severe and unethical manipulation. However, no concrete steps have been 
taken to prevent a future episode. The airing of one discussion program 4 4 (where the 
RCMP continued to make untenable characterizations of the episode) does not constitute 
full reckoning with the seriousness of the threat to journalistic integrity posed by the 
incident. When the nation's public broadcaster becomes complicit in a "disinformation 
and smear campaign," serious preventative measures and much more institutional 
reflection are required. 
Bazay's comments regarding the release of criminal records as well as his 
discussion of the pressure applied by Sergeant Montague to Jeffery Dvorkin substantiate 
the assertion that the RCMP employed a range of propaganda techniques to discredit the 
Ts" Peten Defenders. Bazay emphasized that the extent of the RCMP manipulation 
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techniques included "the release of the names and criminal records of people supposedly 
inside the camp. Sgt. Montague was later quoted as saying this was done to smear the 
reputations and the destroy the credibility of the protesters as part of what he described as 
'psychological warfare. '" 4 5 Strong preventative measures are required to shield both 
journalists and protesters from the coercive psychological tactics employed by people in 
authority in future conflicts. 
Regarding the events that transpired at Gustafsen Lake on 13 September, there is 
no evidence in the disclosures that shows that the Ts' Peten Defenders had agreed to 
surrender in exchange for the playing of the radio message as the RCMP told the press. 
All available evidence is to the contrary. The assertion that the RCMP manipulated the 
press and communicated false information to the pubic is consistent with conclusions 
reached in the previous two chapters regarding the events of 27 August and 4 September. 
In all three cases, there is strong evidence that the RCMP used propaganda techniques to 
discredit the constitutional arguments put forward by the Ts' Peten Defenders regarding 
Aboriginal title. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC INQUIRY 
How did this conflict between two men, Shuswap Faith Keeper, Percy Rosette 
and American rancher, Lyle James escalate into the largest police action in the history of 
the province which raised questions of law that resonate at deep constitutional and 
international levels? The trial that followed the standoff shed important light on this 
question. As mentioned in chapter two, the Ts' Peten Defenders' legal position conflicted 
directly with state assumptions about the jurisdiction of the land at Gustafsen Lake. This 
conflict in legal positions, which underpinned the physical confrontation, became a 
prominent aspect of the trial. 
The Ts' Peten Defenders' pre-trial hearing began in May 1996 and the drama 
ended on 31 July 1997 when those convicted were sentenced. The charges ranged in 
seriousness from trespass to attempted murder. Ts ' Peten Defenders who were charged 
with lesser offences were Robert Lauchlin Flemming, Percy Adrian Rosette, Flora Elsie 
Sampson, Ronald Raymond Craig Dionne, Glenn Darwin Denault, Tronde Fred Halle, 
Shelaugh Anne Franklin, Grant Michael Archie, and Sheila Leanne Ignace. Those 
"accused convicted of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public 
peace and mischief causing actual danger to life." were as follows: Suniva Bronson, 
James Allen Scott Pitawanakwat, Edward Clarence Dick, Joseph Adam Ignace, Jones 
William Ignace, and Francis Edward Dick.1 
The trial received very little national media coverage. I attended many of the trial 
sessions and published a column in the Vancouver weekly Terminal City that explored 
the evidence that emerged. Throughout the trial several of the defendants stridently set 
forth the same legal arguments that formed the basis of the demands made within the 
camp during the standoff. In particular, Wolverine, Flo Sampson, Slelaugh Franklin and 
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James Pitawanakwat consistently issued direct challenges to the jurisdiction of the court 
by arguing that the judge must first address the question of Aboriginal jurisdiction as per 
the constitutional requirements for settlement in untreatied territories before the court 
could be sure that the proceedings were fully consistent with the rule of law. Throughout 
the trial there were passionate pleas from the accused for the court to address both the 
legal aspects of the jurisdiction questions as well as the deeper questions related to the 
subjugation of Aboriginal peoples in Canada. 
Both Ignace and Pitawanakwat emerged as powerful figures at the trial and 
addressed the court in an impassioned way. Pitawanakwat told the court: 
Our people have suffered more than anyone should suffer. 
Our ways were brutally attacked. Our laws said we were doing 
right. Under extreme aggression and oppression we can and 
must protect our people. When the "guardians of the rule of 
law" are oppressive we are guaranteed the right to defend 
our elders, our children and our way of life. The reconstruction 
of our warrior societies threatens those in authority but is 
necessary. 2 
Pitawanakwat and Wolverine often addressed the court from behind a small glass 
cubicle that was then separated from the gallery by a floor to ceiling plane of bulletproof 
glass. This spectacle had the effect of alienating the accused from the general public. 
Supposedly designed for security purposes, the glass reinforced the notion that the Ts' 
Peten Defenders were dangerous terrorists. In many ways, the bullet-proof glass had the 
same effect as the propaganda techniques employed by the RCMP during the standoff; 
the defendants were portrayed as dangerous militants who posed a threat to public safety. 
A reporter for the Toronto Star emphasized the surreal nature of the courtroom 
infrastructure, the intensity of the exchanges between Ts' Peten Defenders and RCMP 
officers, and the lack of widespread coverage of the case: 
In a bullet-proof glass cage resembling a giant fish tank, Jones William 
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Ignace is in the midst of a harsh cross-examination of assistant 
commissioner Murray Johnston, one of the senior RCMP officers who 
coordinated the police response to the 1995 land claims dispute. 
"Who is the terrorist here?" Ignace thunders. "I say the RCMP were." 
The scene at this trial in a bubble is almost surreal. Six armed deputy 
sheriffs are stationed strategically around the courtroom to keep an eye 
on Ignace and 17 other defendants. In stark contrast to the highly 
publicized event that prompted it, there has been little media coverage 
of this eight-month-long trial. The hearing has gone on so long that four 
defendants have had babies. 3 
During her address to the court, non-Native defendant Shelaugh Franklin tried to 
debunk the notion that the Ts' Peten Defenders were outsiders with little or no national or 
international support. On 11 July 1997, she attempted to read more than twenty letters 
which focused on the issue of unceded native land and mistreatment of the Ts ' Peten 
Defenders. For example, the Belgian Human Rights Group, K O L A ' s 4 letter to Prime 
Minister Jean Chretien stated 'The current actions of the BC government and the RCMP 
toward Ts' Peten [Gustafsen Lake] Defenders, as well as the negligence of the Canadian 
national government to intervene and put a halt to these actions unambiguously qualify as 
genocide." 5 
At the trial the Ts' Peten Defenders argued that the court had no jurisdiction over 
them with reference to the same body of law raised at the standoff. Throughout the trial. 
Franklin, Pitawanakwat, and Ignace, asserted that the effect of their interpretation of the 
meaning of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was to exonerate them. They flatly rejected 
the legal theories offered by the state that counter their view. As discussed in chapter two, 
the state has often argued that the Proclamation does not apply to colonies such as British 
Columbia that came into being after 1763 and that the Proclamation was not designed to 
extend to the pacific coast. Nevertheless, several defenders argued that the Proclamation 
did and does apply. Despite interruptions from trial Judge, Bruce Josephson. Franklin 
emphasized the issue of Aboriginal jurisdiction, consistently throughout the court 
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proceedings: 
We are asking you [Judge Josephson] to look at the constitutional law. 
You refused to do that. I 'm still of the belief that the Shuswap are the 
inherent owners of their land. The assumption of jurisdiction over their 
land is fraud, constitutionally treasonous and genocidal. I have yet to 
see arguments, which disprove my contention that judges too are 
subject to law. Wolverine and OJ are in prison because of what they 
believe in, not because of what they have done. [Wolverine and 
Pitawanakwat received longer sentences than the other Defendants] 
They speak the truth. 6 
Franklin challenged Lyle James directly on jurisdiction issue when the rancher 
took the stand at the trial. She asked James if he had ever seen the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 or Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act. She read an excerpt from the 1982 
Constitution Act, which includes the important qualification that the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, "Shall not be construed as to abrogate or derogate from any Aboriginal 
Treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, 
including any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 
1763." 7 
Franklin then asked James if he was aware of this constitutional stipulation to 
which he flatly replied, "No." Although the judge swept aside the jurisdiction issue by 
stating, "That's a question of law. I 'm sorry, not for the witness." Franklin rejoined, 
"This is the precise question of law that we've had a problem getting a hearing at in 
Canada."8 
Although the trial was initially meant to determine the guilt or innocence of the 
eighteen members of the Sundance camp whom the Crown alleged constituted a 
conspiracy on private property, at many times throughout the proceedings the trial 
seemed to be more an investigation into RCMP tactics. Evidence that the RCMP used 
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excessive force and ran a "disinformation and smear campaign" against the Ts' Peten 
Defenders raised the call for a public inquiry by many court observers. 
Defense lawyer Manuel Azevedo argued that political concern over the Gustafsen 
Lake episode echoed at the highest echelons in Ottawa. He directly refuted the notion that 
the Ts' Peten Defenders' protest constituted a conspiracy on private property, as asserted 
by Crown prosecutor Lance Bernard and stated, "If there was a conspiracy, it was not on 
the part of the accused. It was on the part of the RCMP and their political masters to once 
and for all crush this revival of Indian culture at Gustafsen Lake. They were going to go 
right to the Prime Minister... This case went to the highest authorities and that's where 
the conspiracy lay." 9 
The need for further inquiry into evidence of media manipulation at Gustafsen 
Lake is underscored by the insights provided by CBC ombudsman, David Bazay as 
outlined in chapter six. His description of RCMP efforts to pressure the CBC to 
participate in their media strategy on 13 September is highly revealing. He substantiates 
the allegation that the RCMP lied to the CBC to get access to the airwaves in a move 
which reinforced the public perception that the RCMP were bending over backwards to 
accommodate the Ts" Peten Defenders' demands while at the same time reinforcing the 
notion that the Ts' Peten Defenders were unreasonable malcontents. 
The RCMP portrayal of the protesters as violent criminals fits in with historical 
precedents. As Daniel Francis observed in The Imaginary Indian, "In the vast literature of 
the Mountie produced between 1885 and World War Two, the Indian is the bad guy, 
savage and ungovernable, a symbol of the dark forces of anarchy, which had to be 
subdued before civilization could flourish in the West." 1 0 The RCMP recycled this 
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dismissive tone in their press briefings. The terms "criminals." and "squatters," who 
"pursue to kil l" 1 3 were used by the RCMP and the British Columbia Attorney General to 
describe protesters who were attempting to bring about respect for the rule of law and the 
internationalization of the British Columbia title question. 
During the trial, some reporters began to explore evidence of RCMP 
wrongdoing but these articles were infrequent. Most Canadians have likely been left with 
wildly simplified and erroneous impressions of what happened at Gustafsen Lake. 
Further journalistic reckoning with the extent to which the media was manipulated is 
required. Vancouver Sun columnist Joey Thompson's column is a beginning. Although 
her analysis did not receive national attention from editorialists and panellists throughout 
most of Canada, she wrote plainly about the extent to which she felt manipulated by the 
use of propaganda at Gustafsen Lake. In her column, on page A12 of the Vancouver Sun 
on 26 September 1997, she wrote: "The fact is [Gustafsen Lake] camp members weren't 
the terrorists the RCMP made them out to be. Nor did they invite the shootouts the police 
press releases claimed. Officers were ordered to back off the "terrorist" label three days 
into the mud-slinging and name-calling. But the damage was done." Thompson 
emphasized that the media became "sold on the RCMP's script of good vs. evil: Our men 
in red blazers against trigger-crazed Indian thugs. And that's what stung the most.. . " 1 4 
She reviewed some of the main discrepancies between what the RCMP told the press 
during the standoff and what was revealed at the trial. She summarized: "Court 
transcripts tell the story; we got had." 1 5 
Similarly, one Globe and Mail article, written by Ross Howard on 8 October 
1996. reported on evidence of RCMP wrongdoing at Gustafsen Lake. The article noted 
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that some RCMP officers used hollow-point bullets although they are prohibited as 
military ammunition under international conventions because of their devastating impact 
on victims. (See also Appendix 10) 1 6 Howard's article, "RCMP Tactics War-Like, trial 
told, " also stated: "The RCMP had an informer or agent among those who were involved 
in the standoff according to Sergeant Martin Sarrich. And the police violated their own 
no-shooting rule, Corporal Malcolm Callander said, and gave incomplete information to 
the media." 1 7 
Although Thompson and Howard began to unravel the web of "disinformation 
and smear" with these two articles (which contrasted to the vast majority that carried 
false information) there must be much greater attention given to strong evidence of the 
use of propaganda by the RCMP at Gustafsen Lake if these articles are to serve any 
function other than to promote a necessary illusion that there is balance in the mainstream 
media. Without a fuller reckoning with the extent to which the media might have been 
involved in the RCMP media strategy, there is a dangerous threat that "thought control" 
and media manipulation will damage Canadian democracy. 
The manipulation of the media by the RCMP at Gustafsen Lake is evident in the 
statements of several officers that were disclosed at the trial. RCMP Sgt Ryan stated: 
"We want to make sure that the press releases most advantageous to us go out" in the 
same exchange where he asks his colleagues: "Did you find someone who can help us 
with the disinformation and smear campaign." 1 8 It is unclear whether the RCMP did hire 
"somebody" to "help" with a "disinformation or smear campaign" at Gustafsen Lake. It 
is clear, however, that the RCMP were intent on controlling information. In Above the 
Law 2, an RCMP officer states, "I can assure you that we're going to manage information 
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and I don't give a shit what the cost is. It's going to be done and if we have to hire people 
to do i t . . ." 1 9 There is also evidence that the RCMP flew in a media consultant from 
Ottawa, 2 0 indicating that the RCMP may have sought to "hire a staff for the purpose of 
"disinformation and smear." 
The efforts of the RCMP to manipulate the media appear to have been highly 
successful. From the time of the alleged ambush on 27 August until the end of the 
conflict, there was a virtual media blackout which obscured central aspects of the event 
from public view. After the standoff, Mark Hume of the Vancouver Sun wrote, "For 
several weeks, the media were blocked from seeing just about anything of the police 
operation at Gustafsen Lake and largely became dependent on daily RCMP briefings for 
reports on events." He concluded, "The military involvement in the operation was denied, 
even weeks after it had begun. The use of night-vision goggles, spy planes, forward 
looking infra-red and booby traps was never commented on." Hume also explained that 
the RCMP allowed selected reporters to view their centre of operations at Gustafsen Lake 
called Camp Zulu. Several reporters were flown by the RCMP over the camp under an 
oath of secrecy that they would not report on the nature of camp Zulu until after the 
standoff. Hume wrote that, "The Vancouver Sun did not take the trip, or the RCMP's oath 
of secrecy - and instead flew over the base after learning it was located outside an air-
exclusion zone." He reported on what could be seen from above the RCMP's camp Zulu 
and stated that the RCMP "had established a military-style operations base, to launch 
patrols into the thick bush around Gustafsen Lake." 2 2 
Why would the RCMP and state officials feel the need to misrepresent the legal 
and constitutional issues at stake at the Gustafsen Lake conflict and to engage in what 
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Bazay refers to as manipulation and what RCMP officers refer to in their own video­
taped discussions as a "disinformation and smear campaign?" 2 3 The "disinformation and 
smear" campaign had the effect of isolating the Ts' Peten Defenders from domestic and 
international support and contained their threat to the political and economic status quo. 
The use of both state force and propaganda demonstrates that when there is a threat to the 
sanctity of the state, and its access to billions of dollars of natural resources, the state will 
marshall its instruments of force to quell the physical threat, while controlling 
information to discredit those who pose an ideological threat. The Ts ' Peten Defenders 
posed a fundamental challenge to the prevailing property regime and the system of social, 
economic and political relationships that stem from it. The protesters called for a 
fundamental reconsideration of the unequal distribution of wealth and the social and 
political inequities that stem from the colonial era. The use of the police to enforce the 
rule of law is the central point of the controversy. 
The gravity of the challenge presented by the protesters at the Ts' Peten sacred 
grounds was not lost on politicians or the RCMP. In a 24 August 1995 interview on 
CHNL Radio Kamloops, RCMP Sergeant Peter Montague stated, "Basically, the very 
foundations that Canadian society are built on are threatened here, and the RCMP is well 
aware of that." 2 4 At Gustafsen Lake, the RCMP defended a suspect legal regime. If the 
legal truth is that jurisdiction remains with Native people, trillions of dollars of corporate 
revenue as well as the very jurisdiction of the state may be jeopardized. To prevent the 
loss of corporate investment, the use of force, in the name of the law was employed to 
stifle, suppress, and "set the example"" that a challenge to the sanctity of the state will 
not be tolerated. 
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In Roll Jordan Roll. Eugene Genovese wrote, "The legal system of the western 
world had succumbed to a bourgeois idea of private property."2'' At Gustafsen Lake, the 
state and the police acted to defend the sanctity of the doctrine of marketplace equality. 
State officials rejected an interpretation of the constitutional laws that preceded the 
transformation of British Columbia into a province that places highest value on its regime 
of private property holdings. The state also resisted the demand for a fundamental re­
working of the balance of political and economic power. The provincial Attorney General 
claimed to support the equality of all persons before the law but refused to deal with the 
extent to which "marketplace democracy" was instituted as part of a process of illegal 
dispossession and subjugation of Aboriginal peoples. 
Genovese also wrote, "One of the primary functions of the law concerns the 
means by which command of the gun becomes ethically sanctioned." 2 7 At Gustafsen 
Lake, the state and the police claimed that the use of force against the Ts ' Peten 
Defenders was morally defensible by invoking the sanctity of private property rights and 
contradicting their constitutional arguments. Genovese also refers to the "hegemonic 
function of the law" 2 8 and reminds us that the idea of hegemony "implies class 
antagonisms, but it also implies, for a given historical epoch, the ability of a particular 
class to contain those antagonisms on a terrain in which its legitimacy is not dangerously 
questioned." 2 9 At Gustafsen Lake, the class interests of those in positions of economic 
and political power in both Native and non-Native communities in British Columbia were 
protected when the serious threat to state legitimacy that the Ts' Peten Defenders posed 
was quashed. By convincing the public that the RCMP were acting to defend the rule of 
law and that the Defenders were reckless law-breakers, the compelling legal arguments 
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assembled by the Ts' Peten Defenders were muted. Although state legitimacy could have 
been widely questioned if the Ts' Peten Defenders were able to gain public support, an 
RCMP "disinformation and smear campaign" discredited them while a show of state 
force contained them. 
In many ways, the legitimacy of the RCMP response was created through the 
use of propaganda. The legitimacy of the Ts' Peten Defenders' constitutional arguments 
was thoroughly discredited by the police who played an essentially political role by 
arguing that the protesters had no substantive issues. 
The use of the RCMP to quell political dissent at Gustafsen Lake is highly 
problematic. As mentioned in chapter two, the historical record shows that the RCMP 
have often played a political role in the policing of those who demonstrate opposition to 
the Canadian state. Historically, the RCMP has infiltrated unions 3 0 and activists 
associated with the Quebec separatist movement. 3 1 An analysis of the historical record 
shows that the RCMP consistently sided with corporate interests and government, against 
political dissenters, both Native and non-Native. 
Many Canadians may find the evidence of RCMP wrongdoing at Gustafsen 
Lake difficult to believe because it deviates so far from established national myths, in his 
exhaustive study on The Canadian Mounties in Symbolism and Myth. Keith Walden 
examined the construction of the image of the RCMP as a ubiquitous national symbol 
sometimes assumed to be beyond reproach. In contrast, as Edward Mann and John Lee 
explain in RCMP vs. the people: Inside Canada's Security Service, instruction in methods 
of evasion and plausible deniability are core elements of some officers' training, 
especially higher-ranking officers. Mann and Lee state, "The capacity to stonewall, like a 
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musketeer's ability in fencing, will normally increase with the rank of the [RCMP] 
officer."3 2 
The use of disinformation and smear techniques by the RCMP at Gustafsen 
Lake is consistent with a tradition of less than savoury aspects of the RCMP's activities, 
especially in regards to tactics in political policing that are part of the public record. 
Mann And Lee describe tactics similar to those displayed at Gustafsen Lake and advise 
their readers to look beyond the myths that have been "widely celebrated in the press, 
movies, novels, and in the bulk of Canadian history books" because "behind this image, 
almost invisible, the other mission of the NWMP and its successor the RCMP has been 
the surveillance and sometimes forceful control of all minorities that do not fit into the 
Canadian establishment's model of public order." 3 3 
The use of propaganda by the RCMP and state officials to discredit Aboriginal 
protesters is also part of a larger trend that has precedents dating back to 1924. The 
language used by state officials to describe Aboriginal protesters at Oshwegan in 1924 
resembles the language used to denounce the Ts' Peten Defenders in 1995. Both were 
accused of being agitators who lacked mainstream support. For example, in 1924, 
Department of Indian Affairs deputy superintendent Duncan Campbell Scott referred to 
the activism of Six Nations traditionalists as "agitation carefully fomented by a few 
reactionaries."3 4 Similarly in 1995, police referred to the Ts' Peten Defenders as militants 
who "have no support whatsoever." 3 5 The RCMP labelled them trespassers 3 6 and 
"declared war... on a heavily armed band of natives they say are terrorists.""'7 
In particular, the exploits of the RCMP in infiltrating the Quebec sovereignty 
movement in the name of national security need to be reviewed to contextuali/e the 
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evidence of RCMP wrongdoing at Gustafsen Lake. Regarding the actions of the RCMP 
in the 1970's, Richard Cleroux wrote, in Official Secrets: the story behind the Canadian 
Security Intelligence: "They [the RCMP] had lied, cheated, stolen, committed arson, 
opened peoples' mail, held people without warrant, conspired, destroyed evidence, 
created mischief and deliberately misled other police forces. And when it appeared they 
might be found out, they had conspired to cover it up to hide their crimes." This context 
is important when considering evidence of RCMP wrongdoing at Gustafsen Lake, which 
resembles tactics, employed to investigate other elements of Canadian society who were 
deemed to be security threats. 
In RCMP: The Real Subversives. Richard Fidler revealed a pattern of RCMP 
espionage tactics regarding the infiltration of Native political movements. In particular, 
Fidler detailed the role of an RCMP spy who "tried to get British Columbia Natives to 
use violent tactics... to provoke actions that the police could easily suppress, arresting or 
killing radical leaders and discrediting the movement." This RCMP agent tried to 
provoke Native protesters in Mount Currie into using dynamite and AK-47 rifles. Fidler 
concluded that these efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful. 
More recently, the RCMP has been accused of employing excessive force to 
police the meeting of world leaders at the APEC conference at UBC. The use of force at 
the APEC hearings has come under close scrutiny 4 0 and has been compared by some to 
the use of police force at Gustafsen Lake. The need for further inquiry into the dynamics 
of police actions at Gustafsen Lake has been emphasized by Margot E. Young of the Law 
Faculty at the University of Victoria who linked the Gustafsen and Ipperwash conflicts 
with a more pervasive pattern of police abuses related to the use of pepper spray on 
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students at UBC in 1997. She emphasized, "Canadians and their governments are not 
always quick to investigate potential police abuses of power. A range of examples 
illustrates this point. In 1995 the Ontario Provincial Police shot at and killed a member of 
a group of Native protesters occupying Ipperwash Provincial Park." She also noted that 
"no provincial inquiry into this shooting death has been called, despite condemnation of 
this refusal by the United Nations Human Rights Committee" and that "Similar potential 
police misconduct may have characterized the Gustafsen Lake dispute in British 
Columbia in 1995" where "the events have remained largely uninvestigated and media 
coverage dipped sharply as time passed." 4 1 
The use of the RCMP to quell political dissent in Native communities raises 
important questions. What is the role of the police when an expression of constitutionally 
protected Aboriginal rights comes into conflict in potentially lethal confrontations? What 
interpretation of the rule of law mandates the duties of the RCMP? Is it appropriate for 
the police to play a political role? In particular, to what extent did the RCMP co-operate 
in the political designs of the federal and provincial governments to suppress the 
constitutional arguments of the Ts' Peten Defenders? Evidence of the use of excessive 
force and propaganda by the RCMP reviewed in this study raises the serious concern that 
the RCMP has become a police force that defends the interests of state or corporate 
interests at the expense of the civil rights of protesters and the rule of law in general. 
The notion that the use of propaganda and police force might be motivated by the 
economic and political interests of the ruling class has been explored by Noam Chomsky 
in Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies. 4 2 Chomsky writes, "It 
is a natural expectation, on uncontroversial assumptions, that the major media and other 
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ideological institutions will generally reflect the perspectives and interests of established 
power." 4 3 At standoffs with Aboriginal protesters, the RCMP effectively became 
enforcers of the economic and political interests of established power by discrediting a 
legal argument that challenged Canadian jurisdiction over the trillions of dollars of 
resources in British Columbia. 
According to the "propaganda model" of critical analysis explored by Noam 
Chomsky, the media serve the interests of state and corporate power by framing their 
reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege and which limits 
discussion and debate. Although particular reporters might deviate from identification 
with dominant class interests, Chomsky writes, "Journalists are unlikely to make their 
way unless they conform to these ideological pressures, generally by internalizing the 
values: it is not easy to say one thing and believe another, and those who fail to conform 
will tend to be weeded out by familiar mechanisms." 4 4 
The power of television to shape public opinion has been explored by Pierre 
Boudrieu who also examined the extent to which television news coverage often feeds 
back already-held assumptions to media consumers. In his book. On Television, he 
referred to "the circular circulation of information" which "produces a formidable effect 
of mental closure" to ideologies that threaten widely held views." 4 5 Bourdrieu identified 
an economic motivation at the heart of the attempt to display only certain images and 
ideas on television, which can be subtle, perhaps unconscious, but pervasive. The media 
coverage of the Battle of Gustafsen Lake fits into this model because the arguments of 
the Native protesters pose a threat to the economic interest of the dominant economic 
class that are usually connected with ownership of major media conglomerations. 
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Noam Chomsky argues that, "The system protects itself with indignation against a 
challenge to the right of deceit in the service of power, and the very idea of subjecting the 
ideological system to rational inquiry elicits incomprehension or outrage, though it is 
often masked in other terms." 4 6 At Gustafsen Lake, corporate and state interests were 
reflected and defended in media reports, which masked the substance of the protesters' 
legal and historical arguments interests by invoking the assumption that the jurisdiction 
of the lands at Gustafsen Lake remained with the Canadian state. 
As mentioned in chapter two of this work, Jacques Ellul has noted that 
propaganda can be employed to bring about either the active or passive participation of 
individuals. At Gustafsen Lake, the state secured the active participation of RCMP 
officers and military soldiers and the passive participation, or approval, of the general 
public. The attempt of the police and the state to convince the general public that a siege 
on the Sundance camp was morally defensible may have exceeded its initial objective of 
creating passive acceptance and support for police actions. Some citizens went beyond a 
passive role and took to the streets - not only to acknowledge their support for the 
RCMP, but also to demand more aggressive actions of the RCMP to use force to suppress 
the alleged enemy within the Sundance camp. While most citizens did not get a clear 
account of the depth and weight of the legal and historical substance that underpinned the 
Ts' Peten Defenders protest, they were provided with hundreds of media accounts that 
indicated that the RCMP acted honourably, while the Ts' Peten Defenders acted 
criminally. 
The extent to which the public supported Dosanjh and his "get tough" policy on 
the Ts' Peten Defenders was summarized by David Hogben in his column, "Election 
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Train Ready after [Gustafsen Lake] Surrender: 'With the heavily armed native Indian 
militants in police custody, the provincial government may try to translate its success in 
the high-profile stand-off into a victory at the polls. '" Hogben quoted University of 
Victoria Political science Professor, Norman Ruff as saying that Attorney General Ujjal 
Dosanjh has become "one of the best things to have happened to the NDP" in 
"transforming the anxieties over aboriginal issues from a political liability into an 
asset." 4 7 
In Media coverage and political terrorists: a quantitative analysis. Richard 
Schaffert explained two techniques of propaganda which, in my view, apply to the use of 
propaganda by the state and police at Gustafsen Lake. The two processes are: "name-
calling," defined as, "affixing a derogatory label to a concept, thereby encouraging its 
rejection" and "'card stacking:' selectively accumulating fact or fiction to support or 
discredit a concept." 4 8 The repeated use of the terms "terrorists" and "criminals" to 
describe the Ts' Peten Defenders signifies "name-calling," while the use of false 
evidence of aggression from the camp to discredit the protest signifies "card stacking." 
When contrasting evidence disclosed at the trial of the eighteen Ts' Peten 
Defenders with the RCMP accounts of Aboriginal "terrorism" supplied to the media it 
becomes evident that the RCMP worked to discredit the legal position taken by the 
protesters by releasing misleading information. Instead of examining the historical 
precedents and points of law raised by the Ts' Peten Defenders, then British Columbia 
Attorney General, Ujjal Dosanjh told the press that, "Gustafsen Lake has nothing to do 
with Aboriginal land claims issues. It's purely to do with the weapons found there and the 
shots that have been fired." 4 9 By controlling the flow of information that was 
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communicated through the media and by invoking negative ethnic stereotypes the 
constitutional arguments of the Ts' Peten Defenders were silenced. By showing physical 
evidence to the media of police vehicles that were allegedly riddled with bullets from the 
camp, 5 0 any assertion that the campers were principled activists engaged in the defence of 
traditional burial grounds became untenable. 
Although there was extensive testimony in court about the inconsistencies in 
RCMP allegations as well as the constitutional and spiritual aspects of the Ts' Peten 
Defenders stand, the Defenders were not exonerated. Several were convicted and went to 
jail. However, as Joey Thompson stated, two years after publishing columns that flatly 
criticized the Ts' Peten Defenders: "Police led the media to believe they had 'consistently 
been fired upon' by camp occupants, including shots fired at an RCMP chopper. But 
most were never confirmed."'1 
A public inquiry is desperately needed to document, clarify and publicize the 
evidence of RCMP wrongdoing at Gustafsen Lake. Such an inquiry should also examine 
the complicity of the media in the broadcast of RCMP disinformation. Only when 
journalists realized the extent to which they were manipulated at Gustafsen Lake, can 
such threats to journalistic integrity and democracy itself be prevented. 
The trial revealed that there are many aspects of the standoff that bear further 
analysis and examination. A public inquiry is required to determine the participation of 
the Prime Minister's Office in endorsing the use of military armaments, especially in 
light of evidence that this endorsement was based on falsified evidence (as explored in 
chapters three, four and five). The participation of the Prime Minister's Office is 
indicated in the notes of Hall on 9 September 1995: "PMO [Prime Minister's Office] -
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not happy - PMO office - apparently military told PMO troops [are] out, we said they 
were not out. Insp. Smith D/Comm Palmer called DEOC [RCMP Divisional Emergency 
Operations Centre] and said APC's are ours to use as we see fit... concern from 
DND/DEOC over wording of media release." 5 2 
The most compelling reasons that a public inquiry is required are outlined at 
length in the three previous chapters of this thesis. There are vast discrepancies between 
what the RCMP said was happening in the confrontation and evidence that shows the 
RCMP were initiators of shooting incidents. Moreover, the approval of the use of the 
military was premised on erroneous accounts of shooting from within the camp. 
Even with the help of undercover informants planted in the cell of Ts ' Peten 
Defenders who awaited trial, the RCMP could not gather evidence to support their 
allegation that they were shot at on 27 August and 4 September. Constable Richard C. 
Demesester testified that he acted in an undercover capacity as a plant in the cell of James 
(OJ) Pitawanakwat, shortly after his arrest. 5 3 Excerpts from RCMP notebooks as well as 
from their own training video indicate that the RCMP were prepared to use excessive 
force at Gustafsen Lake. The claims made in public by the RCMP like those of 
Superintendent Len Olfert that "A peaceful solution is what we always wanted" 5 4 are 
belied by the recorded statements that showed the RCMP intended to use force including 
the following: 
• "The CO (Commanding Officer) commented and I agreed that we need to clean them 
out entirely and not have any hanging issues similar to what occurred at Oka." 5 5 
• "Len [Olfert] feels strongly that there are a small group - 6 warriors, that will not 
give up - it will require the killing of the hardliners" 5 6 (This statement was made 
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between the alleged aggressions of 27 August and 4 September and indicates that the 
RCMP were prepared, at the command level, to kill those in the camp.) 
• "Superintendent Johnston advised that Superintendent Olfert wants to get more 
proactive and take down the red truck and occupants if they can." 5 7 
These quotes paint a very disturbing picture of the state of mind and the actions 
of the RCMP officers who were at Gustafsen Lake. Although they styled themselves the 
guardians of private property and public safety, the evidence shows that police were 
undertaking and advocating provocative military manoeuvres. 
A public inquiry could also determine reasons why the RCMP deleted sections 
from their internal communications regarding the alleged ambush of the ERT team on 4 
C O 
September 1995. (Appendix 11) What did the RCMP have to hide by deleting sections 
of the account of this incident? It is unclear to what extent officials in the Department of 
National Defence, as well as the provincial and federal governments knew they that the 
police account of the 4 September shooting was false. The deleted sections of the RCMP 
account may provide insight. 
Three incidents have been examined most closely in this work but several other 
instances of RCMP use of excessive force merit serious critical analysis. For example, on 
11 September, the RCMP claimed that their officers were fired upon during an intense 
lirefight. Like the three incidents examined most closely in this thesis, the RCMP account 
of the incident (and repeated in most press accounts) was discredited at the trial. Initially, 
Montague told the press that "RCMP officers riding in Armoured Personnel Carriers 
came under such heavy fire that one of the APCs was disabled" and that two Natives ran 
into the trees, carrying weapons with them, and began firing at officers. 5 9 However, he 
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was later forced to admit that the occupants of the truck were not carrying weapons. On 
the same day, the RCMP used land explosives on a camp truck, killed a camp dog and 
shot one of the campers in the arm. This incident, as well as the examination of the 
evidence around the sniper shot taken at one of the campers on 12 September, deserve 
further attention and research. 
At the Ts' Peten Defenders' trial, Judge Josephson acknowledged the seriousness 
of the unprecipitated shooting at one of the Ts' Peten Defenders on 12 September. In his 
reasons for judgement, Josephson noted, "On 12 September, police had withdrawn to the 
perimeters. Police snipers fired three shots 1,000 yards across the lake at a native person 
dressed in camouflage clothing... While well out of normal range for their rifles, the 
shots were designed to kill." 6 1 Regarding the sniper shot, it is important to note that 
Corporal Callander testified, "They had him [the camper] in sights with the intent to kill 
him." 6 2 The Vancouver Sun reported on 12 October 1996, in an article titled, "Snipers at 
Gustafsen Lake, able to 'shoot to kill, '" that "RCMP snipers using a laser-equipped rifle 
were given the green light to shoot to kill Native Indians at Gustafsen Lake last year 
according to court testimony." 6 3 
Another aspect of the conflict that bears further inquiry is the discussion about 
employing Canada's secret commando unit, Joint Task Force Two at Gustafsen Lake. 
Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) is the Canadian Armed Forces elite counter-terrorist/special 
operations unit. (JTF2's exact terms of reference are not known.) On 13 September at 15 
22, Brown noted: ".. .CO's office for a meeting with Murray and I. Supt. Olfert feels 
current situation is beyond a police role and JTF2 [Joint Task Force Two] should be 
called in." 6 4 (See Appendix 2) More research is required to determine whether this force 
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was mobilized at Gustafsen Lake. 
Although RCMP officers were involved initially only as negotiators, the 
operation at Gustafsen Lake swelled into the "the most costly RCMP operation in 
Canadian history." 6 5 Over 400 officers were dispatched, first to investigate and later to 
initiate a "ground assault" 6 6 on the Sundance camp. Throughout the standoff, there was 
little attention paid to pertinent legal and historical issues while reports of Aboriginal 
violence that rationalized the RCMP siege made headlines. The RCMP were engaged in a 
campaign of disinformation designed to convince the general public as well as high-
ranking Department of National Defence officials that the Gustafsen Lake protesters were 
hardened criminals, guilty of instigating shoot-outs with the police. 
By focusing on the alleged threat that lurked within the camp, the police and 
government diverted public attention from the Aboriginal title issue while the RCMP and 
military surrounded the camp with Armoured Personnel Carriers, night vision, stun 
grenades, parachute flare guns, thunderflash and flash bang percussion bombs, 400 M-16 
fully automatic assault rifles, helicopters and 24-hour surveillance cameras. 6 7 A public 
inquiry is necessary to examine evidence that the RCMP response at Gustafsen Lake was 
marked by the use of excessive force and state-sponsored propaganda that obscured 
unresolved legal issues related to Aboriginal title. 
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O u r H o m e And N a t i v e L a n d 
Whose Land 
bit? 
F r o m t h e b r a n d - s p a n k i n g n e w S u r r e y pre - t ra i l c en t r e , 
B E N M A H O N Y t a l b t o William J o n e s I g n a c e , b e t t e r 
k n o w n b y h i s S h u s w a p n a m e , W o l v e r i n e . 
Daniel J. Collins/Propaganda photo 
W e were searched then taken through two sets oflocked doors. Thefirst set slammed loudly as 
we walked into a vacant space of 
white walls and tinted windows. 
Earlier in the day, I had asked my 
photographer-companion Daniel: 
"Is this nungover-ramshackle-by-
rJie-seat-of-your-pants style what 
they call 'gonzo journalism'?'' I 
wanted this discussion to be a shar­
ing of perspective, not an interroga­
tion. So I came as myself and im­
provised my questions on the one-
and-a-halfhour transitride. Gener­
ous Daniel took the assignment 
when we called him the previous 
night at midnight. Like most of the 
general public, he had little infor-
, motion about the land, legislation 
and people who were in the 
Gustafsen Lake camp when the 
WestmobilizarioaoftheR.C.M.P. 
in history surrounded them. '•' 
Wolverine has been in jail since* 
September-1995, charged with 
eighteen other members of the 
Gustafees Lake camp. The pros­
ecution has made its case. Disclo­
sures by the R.GM.P. that they 
engineered a smear campaign and 
evidence that the R.CMJ?. insti-
gated the violence has led to rumours 
that amistrial may be declared. The 
defence has called controversial 
lawyer Bruce Clark to the stand to 
speak to the jurisdiction of the land 
and to the constitutional law which 
framed the demands of Wolverine 
and the camp. Since this is unceded 
territory for which the Shuswap 
Nation has signed no treaty, their 
claim to the land is per the Royal 
Proclamation of1763, which makes 
them allies to the Queen, not ten­
ants. Because this argumentappears 
convincing and well supported in 
existing constitutional law, it has 
been suggested that Federal Justice 
Minister Allan Rock and B.C. At­
torney-General Ujjal Dosanjh may 
attend the proceedings which the 
TsTeten Defenders encourage you 
toattendattheSurrey Court House. 
Bent what can you tell me about 
the Gusta&en Lake area and its 
history? 
Wcjwlnes Well, the Gustafsen 
*U!&.' area is part of the Shuswap 
Nation, i believe it came out in 
testimony about the inter-tribal 
.agreement between the five bands 
that shared that area. But that's still in 
the part that's the Shuswap Nation. 
The Shuswap Nation is a very large 
Nation. It's surrounded by the 
Chilcotin, theLil' Wat, theOkanagan, 
the Kootenay, and the Cree. So you 
see that it takes in right in to the 
Kootenay, about ten hours drive to the 
east. 
B; Were you born in that area? 
W: I'm from the Southern Shuswap at 
Adams Lake. But Percy asked me for 
help for that area in the Sundance and 
from people that were trying to kick 
them off land which is still unceded 
territory because I've been going to 
court with Bruce [Clark] since 1990. 
B: When did you first meet Bruce? 
W: 1990. 
Be Did he approach you? 
W: No, I came down because there 
was an action going over with the 
Mount Currie people. I met Bruce 
there. That was 1990. We went to 
different courts on the Lower Main­
land here trying to get the jurisdiction 
issue addressed. We've been stone­
walled by the judicial system. I think it 
came out in court that Bruce has tried 
to have the jurisdiction argument ad­
dressed 41 different times. 
B: So he spoke to that question in 
regard to different claims, is that right? 
The Lit* Wat and with other people 
out east as well? 
W: Yeah, we had one action which we 
were involved with in '89 in our area. 
I was more or less an advisor in that 
court case. Then Bruce took a case and 
finally it got to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
B: Where was that, th- il 
"Wat? 
Wi No, it was 
hunting issue, bui 
dealing with the
 v 
land issue that v 
hadn't been 
settled in Brit­
ish Columbia. 
So anywhere you 
go you're still on 
unceded territory. 
B: Most of B.C. is 
unceded territory? 
W: Only a few srr.ill 
treaties were made. Treaty 
Eight is a pretty good size of 
Northern B.C., but that one is ques­
tionable. The treaty was made with 
onlyonenarion, [he paused and smiled, 
raising one finger and I could sense my 
diminutive elder warming to the dis­
cussion. It must have been bizarre for 
him to have been inserted into a white 
ten-by-twenty-fbotdiscussion cubicle 
to meet with young white strangers]. 
You cannot get on the map and draw 
out that, "this is our territory" when 
there are people from other Nations 
living on that. These people were 
drawn into Treaty Eight without even 
knowing it. So that treaty is question­
able. 
Bs When you left Gustafsen Lake at 
the end of the incident did you know 
where you were going, that they were 
going to take you here or take you to 
jail? 
W; I didn't know where we were 
going to go but it didn't matter as long 
as we got the issue dealt with. 
Bs Bruce said that one of the main 
reasons for the incident was to raise 
the issue of jurisdiction and the 1704 
precedent. Is that true? 
W: Well, one of our main demands 
was third-party adjudication. Because 
in an appeal hearing in Canada or 
British Columbia, we'll never get a 
fair hearing because you cannot get a 
fair hearing from people that are com­
peting for the same land and resources. 
We've never had any justice in this 
country andldWtthink we everwill. 
Bt Have you sought action in the 
international sphere? 
W: We took on the issue in 1991 
because B.C. didn't want to deal with 
jurisdiction. This is at a lower level 
Judges did not want to listen. So we 
talked it over with Bruce and asked 
how to advance our legal argu-
nent. How could we get 
this heard in the Su-
t \ preme Court of 
Canada if the 
peopleatalower 
level don ' t 
want to lis­
ten? I went 
v to the 
l l l j l l ' United Na-
tions. I rook 
H. t three volumes: 
' • y "International 
Remedies", ' D o ­
le mestic Remedies", and 
different court cases that 
we were involved in at that 
time which the judges didn't want 
to listen to, to law. We felt that there 
might be at least one country in the 
world that could bring out our con­
cerns. We took this to a panel of 
listeners of indigenous peoples in Al­
buquerque, New Mexico in 1993. 
i 
There I testified to the United Na­
tions. What I said was that the whole 
judicial system in Canada was so cor­
rupt that the corruption begins in the 
very Law Society itself, right to all the 
courts in British Columbia, right to 
the attorney general of British Colum­
bia and right to the premier's office. I 
said that's where the corruption is and 
that goes right to the Supreme Court 
of Canada because they do not want to 
listen to law. 
Bi What reaction did you get? 
W: Well, it sort of shocked some of the 
people. What I stated was that if die 
U.N. fails us in what we're trying to do 
here, to bring out the message, ifit fails 
us, where in the world can we go for 
justice? We may have only one more 
avenue we could go and that was to the 
Queen herself because we felt that the 
Queen had jurisdiction. When the 
traditional people speak about the 
Crown we mean "The Imperial Crown 
of Great Britain", the original place 
where jurisdiction stems from. So we 
have to go back there to get our case 
before the Queen and the Privy Coun­
cil 
Bi Do you think that's possible? 
Ws Well, if it's still in the law books, 
like in 1704 in Queen Anne's Court. 
It's only been used [the third-party 
adjudication mechanism] once. 
B: It has been used? In 1704? 
W: Yeah, the Mohegan vs. Connecti­
cut They still have the Privy Council 
and here in Canada, But the Privy 
Council here in Canada will no t rule in 
our favour because they're eating out 
of the same trough as the politicians 
and everybody else. And so is the en­
forcement arm. So that for any kind of 
action that we do here in Canada, we 
are criminalized. Like at Gustafsen Lake 
when yet clearly all the laws are on our 
side. 
B: When Bruce Clark went overseas to 
speak to people their reaction was 
disbelief. 'There's no way that can be 
goingon in Canada," they said because 
of our reputation as a peaceful and just 
nation. Bruce testified that his mind 
and you're mind are one and the same 
on issues of jurisdiction. Is that true? 
Ws Yeah. I've been putting the pieces 
of the puzzle together since 1974 as to 
how the system operates here. 
B: When did you first learn of the 1704 
remedy. 
W: I first learned about this from Bruce, 
but I had the same document of1875, 
which I picked up a few years ago then 
gave to Bruce. 
B: Bruce has supporters and also people 
that criticize him a lot. Some think 
he's being smeared and that the justice 
system is out to get him. 
Wslt'snot only the justice system, the 
enforcement arm of the government is 
after him, too, because with these legal 
arguments he's the best there is in 
Canada. 
B Some that might support you oth­
erwise feel that his behaviour is erratic. 
Wi Because he'sbeenatit and has seen 
genocide happen to Indian peopli 
themselves... some of his friends. Sol 
guess it touches him. People that don' 
knowhim think he'salittlebit off, but 
he's not. He's the best there is. He's 
the only man here in Canada who's 
willing to take on the case. I had a 
lawyer who undermined the very ar 
gumentthat we're putting forth here 
today. 
Bs Was Rankin just arguing about the 
nature of the evidence? 
Ws That's it. What evidence was thai 
when it's all hearsay by the R.C.M.P. 
themselves, all a pack of lies. I will tel 
you this. I've been here for eiL 
months and only two officers have 
told the truth, only two. That's th 
kind of law enforcement that have 
here in Canada now. They're corrupt. 
They're heads are in the trough like 
bunch of pigs. 
There was only two. 
Bs Did media come into the camp? 
Ws We had a few come in but they 
twisted the story so bad. They made 
stories up. That was part of the smeai 
campaign done by the R.C.M.P. to 
discredit us so that way we'd nevet 
gain support from the people across 
Canada or anywhere because we were 
bringing out the law. The law is whai 
we stood on. We asked for third-party 
adjudication through the Privy Coun 
cil. We tried to open the door through 
the Governor General and to get him 
to open the door to the Privy Council 
in Great Britain. That was the only 
real demand we had. 
Bs People didn't hear that. It's been 
acknowledged that there was a smeai 
campaign. What would you say to 
people who want to know about the 
shots that were fired? 
Ws Who's land was it? Who had a 
right to be there? The R.CM.P. came 
in. They're the ones who invaded into 
T u r n to n e x t p a g e 
xied territory and assumed- that 
and belonged to them. How could 
land belong to them when we 
't have a treaty in this country? So 
i's right according to law? Who's 
lis it? Whohasarighttoit? ...The 
iding forces were the R.C.M.P. 
i never had a right according to 
, They're the ones breaking the 
, ever since 1875. In 1876, they 
i to make changes to the Land Act 
mat is known as the Duty of Dis-
wance. It was an Qrder-In-Coun-
&at disallowed B.C. from making 
nges to the Land Act. Then what 
they do? They set up the Indian 
: in 1876 to cover up the big land 
ft in this country. Until these 
the Indian people, 
that Indian Act they put in Section 
which makes all laws applicable to 
But .they don't have the right be-
iseof 109 and 129oftheConstitu-
n Act which says "subject to, sub-
tto"[kindsnu!eof< 
ans a purchase or a treaty, 
I see. And that never happened? 
i Never happened. So whatM they 
i? It's like if you were to draw a circle 
dcutitmhalf, across. That line that 
es across is the constitutional law. 
neti' our rights were stated in the 
'63 Royal Proclamation, t h a t is 
i o v c , and it sates that B.C. and 
: I didn't 
fcThisis where the people are fooled 
.to thinking that they have a right, 
hey .have an aniending formula now 
xause you have the Meech Lake and 
leCharlottctown accords. They have 
ic an^cUng formuk which lasts for 
fteeh'jreais from 1982 to 1997. It"ll 
e up on June 24th, 1997. The Queen 
aveG^nada. 15 years to settle the 
is From thelUpatiiation in 1982? 
ys Jeat' Thev have the amending 
onnjila now, they can make changes, 
>ut until then the land is still ours... 
syeri the Queen cannot make changes 
a what her forefathers put into law. 
Si Doyiou think possible that 
K o p l e overseas will start to realize this 
s happening i n Canada? ,; .: 
rVi Canada has a way of lobbying 
liffetent nations. If there's a disaster 
hey send over some relief to the poor 
»imtriB .I don't know i f uWs ever 
»llected,-but that's used as way of 
juying support through different 
jusiness groups. So. I fee! that we'll 
sever get any justice.until*we get a 
[hird party involved. 
When you look at the underlying tide 
being held by the Indian people, when 
pou get all this resource extraction in 
territories never given to Canada... 
you might have peace treaties but that 
was only for peace between one a n ­
other^; that did not mean that you 
could have a l l the resources on these 
lands. Ifyoulookatthe different 
and plans for what they're going to 
with the water resources in this prov­
ince in the Grand Canal projects... 
8: The water going to the U.S.? 
Wi All this going to the U.S. They're 
going to destroy the major rivers. For 
these people it's just profit. 
Bs Are tile Band Councils part of chat? 
Ws The Band Councils are just the 
yes-men to the federal government. 
They only follow guidelines set up by 
the Department of Indian Affairs 
[D.LAJ and that keeps them in the 
money.keeps the master happy. You're 
not going to bite the hand that feeds. 
So you look at who made those past 
agreements. It's not the ordinary 
people, it's not the grassroots. They*re 
elected officials who are from the same 
department ofthe fedetal government. 
Is this legal? When you have two from 
the same department making a legal 
agreement with one another, is this 
legal? But yet you try to take this into 
court and you deal with the same 
people. So where are you going to get 
justice? Where areyougoing to take it? 
Not here in Canada. 
Where are all the documents? They've 
been hidden away by the D*LA., the 
D.LA. is part of the federal govern­
ment. How are you really going to get 
a straight answer? They're not going to 
help us out. As a matter of fact - you 
watch - if there's going to be any cross-
examination, if the federal govern­
ment comes in. They may. I'm wait­
ing for that because the federal gov-
emmenthasajudttiary trust to protect 
our rights. But nowwe' re talking about 
the land issue. Now we'll see on which 
side of the rence tH^ ? ^ sdy ral gryyyrn meot 
is going to be on. They're going to join 
the province. You just watch. Mark 
my words on this. They're going to 
join with the province and try to attack 
us. And yet you have a judicial trust to 
protect our rights. Getting hack to the 
circle, and Bruce could fill you in more 
on the constitutional law of this 
country and we're above that, We are 
allies to the Queen, not subjects. Now 
it's the subjects that are trying to tell us 
what the hell to do in our own coiin-
try, ma kinglaw which turns the whole 
thing around where we are below that 
line in the circle. They're putting con-
sutuuonal law below or trying to bury 
it. Butyou turn that circle back around 
and up above is the constitutional law, 
sections 109 and 129, that go back to 
1763 that the federal government and 
the provincial government has to live 
w s pan of die British 
North America [B.NA] Act first set 
up in this country in 1867. They twist 
that around for their benefit. This is 
the reason I'm here today, to try to 
bring that part of the law out that's 
been buried. 
[An interruption occurred here and 
confusion as to whether we could con­
tinue. I was taken out and searched 
again on the* way in after fetching 
more tape. The faithful " 
was still in the room listening to Wol­
verine tdl the story of a friend of his 
who was beginning to win cases m law 
relating to the land issue in the U.S. 
This activist was trying to set up self-
sufficient industry on narive territory 
on the west Coast in the way of oil 
refineries and tobacco shops], 
^Vs.. .the people in government didn't 
like that so they charged him with 
different charges to keep him busy in 
the courts. They manufactured differ-
ent evidence in his trial. This is what 
the F.B.I, did. When you say that the 
smear campaign is the specialty of the 
R.C.M.P, you should know that they 
learned this from the F.B.I. The F.B.I, 
used this with different groups in the 
U.S. 
Bi What was that man charged with? 
Ws They charged him with attempted 
murder, arson, you name it. 
B: They charged you with the same 
Ws Yeah, just to keep you in so you 
can't bring the message out to the 
Bs Now you stood up to a tank. 
Ws Yeah [hearty laughter]. 
Bs What do you want to tell people 
about that? Are there some things you 
can't talk about? 
Ws No, it's come out in the courts... 
That A.P.C [Armoured Personnel 
Carrier] was coming at me. He was 
running. I don't know, my; 
had to go after buffalo. They call these 
Bisons, I guess, the A.P.C. What my 
forefathers had to contend with only 
had four legs, this one had eight, I 
guess that's what scared the hell outta 
me [more hearty laughter]. What I'm 
charged for, the six attempts, that's 
what the A.P.C. had, six flat tires. I 
guess there must be K-iicheUn* what 
are the different tire manufacturers' 
names. »• Evcr-resdy..»[hearty laugh-
ter all around... the faithful photogra-
pher offers a company name] So that's 
what I'm charged for. It tried to run 
me over* It missed me. 
S; What were you doing there that 
day? Did they come find you? 
Wi Z came out because people were 
being attacked We were i 
It started off with an explosion which 
the R.CM.P. did not want to bring 
out. They attacked the camp. That's 
self-defence, automatic self-defence. 
Only a small group of people of 18 
against 400. That's great odds. Even 
rhatwasn'tenough, theywere going to 
bnnc the refinrrient nia 
B: When did you first get the sense 
that you were surrounded and you 
were under attack? 
Ws I sensed that pretty well nght away. 
B: August? 
WsYeah. 
B: Had there been attacks from people 
in the neighbourhood? There were 
> that people came around with reports that p 
a bull whip. 
Ws That was the rancher himself, ac­
tually one of his men. I wasn't in the 
8s Percy asked you to come? 
Ws 1 was phoned on June 13th when 
the ranchers came in. So it was on the 
14th we came in during the night... 
what I was there for was more or less to 
bring out the law, the law as I under­
stand i t We had a meeting with two of 
the rancher's sons, one of his daugh­
ters. Three R.C.M.P. officers all came 
into the. camp along with the North­
ern Shuswap TribaTCouncil. 
Bs Was that in June? 
WsYeah, we were discussing the issue. 
It was opened up in this way; Lyle 
James' daughter said: "I guess you 
guys know what we're here, for. The 
law's been broken. We want to have 
something done about it," So I just sat 
there, I thought she was going to carry 
on from that point but she didn't. So 
I said, "I agree with you. The law has 
been broken, but by you people be­
cause we don't have a treaty, there's no 
purchase." The people in the tribal 
council, the Chief, tried to take over 
the meeting from that point on. I told 
him I didnt recognize him in having 
any say on the landissue because I said, 
"You are a civil servant therefore I 
don't want to hear from you because 
the people I work with are the Eiders 
of the'Shuswap and Okanagan Con­
federacy." That Confederacy dates 
back to 1877 with the hereditary 
Chiefs. 
Bi I think Brace was talking about 
how when an agreement is signed be­
tween Natives and newcomers it has to 
be signed by a hereditary Chief. 
WsYeah, that's right. 
Bs And there has to be a community 
oc something like that and 
those things didn't happen in 
WsNo. 
Bs Is it clear who hereditary Chiefs 
would be in this case? 
Ws Well, prior to the Indian Act sys­
tem that was imposed on the Indian 
people, we had four [Chiefs] that went 
over to England in 1906, two from the 
Okanagan, two from, the Shuswap. 
Again in 1924, two from the Shuswap 
and one from the Okanagan. [I wont 
attempt to spell their names - B.M.J. 
In 1884 they put in the law banning 
three or more people from banding 
together, like the Podatch. In 1927 
they made the laws enforceable. And 
for people that talked about the land 
issue, you were picked up, you were 
given maybe sixty days, 
Ws Yeah and sometimes up to a year. 
Itwas 1927that they enforced that law 
in British Columbia. 
Bs What was that law? 
Ws The Potlatch laws - where anyone 
who talked about the land issue could 
be picked up and brought to the courts. 
And people were brought in for over a 
year. Those laws stayed on the books 
until 1951 and then theywere taken 
off because I guess the federal gov-
t felt that a long enough time 
about the land issue... the 
was lost and that the people then 
forget about their nation and the land 
issue. So they took that part of it offin 
1951 and then it was okay to talk 
about the land issue, to gather monies 
for hiring lawyers. Before that, tight 
from 1884 until 1951 it was against 
the law, it was in the books, it was 
against the law for the Indian people 
to hire lawyers. 
Bs From '51 until today, whose been 
on the land around Gu... the Shuswap 
Nation. Is Percy's family from that 
Ws Yeah, he's from up in the North­
ern Shuswap, I'm from the Southern. 
When we went down to Albuquerque 
together he brought out the Sundance 
.in the U.N. you have 
to have the four elements in order to 
he recognized as a nation. You have to 
have the language, the land base, the 
culture, and the religion. This defines 
who you are as a people. So, Percy 
went down with me to Albuquerque 
in '93. That's where we met the ( < 
[inaudible, he was speaking softly but 
Ididn'twsnt to interrupt]) people and 
people from Chiapas. Prior to their 
rebellion down there the las! message 
we got from them was mat, This 
might be the last time we will see you, 
maybe in this lifetime because whea 
we go home we might be walking the 
stars." This is the message they gave us. 
Bs From Chiapas? 
WsYeah. It didn'thitmclwaspuzzled 
a little bit about what he meant be­
cause he was talking very high and 
spiritual It wasn't until I got home I 
thinkitwas the 18th. It wasn't'rillgot 
home. I was sitting down still thinking 
about that and some of the people that 
we met, So I said we're going to have 
to watch that TV. I thitut something is 
gonna-break. 
Bs You just had that sense?-
Ws Yeah, so in the next couple days... 
watch, watch... and sure enough the 
rebellion happened in Chiapas. So far 
I think there's one or two that've come 
up to this area from down there... 
[More visitors were waiting so we the 
interview had to end here. * . ] . 
B: I'd like to talk to some more if I 
couiu anotner nay. 
Ws Yeah, we'll talk some more an­
other time. I hope I filled you in a little 
bit. 
His delivery was like that of a grand­
father. That is the nature of oral his­
tory, I suppose. 
The prosecution continues to push 
for a guilty verdict as Bruce Clark's 
testimony as to the issue of jurisdic­
tion concludes this week. 
. The Ts'Peten Defence Committee 
on the other hand urge you to com­
municate at the website: http:// 
k a f k a . u v i c . c a / ' - v i p i r g / S S I S / 
Ipickedup this tidbit about thecase 
from one of their press releases which 
for one reason of another seem ig­
nored by mass media: 
"Aprevious lawyer informed us that 
she has attended a social function at 
SJF.U.'s Harbour Centre which was 
alsoattendedbyMadamJusticeAbUa, 
Ujjal Dosanjh, and Justice Patrick 
Dohm. 
During this social event our former 
lawyer was told by Justice Dohm that 
she had better not come into this case 
trying to advocate the constitutional 
arguments or the Legal Aid funds will 
dry up. That is nothing less than 
judicial extortion and these statements 
are punishable under Canadian law/ 
said Splitting the Sky, "I stand libel by 
that statement and challenge Justice 
Dohm to prove otherwise." 
Trnmld thatLegalAidhasjustbeen 
cut orTto the defence. 
NOTE to FILE File #: 95KL-334 
r e : GUSTAFSEN LAKE 
Sunday, August 20th. 1995 1245 hrs; I met with the Commanding Officer in Regina 
at the Airport, he reviewed the Gustafsen Lake native incident verbally with me 
indicating that the natives are still refusing to leave property, the ERT Members were 
checkino.il o MXljS^lfJ^ iWj 
i a m leader. 
7' 
Kamloops are putting together a plan to go in and get them out. ^he use of firearms 
is definitely a p o s s i b i l i t y a n d we may ^ e o our protectivetype*of devices from the 
military to ensure that otif personnel • a r e ^ n o t hu^"'"T ,he CO. c o i f f m e n t e d and I agreed 
that we need to clean them out entirely ana riot have any hanging issues similar to 
what occurred at Oka 
August 2Qth, 1995 1645 ius: I received a phone call from Willard Townsend who had 
been instructed by the CO, prior to his departure, to brief me on the Gustafsen Lake 
situation. We again reviewed the same material that f had discussed with the 
Commanding Officer and he informed me that Insp. GUY is coordinating the effort 
from Division Headquarters. 
August 22nd, 1995 2200 hrs: I received a call from the Commanding Officer who is 
on conference in Regina. We had a general discussion about the Kamloops 
operational plan. The CO has also discussed this issue with the Commissioner, who 
i&^^^^^^^^^^^^dmm^Nes m f t e q h a ^ g o i n g ; ^ | f h e . 
CO suggests getting the lawyers In Ottawa and the Attorney General Department 
lawyers and have them research how we are going to get the bison and personnel -
carriers through the province or are we going to go to the base to get them on" our. 
own. 
August 23rd. 1995 1028 hrs: Insp. Guy met with me and gave me a short briefing 
in respect to the Gustafsen Lake incident. He advised that 0800 hrs. the CO called 
and wants to-!|fi||f^  tsisonsf 
He also wants us to keep track of all newspaper clippings that are being published on 
this affair. He a d t i s e d s t h a t the military h< 
•Mm 
advised him. Apparently the OCvKamloops. has an open line of communications to the 
urned down our request ^ and referredito;;-
Kamloops has been called by Insp. Guy and 
natives and Wit!' rig to them today, Supt..; Olfert maybe going :.out .to that 
to the Cariboo Tribal Council today at 5:00pm and he would make a decision after 
that. I advise the D/Commr. Beaulac that Supt. Len Olfert at Kamloops would be the 
best individual to liaise with Mercredi as he has all the ground information and would 
be making a decision as to whether it would be safe to proceed with this plan of 
action/ : - ''."' r'., •.. • *; 
Aifqust.'23rd. 199'5 1155 hrs: I spoke with Supt. Len Olfert. He stated that the 
Detachment Commander at 100 Mile House had talked to the Natives at Gustafsen 
Lake on the phone'and did not get a good response.\^h^^^^isi^Sp^l^&S 
s|h_e^^e/n^r^Gener^l 7of Canada and njo^one els^. ' I advise him to call'D/Commr. 
Beaulac^and discuss with him the involvement or possible involvement of Ovide 
Mercredi. 
August 23rd^1S95J~T2T¥Tirs: Insp. Guy advised that there will be training nine of our 
peopleat Chilliwack starting tomorrow. The training would go on for two to three 
jys. It would be a very intense bare bones training to allow them to operate the 
bikon transporters. He further advised me Media Relations will collect all the 
f 
August 27th. 1995 1124 hrs: The CO continued to discuss the APC and the numbers 
of people involved. We believe that most of the people will comply when we move 
in. The peace consultation process would be exhausted when Mercredi says he 
cannot do any more. The Attorney General requests an overview time line of the 
events at the site since last June. Insp. Guy will prepare this for him. The main issue 
is can Mercredi talk them out, if not, he should leave and we will get on with our 
operational plan. 
August 27th. 1995 1200 hrs: The CO briefed D/Commr. Beaulac on the current 
status at Gustafsen Lake. The military vehicles are under the command of the CO as 
of 2000 hrs (8:00pm) the night before. This was given by Major General Addy. 
Peter Montague has to tighten up on what he says to the media, the only mandate 
that Mercredi has is to talk the natives out and surrender to us unconditionally. 
August 27th. 1995 1220 hrs: The CO put on a conference call with Supt. Olfert. 
We reviewed the meeting with the Attorney General this AM. Everyone is on side. 
The Attorney General and we would come to an agreement, when we have exhausted 
all avenues then we would go in. 
Olferts states it is very hard to seal the militants in as the 
vehicle got through today. 
August 27th. 1995 1246 hrs: The CO asked me to call Supt. Rick Preston and set 
him up to help Supt. Olfert. 
20 
August 27th. 1995 1250 hrs: Call placed to Insp. Earl Moulton by the CO he wanted 
to know if there is a problem with the military, the issue is, the military cannot seem 
7 — ! 
to take overt action. CO advised that the troupes and vehicles are under his control 
and if there is further difficulties to advise him and he would go back to Major General 
Addy. 
August 27th. 1995 1307 hrs: I called 1 ^ ^ ^ f ^ ^ | | ^ n ^ § r ^ n d % a v e him a brief 
update on the meetings and the events so far. 
August 27th. 1995 1515 hrs: Attorney General called and advised me that BCTV has 
just reported that three officers had been shot at Gustafsen Lake. He wants 
confirmation. I advised him that I did not have my TV on, and that I would get 
confirmation from my office. 
August 27th. 1995 1520 hrs; Called Insp. Guy he advised that Emergency Health 
Services in Kamloops have reported that two members were shot and that they were 
wearing bullet proof vests. 
August 27th. 1995 1525 hrs: I called the Attorney General advised him of what Insp. 
Guy had informed me and at this time it was unknown what the condition of the 
members was. 
August 27th. 1995 1530 hrs: The CO advised of the info received from Insp. Guy. 
The CO will advise headquarters Ottawa of the sketchy information. 
August 27th. 1995 1535 n ^ ^ ^ g ^ l i e l i S P o l t e r f a d called In to Insp. Guy and 
' advised that two ERT teams were standing by while the Ministry of Forestry were 
clearing trees off the road. They were shot hitting the vest on their way out to 100 
Mile House. The PC was left at the scene. Forestry people have also vacated the 
• 2 1 
scene. There were rapid fire shots at the police vehicle and they were hit in the back 
of the bullet proof vest . All road blocks have been pulled out except the main one, 
on the road to 100 Mile House." There is,one check point 15 kilometres from the site, 
all the rest have been abandoned. Mercredi is telling the press that this will be a day 
of rest. Wescam has picked up the members at this end. The shooting occurred 
while the members were on their way towards the logs were on the road on the 
stand-by location." It was an "ambush; the members are alive and OK., 'They-are being 
checked out at 100 Mile House Hospital. - . ; 
August 27th. 1995 1554 hrs: The CO advised of the above, 
August 27th. 1995 1640 hrs: Arrived at the Office on re-call to deal with this crisis 
situation. 
Audus^7tl i&. 9~'9fN 65Qlh1rl§ln^he; CO&Office with^Chje^/Supt.vM.?John^ton, 4nsp^ : 
. .Di^iw^nd-myseif^The CO wants to set up on a 24 hour basis our DEOCC, asked 
that. it be activated. We will use it as our central communications point. Have 
Kamloops set up a similar facility to ensure we got smooth communication. All NOC 
inquiries would be directed to DEOCC. 
August 27th. 1995 ^703" hrs^lhsp. Earl Moulton called on conference calf with us. 
He advised that two ERT vehicles and one PSD vehicle were in with the Forestry crew 
who were clearing the logs off the road that were cut earlier by the natives. 
Members were acting as cover. They saw a white dog in the bush which they 
recognized as being seen in the native camp and ran back to their vehicles. This 
location was about 6 kilometres from"the'encampment. We.received fire, possibly 
semi-automatic, fronvthe campsite of the road. The rear vehicle of. the ERT group 
returned ihe fire,, there .were more semi-automatic fire, and bullets when through t h e 
back-of the suburban and lodged In' the dash, ft was^ecQyered'ancl. it. appears to be 
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7.62 millimetre full metal Jacket.- Which is a concern with the APBs as it, according 
to Earl Moulton's information, it would go right through them. Moulton feels it is no 
longer a police process, and we must do something to stop this type of ammo. He 
is not of the opinion wj|i!lr^^ 
too dangerous.' T T ^ l ^ ^ there is still 25.. 
to 30 people in the camp. Right now there are 12 ERT people out on the roads. 
Vancouver team will relieve them in a short while. The CO feels we should look at 
mobilizing all our ERT members. We have tentative identification of approximately 15 
persons in the camp, some are from Chase, several are Mohawks, estimate of 7 or 
8 of them, some are local people who are hanging on at the camp for whatever 
purpose. Earl Moulton has been talking to the Force psychologist, Mike Webster, 
about these people. Webster has'worked with the FBI on their major cases such as 
CO feels we should move the APCs into position. The CO wants traditional 
roadblocks set-up to control the access. The CO advised Earl to get his people to a 
safe position and Earl is assessing a safe retrieval of the abandoned PC. We need the 
second Wescam from Ottawa to assist with observation. A mobile command centre 
will be established near 100 Mile House. Camp participants are concentrated in the 
camp and there are a few scattered throughout the bushes which is hard to pin them 
down. Earl Moulton will attempt to seal off as much as the camp as possible. His 
contact number 
August 27th. 1995 1728 hrs: Cojr|Ti1ssiQrief ^ u l r ^ ^ i ^ ^ e ^ C Q f He is checking 
on the members who have been shot at. They have been checked at 100 Mile House 
Hospital and they are OK. The CO gave an overview of the current situation. 
Members c a^^^^^^^^^^^^^S% s ^ l d e n c e of them full metal jacket ammo. 
•?The Commissioner will.get the;second Wescam.on'itsrway out here. 
August 30th. 1995 1920 hrs: Called S/Sgt. Wayne Jeffreys. He advised that Stuart 
and Frances Dick are in 100 Mile House detachment. He does not have any further 
information and will check with Kamloops. 
August 30th. 1995 1923 hrs: Called C/Supt. Johnston. He has briefed Stephen 
Owen on the two people who walked out. 
August 30th. 1 9 9 5 1930 
' August 31st. 1995 0730hrs: C/Supt. Johnston advised that Bruce Clark is losing 
patience with us and has walked out to the roadblock and demanded access to the 
camp. Members at 100 Mile House feel he is suffering from sleep deprivation and 
they will try and talk him into taking it easy and get some rest and then discuss his 
visit to the camp. 
August 31st. 1995 O830hrs: C/Supt. Johnston advises Bruce Clark has stated he is 
going back to Ottawa. Supt. Len Olfert will be talking to the elders today. 
August 31st. 1995 0840hrs: The CO advised that he spoke to Major General Add'sp-
who told him the ChHIiwack Times is going to run an article about the APC's we have 
staged at Kamloops. Major General Addie has instructed the Acting Base Commander 
at Chilliwack to approach the editor of the Times and have him kill the story as it 
would put lives in jeopardy. The CO wants this logged • in DEOC. The Supt. 
contacted as well as'Supt. Olfert was advised. ' 
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September 1st. 1995 0900hrs: Meeting in the CO's office where we discussed 
resourcing of ERT at Gustafsen Lake. Prince George is using municipal members on 
ERT which depletes the municipal complement. CO requests that a discussion be had 
with C/Supt. Don Belke about the bill-out provincial costs on this for transfer to the 
municipality. CO feels that it would be appropriate for Murray Johnston and I to visit 
the members next week to see how they are doing. The CO also feels that Bruce 
Clark double crossed us and we should have nothing further to do with him. 
September 1st. 1995 0949hrs: Supt. Len Olfert called while our meeting was in 
^ progress. Clark has done damage in Olfert's view. He has asked negotiators to come 
Oy up with a plan. He is working on a profile of Wolverine (Ignace). The family had 
*f contact with Rosette and he had a definite emotiorfafjmpact.on him. Olfert will not 
let Clark back into the camp again. The biggest he is having is command structure 
| and he hopes to resolve it soon, between HQ, Kamloops and 100 Mile House. He 
wants to move in a bigger mobile command post. He will look at Burnaby mobile 
| command post for that purpose. Olfert is looking at their planning and the media 
strategy. Have to give us a better profile on this, Clark took a tobacco gift into the 
camp yesterday when he went in to visit the occupants. He is considering getting 
the Adams Lake band as that is where Wolverine is from. There may be about six 
occupants in the camp who handle the guns. There is no indication there are any 
hostages in the camp at this time. It appears that Ovide Mercredi is gone from 100 
Mile House. Olfert has heard that there are military people in 100 Mile House who 
. are looking at taking over this incident. We may eventually use the APC's for patrols 
but this would aggravate the situation and be very controversial across the country. 
We cannot rush in, we have to continue to negotiate and go slowly. We have to. 
| pressure the Shuswap elders to work at resolving this. 
V ' . September '1st.1995-1135hrs: D/Cornr^ pl^ SiSuSfe had talked to the. CO and 
was updated by him.' He advised he had received a call from D/Commr. Jerry Boose 
--. - ' 39 .. - V = 
September 13. 1995 1510hrs: Called Stephen Owen and advised him of one more 
native walking out and the elder doing the CBC broadcast. 
September 13. 1995 1522hrs: CO's office for a meeting with Murray and I. Supt. 
Olfert feels current situation is beyond a police role and JTF2 should be called in. 
Members are getting very tired and discouraged. ERT is not trained for this type of 
operation. They can hold this position but can't last for too long. The CO states that 
if we can get a Chief of our choice and guarantee them safety, the natives in the 
camp will come out. There is a lot of stress and fatigue working on our people. The 
CO directed that we pull some of our ERT back from some of the points to give our 
people relief. Put them into a holding pattern for a while. We have to review our 
strategy. If we need more teams to replace the tired members, we may have to 
borrow. Supt. Bill Sweeney from "G" and Supt. Cal Legasik, "F" Division. Make sure 
Montague does not make any mention of a pull back in his press releases. Contact 
— i — - — — • _ — — . _ _ _ — . • — 
"D" Division and alert them. The CO feels we should call all the Divisions, through 
Frank Palmer and have him alert the other Division ERT teams. Ask for Legasik to 
replace one of our officers. Also, get Sweeney from "G". Talk to military about 
getting a representative from JTF2. 
September 13. 1995 1640hrs: CO called Supt. Olfert and asked for an update. The 
Chief has gone on CBC Radio and broadcast a message that the camp people could 
come out safely. The natives then held a press conference at 1530hrs that was very 
positive. The sundancer who is assisting has gone in with 3 vans to talk to the 
renegades in the camp. Discussed the resourcing issue at 100 Mile House. The CO 
directed Olfert to withdraw the teams to a safe position. Olfert states they are out 
to a position that ERT can control. Olfert doesn't want to pull out too far as it will 
open their supply lines. "F" Division ERT team is in 100 Mile House and is being 
briefed. Supt. Hall advised the surveillance plane indicates all the camp occupants 
are gathered in the area of the vans. Some are running around and may be disposing 
70 
r.P&: 
" V- D R A F T 
P R O T E C T E D " B " 
KAMLOOPS SUB/DIVISION OPERATIONAL PLAN 
Q U S T A F S O N T . A K E . , 
FILE: 9 5 K L - 3 3 4 • KAMLOOPS SUB/DIVISION 
FILEs 95-528 100 MILE HOUSE DETACHMENT 
SECURE FAX/KAM 
Prepared B y : 
S/Sgt. K . PORTER 
WEST SECTION NCO 
KAMLOOPS SUB/DIVISION 
•CST. R. WILBY 
kamloops smmmsim 
ERT LEADER 
U n d e r - the B l r e c t l d a o f t 
Supt. L e a O L F E R T ,
 t . -
"3S : 44PM RT>P_KPrt.COPS -
PROTECTED "B" 
OPERATIONAL PLAN - GUSTAFSON LAKE FILE 95KL-334 3 
DELEGATION O F AUTHORITY; 
Kamloops Sub/Division having geographical responsibility for policing the GUSTAFSON 
LAKE/100 MILE HOUSE area becomes the organizational entity to provide police services to 
deal with this situation. 
All police operations will come under the direction of the Officer Commanding Kamloops 
Sub/Division Supt. L. OLFERT who will participate in the execution of this plan. His 
delegation of responsibilities is as follows: 
Ops. Commander S/Sgt. Ken PORTER 
Site Commander S/Sgt. Brian TURNER 
ERT Operations ' Sgt. Vera BRAVENER 
The NCO i/c 100 Mile House Detachment remains responsible for the delivery of police services 
within the Detachment area and as such is responsible for the investigation of criminal offence^ 
pursuant to this situation. 
S I T U A T I O N ; 
There -is a small group of natives occupying approximately one quarter square mile of private 
land situated roughly 45 minutes by gravel road southwest of One Hundred Mile House B.C. 
The property District Lot 114 Lillooet Land District is clearly private land deeded to the James 
Cattle Company owned and operated by Lyle JAMES and his family. There has been disruption 
to the operation of the ranch in that the natives have erected fences around the site, prohibited 
access by ranch staff and have disrupted the free movement of some of the ranch cattle in the 
OPERATIONAL PLAN - GUSTAFSON LAKE FILE 95KL-334 
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area. The site is not on or near any main roads to or from anywhere. Fishermen and campers 
who use the area for recreational purposes with JAMES' tacit concurrence have not been denied 
access to the Lake. According to the group occupying the site, and the small group of vocal 
supporters across the country, the area does not belong to JAMES and forms part of "Sacred 
Aboriginal Ground". 
At present the group is believed to consist o ^ g ^ o j ^ B l ^ ^ ^ n . women and children who 
remained behind after the actual Sundance Ceremony which was held from early to mid July, 
plus an additional group of 10-20 supporters including some non-natives who arrived within the 
last few days for an estimated total of 30-40. There is some question as to the exact number 
present as some of them disappear into the woods when members attend the site and others are 
coming and going continuously. The group remaining are adamant they will "Hold the Sacred 
Land". The main players include Percy ROSETTE of Alkali Lake, the organizer and long term 
"squatter" John DOXTATOR (alias: Splitting the Sky) who has acted as spokesperson and 
security officer, and an unidentified militant native known only as "Raven". DOXTATOR is 
believed to be John HILL FBI #259784H a l W t g ^ | ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f f l | 
across Canada recruiting and encouraging the reactivation and expansion of the American Indian 
Movement (AIM). He recently c o m p l e t e d ^ ^ ^ $ f f l ^ f f l ^ f e ^ t e ^ ® f f i 8 ^ ' . All others 
observed on the site with the exception of a few local natives, remain unidentified as they wear 
masks and camouflage clothing. Efforts are ongoing to identify more of the group. The group 
is receiving advice from Bruce CLARK, an Ontario lawyer who represented members of the 
LJL'WAT PEOPLES MOVEMENT arrested in connection with u ^ M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ K j R E 
CREEK BLOCKADES a number of years ago. -The group has little or no support 'from natives 
In the aresu The Cariboo Tribal Council which represent the bands upon.who's traditional 
territories the site lies, has publicly denounced the group and their occupation otfMs site. 
Likewise, the Traditional Sundance Society claim this group are not bona fide"^iundanceri. 
Efforts by local detachment members, JAMES and his staff, and local native leaders, to have 
PROTECTED " B " 
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this group move peaceably, have been unsuccessful. There have been several shooting incidents 
in the One Hundred Mile House/Williams Lake area over the past few weekssa£SMi&SB& 
the site were arrested August 11th 1995 by Federal Fisheries Officers fishing illegally in the 
Fraser River near Williams Lake. They had in their possession an AK-47 assault rifle and a 
loaded 9MM semi-automatic pistol. The assault rifle was accompanied by three loaded 30 round 
clips. In addition a number of martial arts weapons and a piano wire garrot were seized. A 
total of eleven weapons related charges have been laid. Rumours of the presence of these 
weapons have persisted throughout other actions in this Sub/Division such as the Blockades at 
Merritt and Adams Lake. A ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | a H M a ® M a ^ ^ t e l J © J ® ^ ^ I W ^ T O W 
^ ^ P | ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ s i k e ^ i t £ ? Preliminary planning included reconnaissance 
patrols by E.R. Team members in an attempt to determine a threat level. During one of these 
patrols in the early morning hours of August 18th, c^^^^av^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
igttt3£ Within seconds of this encounter the native fired at one of our members with the bullet 
narrowly missing him. The native fled the scene. T f e S I M M ^ r a ^ ^ H ^ ^ ^ S I ^ ^ W 
Iflsl^Se^^^ngn^ On August 19th, CBC Television aired a video of the site in which a spoke 
person known as "Splitting the Sky" believed to be HILLS, states any attempt by the RCMP to 
arrest anyone on the site or remove anyone from the site will be interpreted as an act of war. 
In addition, the video shows armed natives dressed in camouflage clothing some of which are 
carrying assault weapons. As well, the video features "Splitting the Sky" instructing unidentified 
natives in commando warfare. ; ' 
conference featuring speakers from DFO, RCMP, 
Cariboo Tribal Council and Lyle JAMES himself; .The objective-of this conference:.was' two 
fold. Firstly, to warn the public of the presence; of,this radical-'gfopp and their weaponk and 
secondly, 
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SJffiATEfiX 
Clearly, there are serious Criminal Code weapons offenses ongoing at the site. As well, those 
on the property are constructively breaching Section 430(l)(c) of the Criminal Code, ffl 
Jited and dangerous weapons. At present, the RCMP 
docs not^have the resources to safely enter Che area and enforce the law. To facilitate execution 
f B 3 S S B ^ ^ S ^ 3 f f l 3 S U S ^ ^ f ^ This will be followed by the arrest of all persons on the site 
including those attempting to leave. The next phase involves implementation of EDU to deal 
with explosives and booby-traps believed to be on the site. This will be followed by a full 
search of the si^ g^Bia^ B^ i^ hc^Bu^ tnt. Once the area has been fully searched and video 
taped, evidence seized, and prisoners secured, we will maintain site security pending dismantling 
of the structures and other impediments to lawful use of the land. In response to a request from 
the Cariboo Tribal Council, Native Chiefs will be invited to first remove any items considered 
by them to be of significance, prior to turning the property back to Lyle JAMES for total 
destruction of everything illegally constructed. Follow-up investigation with respect to offenses 
in connection with this operation will be the responsibility of 100 Mile House Detachment. The 
exception being the shooting incident involving our Emergency Response Team, August 18th, 
which will be investigated by Kamloops Sub/Division G.I.S. as an Attempt Murder and any 
shooting incidents coincidental to the execution of this Plan which will also be investigated by 
Sub/Division G.I.S. 
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Video down load from West Cam 
. secure phone 
- / ' EHS radio ^ 'cJk<* 
• Vehicle repeaters deployed as directed by Radio Techs. 
...Special "I", Aircraft, EDU and Ident to communicate directly with Command Centre. 
. All other police vehicles operate on assigned channel. 
ERT members equipped as per ERT Commander's instruction. 
All other members in full working uniform minus head gear, including vest and gloves. 
Equipped with disposable handcuffs. 
Photography 
- Ident members equipped to video and still photograph 
- Operation to be taped via West Cam surveillance aircraft 
Exhibit person equipped as required. 
Special T and EDU equipped as required. 
CjnATUKiT-^LnM LL-iftfr • TPS < £ . 22 e¥TH 
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All expenses for this project are chargeable to 100 Mile House Rural Detachment 
Collator E2196. Form 1393 and 1112 must contain the notation "Gustafson Lake" with 
a copy provided to NCO i/c 100 Mile House Detachment. 
BRJEFTO? 
All personnel involved in this operation are to report to Kamloops Sub/Division at 1200 
hours August 24th 1995 for briefing. It is requested that where ever possible members 
travel-by unmarked police vehicle to the briefing.. 
'TELEPHONE DIRECTORY - . 
Appendix " C attached (forthcoming) 
MILITARYmmmc^ : 
«,
 : Four (4) BISON APCs C/W driver and driver supervisor. 
appropriate transportation for BISON to and from field muster point. 
EDU Team / 
BISON familiarization training for ERT and PSD members, 
temporary overnight accommodation RMR barracks for approximately thirty (30) 
ERT/PSD personnel 
Field mobile kitchen to provide one mid day meal for approximately fifty (50) RCMP 
personnel at field muster point. 
ERT OPERATION - APPENDIX "A" 
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The execution of 
monitorial ground activity during the ground assault. The Command Post for over-all command 
will be situated at 100 Mile House Detachment and manned by SUPT. OLFERT and personnel. 
Ops. Commander ERT will be on site in Air 4 to command all ground forces. If dale of ground 
assault is 0700 hr. 95.08.25 (Friday) all ERT personnel and support personnel will be 
sequestered in the RMR Armoury no later than noon Thursday 95.08.24. This will facilitate 
briefing and training as well as enhance the security of the Operation. 
95 August 24 -1200 hr?, 
All personnel in RMR Armoury full briefing and training period. 
95 August 24 . 2300 hrs. 
Final briefing and updating gear up. Equipment check. 
95 August 25 • 0200 hrs. 
Depart RMR Armoury for 100 Mile House staging area via Team Suburbans 
Staging area is large gravel pit approximately 15 kilometres from site. 
95 August 25 - 0600 hrs. 
Arrive 100 Mile House staging area. 
95 August 25 • 0630 hrs. 
Board (APQ BISON 
Depart for ground assault jump off point. 
0700 h r s , 
West Cam already on scene video taping. 
Air 4 and Ops commander already in the air with FLIR operating. 
IT "J c-iA<vs.*-fsr-_i.r»%J l u t c t b <-e -7-7 c*tm 
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CHROIJND ASSAULT PLAN 
ERT will be utilizing four (4) Military "BISON* armoured personnel carriers. They will 
be operated by a military driver who will be assisted by a Military Crew Commander. • 
These Military personnel will be confined to the BISON'S for the duration of the 
operation. 
Due to a large area, containment will be difficult and not guaranteed. The dynamic use 
of APC's will reduce risk and enhance member's safety. 
Each of the four (4) BISONS will carry eight (8) ERT personnel
 8one PSD and handler 
totalling nine (9) persons. Each BISON will have a POLICE sign on each side and the 
front. As well each BISON will have a corresponding number on the top of the BISON 
to assist the Air borne ERT Ops Commander in identification of land units. 
The four (4) BISONS and ERT personnel will depart from the staging area and proceed 
aboard the BISONS down the #1000 Road to the right hand turn into the encampment. 
From this point the four BISONS will proceed at maximum speed into the encampment. 
BISON #1 will proceed past the gate (which is on the east side of the encampment) and 
proceed directly to the already identified sniper position on the rock out cropping 
approximately 600 yards N/E from the encampment. The BISON will drive directly to 
the sniper position and five (5) ERT personnel and one (1) PSD and handler will exit the 
..; BISON and secure this position which has a commanding view of the ©pen 'terrain to the 
S/W which is the encampment - At the same time BISON #2 and #3 will proceed to the -
encampment. One from the east side and one from the west side. ..Upon entry to 
-> prdperty:;following statement will be.issued from the APC's.•: "This Is the Polio©/ Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police. We are tee to execute a Search War^ 
the Criminal Code of Canada". Separate instructions will be issued regarding the 
- vwB.»jv-_jj-tt4 S.WTC: TPS C« . W AHH 
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lowering of weapons and arrest procedures. All personnel will remain in the BISONS 
until BISON #1 has secured the sniper position. BISON #1 will traverse the high ground 
south from the sniper position to prevent any offensive fire from the tree line to the east 
of the encampment. Once the sniper position is secure BISON #2 and #3 will secure the , 
encampment and deal with passive and violent resistance. All prisoners will be secured. 
All structures will be entered and searched. Once the immediate area is secure then 
BISON #2 will transport the prisoners to the 1000 Rd and turn them over to the arrest 
teams. All evidence will be secured for the investigation team. BISON #4 will be left 
available to respond to any request for assistance from the other BISONS or the ground 
team. 
Once the warrant has been executed and all prisoners and evidence secured then the ERT 
compliment will standby while the remaining structures are bulldozed by Ranch Owner 
Lyle JAMES. Upon completion the BISONS and ERT will return to the staging area. 
It has been requested that Special "I" eliminate the auto-tel and hand held radio 
capabilities, to facilitate as much surprise as possible. 
With the event of armed natives being observed, they will each be dealt with as 
expediently as possible. Each encounter will be done by the BISON. If an armed native 
was to run into the bush thusly posing a physical threat BISON #4 will be tasked with 
pursuing and arresting same. The confrontation will be done.by the PSD carried within 
each BISONS It is anticipated that with some degree of surprise most of the inhabitants 
will be encountered and surrounded at the'encampment . : 
Stealth 'approach is not being.considered atthisrtlme. dueto previous encounter and risk 
of a compromise! prior to Warrant e x e c u t i o n . y • . 
iment Gouvernement 
-Canada du Canada 
Commiss ioner , Ot tawa 
Att: Di rector Communi ty Contract and 
T Abor ig inal Pol ic ing Branch 
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FROM "E" Divis ion 
DE 
MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE 
o b j e t C T G u s t a f s e n Lake Operation 
Videotaping Bv D iv is ion Training S e c t i o n 
J 
1 
J 
SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE 
Protected "A is 
OUR FILE - N/REFERENCE 
YOUR FILE - V/REFERENCE 
DATE 
1997.02.02 
Reference your E-mai l message o f 97-01-23 asking fo r an explanat ion o f the v ideotaping o f the 
Gustafsen L a k e cr iminal 
Please find attached correspondence from Insp. EDWARDS dated 97-01-28 explaining the 
rationale for the taping of the Gustafsen L a k e operat ion. At the time of the taping no one thought 
about the ramif icat ions relating to disclosure that the video tapes would have, but concentrated on 
the value to fixture Operations Commander training. It must be pointed out that in 50 hours o f 
video taping of the highly charged and very stressful Gustafsen Lake investigation, Defense 
Counsel has only identified three incidents that have become embarrassing to the Force. These 
incidents are truly unfortunate, but when members work extensive hours under very stressful 
conditions comments like those made become a fact of life. N o one, much less the members 
involved, likes what has happened as a result of the statements becoming public. However, this 
incident has become a learning experience and we will have to move forward and ensure that it 
does not happen again. 
If you require any further information, please feel free to contact me. 
( M . J. J O H N S T O N ) A/Commr. 
OIC Operatic 
"E" Division 
7 7540-21-798-8998 
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'August 25, 1995 
The Honourable Ujjjal Dosanjh, 
Attorney GsnersJ, 
Province of British Columbia, 
Parliament Buildings, 
Victoria, British Columbia. . 
VSV1X4. 
««SECUREfiur; 
• Y A R N I N G - THIS DOCUMENT REQS HRES SPECIAL 
H A N D L I N G . IT HAS BEEN PROCESSED BY A SECURE 
:OMML/KICATJONS SYSTEM .AND CONTAINS SENSITIVE 
INFORMATION WI J'-CH MUST BE SaPCGUARDED. YOUR 
T E L E T H O N S IS N O T SECURHi, do'nOV discuss THE 
Dear Minister, 
This win acknowledge your correspondence dated August 25, 1995. 
I am confirrning in writing, the following: 
" Given the present dreumstaneesj the RCMP cannot fulfill its policing responsibilities in a safe 
manner and protect the security of the public regarding the activities of the group of individuals at 
Gustafsen Lake without the requested armoured personnel carriers; 
The RCMP are confident this group of individuals is in possession of various weapons and 
equipment including AK-47a, based upon various sources including video taped evidence of persons 
inside the compound possessing these weapons; . 
Upon a direct h i t , the A K - 4 7 weapon has the necessary firepower to penetrate a normal 
personnel carrier at ten meters potentially killing the occupants; 
The armoured personnel carriers are not equipped with weapons, will be clearly marked as 
police vehicles, and will be used to provide safe and protective transport for RCMP investigators; 
- The RCMP are not requesting military personnel to possess weapons as their functions will 
be restricted to operation of the four Bisons as transport vehicles, and as members of The Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal Team who may be required to deal with any unusual military explosives or devices 
encountered; -
The request for food rations for one hundred for one day reflects the length of time RCMP 
and military personnel may be required given the isolated location and complexity of this operation; 
The RCME will continue to maintain all reasonable efforts to resolve this matter without the 
use ©f force and, in conducting this operation, will use the minimum force required to conclude the 
criminal investigation and apprehension of any suspects. 
Canada! 
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I trust this will assist you in finalizing your decision in this matter. 
Yours truly* **/s&3 
ity Commissioner, 
Division. 
ff a SECUBEFAX ty-
' E ' D i v i s i on Headquarters, 
657 West 37th Avenue, 
Vancouver, British Columbia. 
V5Z 1K6. 
EARNING - THIS DOCUMENT REQUIRES SPECIAL 
H a n d l i n g, it has been procgssrd by a secure 
Communications system and contains sensitive 
information which must bs safeguarded. y o u r 
TELEPHONE IS NOT SECURE. D O NO'* usscuss THE 
"jtp.nts o p t j j : s r y v i i w p . n t o v f j ; the yj-j.pj'm< w e . 
A u g u s t : 2 5 , . 1 9 9 5 
Deputy Commissioner J. D. Farrell 
Commanding Officer 
"E* Division Headquarters 
Royal Canadian. Mounted Police 
657 West 37th Avenue 
Vancouver, British Columbia 
V5Z I K6 
Dear Deputy Commissioner Farrell: 
I am writing in response to your letter of August 24, 1 9 9 5 , 
wherein you ask me to request the a i d of the Canadian Forces 
to provide the RCMP with specialized equipment and services . 
with which to carry out your policing duty related to the 
activities of the individuals at G u s t a f s e n Lake. In 
considering your request, I wish to confirm the f o l l o w i n g 
additional information provided to the Ministry .o f A t t o r n e y 
General by you and your officials yesterday and t o d a y : 
Given the present circumstances, the RCMP cannot fulfill 
its policing responsibilities in a safe manner and 
protect the security of the public regarding the 
activities of the group of individuals at Gustafsen Lake 
without the requested armoured personnel carriers,-
The RCMP are c o n f i d e n t this group of individuals i s in 
possession of various weapons and e q u i p m e n t including 
AK-47s, based upon various s o u r c e s including video taped 
evidence of persons inside the c o m p o u n d possessing these 
weapons; 
Upon a direct hit, the AK -47 weapon has the necessary 
firepower to penetrate•a normal personnel carrier at ten 
meters potentially killing the occupants; 
The armoured personnel carriers are not equipped with 
weapons, will b e clearly marked a s police vehicles, and 
will be used solely to provide s a f e and protective 
transport for RCMP investigators; 
The RCMP are not requesting military personnel to -
possess weapons a s their functions w i l l be restricted to 
operation o f the four B i s o n s as transport vehicles, and 
as m e m b e r s of The Explosive Ordnance Disposal T e a m who 
Province of Attorney General Parliament Buildings 
British Columbia • Victoria, British Columbia 
vav iX4 
may be required to deal with any unusual military 
explosives or devices encountered; 
The request for food rations for one hundred for one day 
reflects the length of time RCM? and military personnel•• 
may be required given the isolated location and 
complexity of this operation; 
The RCMP will continue to maintain a l l reasonable 
efforts to resolve this matter without the use of force 
and, in conducting this operation, will use the minimum 
force required to conclude the criminal investigation 
and apprehension of any suspects. 
Prior to finalizing my decision in this matter, T am 
requesting the courtesy of your confirmation in writing that 
the above noted circumstances are accurate and form part of 
the basis for the RCMP request as set out in your letter of 
August 24, 1995. 
Thank you for your consideration in this regard. 
Yours sincerely. 
Ujjal Dosanjh 
Attorney General 
August 25, 1995 
The Honourable Herb Gray, P.C., Q.C., M.P. 
Solicitor General of Canada 
340 Laurier Avenue West 
Ottawa, Ontario 
K1A 0?8 
Dear Sir: 
I am writing to request your assistance in obtaining the 
support of the Department of National Defence to provide 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 3ritish Columbia with 
the following equipment and services as technical support 
to a criminal investigation into the activities of 
individuals at Gustafsen Lake: 
1. Four (4) Bison Wheeled Armoured Personnel Carriers, 
complete with military driver and crew commanders'; 
2 . One (15 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team; 
3. 100 allotments of 1 day food rations. 
For the reasons set cut in the attached correspondence, 
•the RCMP are of the view that the equipment and services 
are required in order to safely conduct this criminal 
investigation which will remain under the direction of the 
RCMP. . • 
m i l g 6 0 4 387 0090 AG CR1M JUSTICE 
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Thank you for your consideration of this request on an 
expedited basis. 
Yours sincerely, 
Ujjal Dosanjh 
Attorney General 
Attachments: 
1. Letter of August 24, 1S95 from Deputy Commissioner 
Farrell to Attorney General Dosanjh 
2. Letter of August 25, 1995 from Attorney General 
Dosanjh to Deputy Commissioner Farrell 
3. Letter of August 25, 1995 from Deputy Commissioner 
Farrell to Attorney General Dosanjh, 
1 6 : 5 8 NO. 2" 334 
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AUG 2 7 1995 
The Honourable Ujjal Dosanjh 
Attorney General 
Province of British Columbia 
Parliament Buildings 
Victoria, B.C. 
VSV 1X4 
Dear Mr. Dosanjh: 
Thank you for your letter of August 25. 1995, requesting my assistance in 
obtaining the support of the Depan nent of N ational Defence (DND) to 
provide the Royal Canadian Moun; x! Police (RCMP) in British Columbia 
with the equipment and services, c ascribed i i your correspondence, as 
technical support to a criminal inve -ligation into the activities of persons at 
Gustafsen Lake. 
I have discussed the matter with tr, j Minister of National Defence, the 
Hon. David Collennette, who has s Jvised that DND will provide the 
resources that you have requester 
Yours sincerely. 
The Hon. Herb Gray, M.P. 
»o / i 1 / a s " * TOT! 16:06 FAX 604 3 ^ ^ 4 1 1 AG'S OFFICE 
12 ' 9 5 0 i : 32FW " E " DIV OCC 
R o y a l 
C a i m a n 
Mounted 
P o l i c e 
Commanding 
Officer 
G e n d a r m e r i e 
royaSa 
d u 
C a n a d a 
Commandant 
dMsJonnalre 
AG 1006 
P. 4 
P r o t e c t e d * B " 
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September 12, 1995 
The Honourable Ufjal Dosanjh 
Attorney General 
Province of British Columbia 
Parliament Buildings 
Victoria, B .C. 
V 8 V 1X4 
h a S E m ^ ™ 1 5 5 o o c u ^ t r e q u i r e s s p e c i a l 
H A N D L I N G . ; i • j . • «. H . < ^ . - r ^ ? D BY a S P e u s c 
^ ™ 9 ^ i S - - C U K E . C ^ N O T o ' j S C u S S S 
S T E N T S OF THIS DOCUMENT OVER THE TELEPHONE 
OTECT D a 
Dear Mr. Dosanjh: 
GUST LAKE 
This correspondence is supplementary to that provided you on August 24 , 1995. 
The situation at Gustafsen La te is critical and has deteriorated to the point where further 
military resources are required for the purposes of providing safety and protection for our 
police personnel, who are carrying out their dudes in accordance with our original 
Operational Plan. 
On our behalf, it is necessary that you requisition the following additional equipment and 
services from the Canadian Forces: 
Five (5) Bison Wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers, complete with Military 
driver and crew commanders. 
It must be reiterated that these resources are in addition to the items that the Canadian 
Forces are currently supplying. We ask that they continue to fupply items they are making 
available to us now. 
. . . n 
CanadS 
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Protected * B " 
Your urgent attention and consideration « required. Once approved, would y t s a kindly 
provide me with written confirmation &t "your earliest convenience. 
Yours truly, 
J. D, F#*ff,' pejfuty Commissioner 
•jg/Hfteer 
*E- DivisBr 
657 West 37th Avenue 
Vancouver, B.C. V52 1K6* H a S t ^ S A ™ 1 5 d o c u m e n t r e q u i r e s s p e c i a l 
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The Honourable Herbert Gray. P.C., Q.C., M.P. 
Solicitor General of Canada 
340 Lsuriar Avar.ue 
Ottawa, Ontario 
K1A OPS 
Dear Minister: 
Following consultation with the Commanding Officer of "B" 
Division regarding requirements for ending the unlawful 
activities at Gustafson Lake/ I hereby request the follawin: 
additional resources from the Canadian Anaed Forces, to bs 
assigned immediately to the Provincial Police Servicas 
- Five Canadian Forces armoured personnel carriers with 
military drivers and commander. 
It ±z ray understanding that the ComHianding Otficar of " S : l 
Division has consulted with the Commissioner of tho RCMP in 
Ottawa regarding the need for and availability of thase 
roecurco^, I r e c a s t your cooperation in. expediting the-
federal approval process and deployment of the resourcas, 
Yours sincerely, 
Ujjal Dosanjh 
Attorney Gansrsl 
cc% Commissioner P. Murray 
.Paputy Conuniesionar J.D. Farrell 
Province of 
British Colurnbi. 
Attorney Genera! Pariismsnt Buildings 
Victoria, British Columbia 
V8V !X4 
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Solicitor General 
of Canada 
Solliciteur general 
du Canada 
CANADA 
]012 
or n - T f ? 
I G 
The Honourable Ujjal Dosanjh 
Attorney General 
Provincs of British CoSumbsa 
Parliament Buildings 
Victoria, B.C. 
V8V1X4 
Dear Mr. Dosanjh: 
I am writing with reference to your letter of September 12 ,1995 
requesting my assistance In obtaining the support of the Department of 
National Defence to provide the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 
British Columbia with five Canadian Forces armoured personnel carriers with 
military drivers and commander as technical support to a criminal investigation 
at Gustafsen Lake. 
The Minister of National Defence, the Honourable David Colienette, has 
advised me that he will provide the technical support that you have requested. 
LAL Cr: 
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E . R . T . O P E R A T I O N A L PLAN 
1 0 0 0 ROAD SOOTH .OF EJfCAMPMEMT 
EESanRgJES REQUIRED; 
-HQ ERT ENTIRE TEAM (11 MEMBERS) 
-TWO PDS MEMBERS 
-ONE SPECIAL "I" MEMBER 
-AIR SERVICES HELICOPTERS (AIR 1 AND AIR 4) 
PETAILS QF PLAN; 
^^B5^Xf9'Q0^^Q: Emergency Response Team will establish a base 
at thd%irea , rof €he 1020 checkpoint. From this base Airl and Air4 
will insert all ERT and support personnel to the area of 1039 
south of the Gustafson Lake encampment. Once inserted and 
established ERT will identify the appropriate location to drop 
several large trees across the 1000 Road. Trees will be dropped 
with chainsaw. 
When the barricade has been established Special "I" member 
will then set up a perimeter security alarm on the encampment 
side of the barricade. These alarms can be monitored from the 
mobile command post and possibly the permanent command post in 
100 Mile House. **T/L must record/map placement of any 
sensor/early-warning devices for information of other teams and 
assurance of subsequent retrieval. ** 
Communications and aerial observation support will be 
provided by WESCAM during the entire operation. 
If time allows, ERT will conduct a recce of this area and 
attempt to establish a basecamp in the area of this barricade for 
future use. -
It is proposed that ERT will hike south from this barricade 
and be extracted, again by helicopter, from an area that cannot 
be observed by members of the encampment. ' . 
PJBJECTJCgEx Insert ERT.and support personnel by helicopter to 
block^ 1000 *da*d, located south of the encampment, 
t*6^ensure 'this road is impassable by subj ects 
inside the camp. 
Prepared by: Recommended: 
{K.J. MANN) CST 
T/L HQ ERT 
•Sgt. K.C. GATES 
"E" Div. ERT Superv. 
Insp. P.L EDWARDS 
OIC/ERT 100 Mile Hse 
| ^ ? ^ Mounted police du Canada ' «ffPP( ' 
F A C S I M I L E T R A N S M I T T A L ^ 
ENVOI D ' U N F A C - S I M I L E ' 
Protected "B" 
Priomy - Pfiorn* Oaf« 
Urgent 77 1 9 9 5 , 0 9 : 6 7 -
File No. - No de dossier ' 
95E-6812 
Re(er*ice Mo. • No de reference 
NAME TELEPHONE NO. (JOM LFWA NO OE TELEPHONE. 
ADDRESS 
adresse Major General C. ADDY 
FAX NO. 
NO OE FAX-SIMILE 
NAME NOM O I C Cont rac t Policing Branch 
TELEPHONE NO. NO OE TELEPHONE 
ADDRESS ADRESSE 
" E " D iv is ion 
FAX NO. 
NO OE FAX-SIMILf , 
C 
OM 
Total number of pages to fo l low including this one 
Nombre total de pages a suivre y compris celle-ci > 5 
5MMENTS 
)MMENTAIRES 
a n 
Please ensure that Major General C. Addy is informed immediately on the arrival o f this 
document. It is for his personal attention. The attached appendix to our original operational plan is 
predicated on the basis that negotiations are ongoing in an effort to peacefully resolve this situation. It 
is absolutely critical that we gather additional investigative intelligence and that we have the flexibility 
to use the currently assigned military vehicles for which the Royal Canadian Mounted Police accepts ' 
full responsibility. In order to successfully fufill our mandate, the safe transportation of police 
resources is of paramount importance. This amendment will allow for a protected and immediate 
response to situations necessitating an emergent insertion or extraction of police resources shoud status 
deteriorate during or after negotiations. 
J . DTFarteJiTDeput^ 
Commanding) Officer 
"E" Division 
ommissioner 
- l a SECUREFAX 
.of page* 
Operator - OpeVite-jr 
87S (69-C4) 753O-21-90G-1O62 
Telephone t:s. - No de telephone 
Canada 
A P P E N D I X B" TO OPERATIONAL PLAN 
This appendix d s submitted as the proposed Long-Term' Operational 
Plan^«>r~'E ;R*rT. It is a calculated'approach designed to 
gradually escalate pressure on the armed and barricaded persons 
presently dug in at Gustafsen Lake. This plan is designed to 
make the continuing occupation of Gustafsen Lake more difficult 
by severing supply lines and ensuring supporters do not 
infiltrate. This plan is a complement to the ongoing negotiating 
process which is designed to produce a viable surrender option. 
Both tactical and negotiating'strategies must proceed in concert. 
The shooting incidents of 35-08-27^"^^Sljjffi^Lof E R T members 
cannot b e ^ ^ n ^ ^ ^ ^ d i u e ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ i t o f t n e aircraft, dictate 
that member safety be a paramount planning concern. . The 
extrication of thje^JLLcJLCiria and Prince George ERT te< 
Of 
Command Structure 
Due .£.o the increase in threat levels and complexity, t&e'„:Qcncr.and> 
stj^£ure"-ribfr*in?j^ iri Appendix* 
,_
MA«' "which w4s;;pri;:95.-08'--25. ' " 
Overall Incident Commander - Supt. Len OLFERT 
ERT Operations Commander - Supt. Ric HALL 
Assistant Operations Commanders - Insp. Roger KEMBEL' 
- Insp. Earl MOULTON 
- Insp. Perry EDWARDS 
ERT Personnel 
Sgt. Ken GATES - Operational planning and support 
Sgt. Vern b r a v e n e r " «» «> 
Kamloops S/Div. ERT 
Kelowna S/Div ERT 
Vancouver HQ ERT K „ , , . . 3D& 
Chilliwack S/Div ERT u D l v - H-V- * _ 
Prince George S/Div ERT . 
Victoria S/Div ERT v i a SECUREFAX 
Courtenay S/Div ERT P- ^ 
Surrey Det. ERT • — pcgrv 
Nelson S/Div ERT 
North Vancouver ERT 
•Prince Rupert S/Div ERT 
Efforts are continuing to secure the services of Coquitlam Det 
and Burnaby Det. ERTs. . . 
Each of the foregoing actions are non-
f , a • ay/^iV^ifoff^to^^cfi^jgjDnfrontation 
_ _ ic tid$3||^^^ ; 
the' conoulting "psychologist being used by the negotiation team, 
who,advises that each-of the foregoing will be beneficial to the 
negotiations as means of reinforcing the existence of an 
effective perimeter. 
Following
 v£he m, above ..actions, a number of j E u r t h e r ^ p r c f T active -J 
% e g i s j H ? I ^ ^ The decision to 
"€alc'e^ny^or all of these actions will*'bla?^ottfcingent upon the RCMP 
management group assessing the viability of negotiation 
strategies and the impact on existing, and probable, related 
activities across Canada. Such actions are expected to include: 
Stealth insertion of ERT personnel with the object of 
neutralizing the encampment's ability to 
tralizing the encampment 
Establishing ^ammp^^39^mSS33:e and distraction devices 
to increase the security of checkpoint personnel. 
Stealth insertion of ERT personnel to the ROSETTE 
leasehold property south of Gustafsen Lake to take out the j & s / 
encampment's ability to utilize that property as a source of r * * ! < 
building material. T ^ ^ & ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S m ^ ^ m ^ ^ & ^ m m m M f ' T / U Z f c . 
Each of these latter options will require the deoloyrr.ent of the 
APC's and/or the Hue} " ~ 
The execution of all t h e foregoing initiatives is absolutely 
constrained b y the availability of APC's for insertion and 
extraction. Should there arise a concern f o r the s a f e t y of any 
military p e r s o n n e l that might be involved in such deployment, 
please be advised that we have on-site RCMP personnel who are 
t r a i n e d and capable of being fully operational in the APC's . We 
also have available helicopter RCMP pilots to fly the Huey's. We 
are therefore requesting that authority be given for RCMP 
personnel to operate these resources. This request is NOT, to be 
considered a lack of support for t h e p e r s o n n e l currently deployed 
with the APC's. Their actions during' the operation of 95-09-05 
were e x e m p l a r y . ' " ' -^ '[,•-< 
It i s impossible to overemphasize the necessity for s u c h support. 
On two occasions, the ERT s u b u r b a n s have b e e n , c o m p r o m i s e d by 
hostile gunfire. On both occasions, the absence.of l o s s of life 
h a s b e e n • s o l e l y ' s e r e n d i p i t o u s . ^ " ^ '^-Q ^  r l f Jog 
daSECUREFAX} U'. 
of 5 ~ 
PSD Porflonnol 
S/Sgt., Tom HOWARTH - Co-ordinator 
19 P.S.D.'s have been identified to be deployed to this incident. 
Additional Support functions 
Special "I" - Kamloops and Kelowna S/Div. and " 3 " Division 
B. D. II. - Two "E" Division personnel 
Weacam - Two dedicated fixed wing aircraft with onboard high-
resolution video taping and live feed capability. 
Helicopters - Air 2 (Courtenay) and Air 4 (Kamloops) currently 
deployed with Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) . Air 1, also with 
FLIR, will also be deployed once its maintenance is complete. 
Research i s being conducted to secure a Bell 212 for personnel 
transport, insertion and extraction. If successful the 
helicopter will be flown by RCMP pilots trained in the Bell 212. 
LONG TERM OPERATION PLAN 
95-09-06 - Maintenance of status quo being holding checkpoints 
at points 1120 and 1029. 
95-09-07 - Maintenance of 1120 and 1029. Reconnaissance of 1137 
and 1140 checkpoints in preparation for re-establishing those 
checkpoints. Reconnaissance to be by two APC's with two teams of 
8 ERT and one PSD. 
95-09-08 - Maintenance of 1120 and 1029. Re-establish 1137 and 
1140 by inserting ERT members by means of APC's. Ongoing 
staffing of these points must be my means of APC's for member 
safety. Transport via ERT Suburban has proved dangerous and only 
good fortune has thus far avoided lethal consequences. 
95-09-09 - Maintenance of 1120 and 1029. Maintenance of 1137 
and 1140 by APC support. Insertion of SRT team to point on south 
side of Gustafsen Lake by stealth approach to install technical 
devices. T w o APC's r e q u i r e d to standby for the execution of an 
immediate action plan should the insertion team be compromised. 
Operational Plan exercised 95-09-05 for the extrication of 
Victoria and Prince George ERTs will be in place for that 
operation. 
95-09-10 - Maintenance and.,,staf f ing \df / 1120/1029, 1137 and 1140 . 
Reconnaissance of point known as-^Hanging Tree" at'approx. 1041 
with,; follow-up-Insertion of personnel-'.'-to.'"man; a checkpoint to 
secure the southern access to Gustafsen Lake.--" 
'. em****:*'
0
*—' -
[ '• ' " ; . . . .:,*: ,"' Y l a S E C U R E F A X . . . . 
That shooting incident occurred during the process of inserting a 
relief ERT advance .checkpoint team which is precisely the 
activity covered by the actions covered by the timelined actions 
set out above . " "'• 
Finally, the command structure now located in 100 Mile House 
advises that they will be forced to withdraw the current 1120 and 
1029 checkpoints should the APC's be formally designated as being 
unable to assist. 
PLAN SIJSMMTED BY: 
( R . D . HALL) SUPT. 
<TDIV.RO.*- --^08 
via SECUREFAX 
RCMP GRC 
IDENT CONTINUATION REPORT 
MUST BE PROCEEDED BY INITIAL REPORT 
SUITE DU RAPPORT DE L'lDENTITE 
DOIT ETRE PRECEDE D'UN RAPPORT INITIAL Page no./n" 
Oet./Unit Det./Service 
TO 
A 1 0 0 MILE HOUSE DETACHMENT 
Investigator Enqueteur 
CST. TASSELL 
Occ. No. N" d'inc. 
95E /6812 
Merit. Sect. Sect, de I'ldenUt* 
FROM 
DE KAMLOOPS FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION SECTION 
Ident. Specialist Specialists en Identification 
CPL. K.R. CARROTHERS 
Ident. Occ. No. N' d'inc. de I'ld. 
9 5 / 2 1 3 1 4 
Nature of Event Genre d'lncident 
GUSTAFSEN LAKE BLOCKADE - NR. 100 MILE HOUSE, B.C. 
SPECIFICS OF SCENE. ADDRESS, POE, etc. DETAILS RELATIFS AUX LIEUX, ADRESSE, LIEU D'ENTREE, etc. 
Y-A M D-J 
9 5 . 0 9 . 0 8 
Time Heure 
10:52 
ACTION TAKEN MESURES PRISES 
GUSTAFSON LAKE PROJECT APPENDIX "B" 
EXAMINATION OF VICTORIA ERT SUBURBAN 
PHOTO SECTION 5 
WHILE AT THIS CHECKPOINT AWAITING POSSIBLE SURRENDER OF PRISONERS, CPL. McLARNON AND 
MYSELF WERE REQUESTED TO EXAMINE A VEHICLE ATTACHED TO THE VICTORIA E.R. TEAM, WHICH 
SUPPOSEDLY HAD COME UNDER FIRE FROM NATIVES ATTACHED TO THE ENCAMPMENT AT GUSTAFSEN 
LAKE. THE SUBJECT VEHICLE WAS A GREY CHEV SUBURBAN WITH B.C. LICENCE XGX 814 . THE 
VEHICLE WAS PARKED IN A FIELD NEAR THE MOBILE COMMAND POST, AND THE VICTORIA ERT MEMBERS 
POINTED OUT DAMAGE TO THE EXTERIOR REAR VIEW MIRROR ON THE PASSENGER SIDE FRONT DOOR. 
THE MIRROR WAS BASICALLY SQUARE IN SHAPE, AND SUPPORTED ON A SINGLE CURVED METAL ROD, 
WHICH HELD IT APPROXIMATELY 6 INCHES FROM THE WINDOW. THE VICTORIA ERT MEMBERS FELT 
THAT THE MIRROR HAD BEEN STRUCK BY A BULLET WHICH HAD THEN DEFLECTED UP AND INTO THE 
VEHICLE, PIERCING THE HEADLINER OF THE CAB. 
THE MIRROR, FACING FORWARD, HAD A CREASE IN THE METAL, AND THIS CREASE RAN BASICALLY 
HORIZONTAL. AT RIGHT ANGLES TO THIS CREASE, PRETTY WELL VERTICALLY, W A S AN INDENTATION IN 
THE METAL, BUT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF ANY SCRATCHES, ABRASIONS, OR DAMAGE TO THE PAINT. I 
COULD SEE NO SIGNS OF ANY TRANSFER OF METAL, OR ANY INDICATION OF CONTACT WITH A 
METALLIC SURFACE. 
ON THE CURVED ARM OF THE MIRROR SUPPORT, BETWEEN THE 90 DEGREE BEND AND THE POINT 
WHERE THE MIRROR MOUNT ATTACHED TO THE DOOR, THERE WERE HEAVY SCRATCHES WHICH WENT 
THROUGH THE PAINT TO BARE METAL. THESE SCRATCHES APPEARED TO BE PARALLEL TO THE ARM OF 
THE MIRROR. ON THE METAL EDGE OF THE VERTICAL WINDOW SUPPORT. THERE WERE ALSO HEAVY 
SCRATCHES ON THE TRAILING EDGE OF THE SUPPORT. THESE GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF BEING 
CAUSED BY CONTACT WITH A METALLIC OBJECT, AS DID THE SCRAPES ON THE MIRROR SUPPORT ARM. 
THE HOLE IN THE HEADLINER OF THE VEHICLE WAS ELLIPTICAL IN SHAPE, LONGER THAN IT W A S WIDE, 
AND RAN FROM FRONT TO BACK. THE HOLE WAS APPROX. 1 CM IN LENGTH, AND W A S DARK, AS 
THOUGH SOMETHING HAD DISCOLORED THE FABRIC. THE HOLE WAS LOCATED .80 M . BACK FROM THE 
FRONT EDGE OF THE HEADLINER, AND .41 M. FROM THE PASSENGER SIDE EDGE OF THE HEADLINER. 
THIS PLACED IT ABOVE AND JUST BEHIND THE PASSENGER SIDE FRONT SEAT. NO SIGN OF ANY 
FOREIGN OBJECT WAS FOUND IN THE HOLE OF THE HEADLINER. 
OPINION: IT IS MY OPINION THAT NEITHER THE DAMAGE TO THE MIRROR, AND THE HOLE IN THE 
HEADLINER IS CONSISTENT WITH BEING STRUCK BY A BULLET OR ANY SIMILAR OBJECT. THE CREASE 
ON THE MIRROR WAS BASICALLY IN THE PHYSICAL CENTRE OF THE MIRROR BACK, AND W A S VERTICAL, 
AT LEAST 6 INCHES FROM THE DAMAGE ON THE SUPPORT ARM AND WINDOW FRAME EDGE. THE 
SCRATCHES WERE MULTIPLE IN NUMBER, AND WERE PERPENDICULAR TO THE PATH OF AN OBJECT 
APPROACHING THE VEHICLE FROM AN ANGLE OF LESS THAN 90 DEGREES TO THE PATH OF THE VEHICLE. 
ALSO, FOR AN OBJECT TO STRIKE THIS MIRROR SUPPORT AND DEFLECT TO THE POSITION OF THE HOLE 
IN THE HEADLINER, IT WOULD HAVE HAD TO PASS THROUGH THE NECK/HEAD REGION OF A PERSON 
SITTING IN THE PASSENGER SEAT. 
1 WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE DAMAGE TO THE MIRROR BACK IS MORE CONSISTENT WITH BEING HIT BY 
A VERTICAL OBJECT SUCH AS A TREE BRANCH. THE DAMAGE TO THE SUPPORT ARM AND WINDOW 
FRAME WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH A METAL OBJECT SUCH AS A RIFLE BARREL RESTING BETWEEN 
THE ARM AND THE WINDOW FRAME. AS FOR THE HOLE IN THE HEADLINER, IT GAVE ME THE 
APPEARANCE OF BEING TORN OR RIPPED BY A SHARP OBJECT SUCH AS THE FRONT SIGHT OF A RIFLE. 
ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE TO HAVE THE HEADLINER OF THE VEHICLE REMOVED BY SPECIAL T 
SECTION MEMBERS AT THE COMMAND CENTRE ON 95 .09 .10 AT 08 :00 . 
95 .09 .10 - VEHICLE W A S NOT AVAILABLE FOR HEADLINER EXAM. DUE TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
IN THE FIELD. TO BE EXAMINED LATER. 
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EXAMINATION OF VICTORIA ERT SUBURBAN 
PHOTO SECTION: 11 
VIDEO NO. NIL 
CPL. MURRAY SMITH AND CPL. JOSH CR0ISET1ERE OF VANVOUVER SPECIAL T ARRIVE AT CHECKPOINT 
BRAVO BY HELICOPTER. CPL. SMITH UNLOCKS THE VEHICLE TO BE EXAMINED: 
VEHICLE: 1993 CHEVROLET SUBURBAN, GREY, B.C.L. X G X 8 1 4 . 
REGISTERED TO COLWOOD R.CM.P. . VICTORIA ERT TEAM. 
SMITH POINTED OUT A HOLE IN THE HEADLINER OF THE VEHICLE. THE HOLE WAS MEASURED AND IS 
1.5GM X .5CM. IT W A S LOCATED ABOVE THE FRONT PASSENGERS SEAT APPROXIMATELY ABOVE THE 
LEFT BACK CORNER OF THE SEAT. THE HOLE HAD A 2 0 M M SCALE BESIDE THE HOLE. THIS VEHICLE HAD 
BEEN EXAMINED PARTIALLY BE CPLS MCLARNON AND CARROTHERS. CPL. SMITH ADVISED HE HAD 
ALREADY REMOVED AND SEIZED THE RIGHT SIDE OUTSIDE MIRROR. 
CPL. CLARKE PHOTOGRAPHED THE VEHICLE AND TOOK CLOSE-UP PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE HOLE IN THE 
HEAD LINER. I THEN TOOK TWO PIECES OF .25" WOODEN DOWELING WHICH HAD BEEN PAINTED ORANGE 
AND TAPED ONE END OF THE DOWELING TO THE HOLE IN THE HEAD LINER AND PLACE THE OTHER END 
IN THE AREA WHERE CPL SMITH APPROXIMATED THE DAMAGED MIRROR HAD BEEN. CPL. CLARKE 
PHOTOGRAPHED THE DOWELING IN THIS LOCATION. 
CROISETIERE THEN REMOVED A HEAT AND AIR CONDITIONER VENT FROM THE HEADLINER. AND THIS 
ALLOWED A VIEW OF THE HIDDEN SIDE OF THE HEADLINER IN THE AREA THAT THE HOLE WAS LOCATED. 
IT APPEARED THAT THE HOLE IN THE LINER WAS AT LEASE PARTIALLY THROUGH THE HEAD LINER 
FAINT TRACES OF FIBRE WERE VISIBLE ON THE TOP SIDE OF THE LINER. THE AREA ABOVE THE HOLE IN 
THE LINER IS A CHAMBER WHERE THE A/C AND HEATED AIR IS DUCTED. THIS DUCTED AREA WAS 
EXAMINED AND NO TRACE OF ANY BULLET WAS LOCATED. THERE W A S NO DAMAGE TO THE TOP SIDE 
OF THIS DUCTED CHAMBER TO INDICATE A BULLET MAY HAVE HIT IT. CROISETIERE THEN REMOVED THE 
HEAD LINER FROM THE ROOF OF THE VEHICLE AND PULLED IT DOWN SLIGHTLY ON THE PASSENGERS 
SIDE. I USED A SCALPEL TO CUT THE A/C DUCTING BACK TO A POINT WHERE IT IS DUCTED UP ALONG 
THE POST BEHIND THE RIGHT REAR DOOR POST. THERE W A S NO BULLET OR FRAGMENTS LOCATED 
ANYWHERE ALONG THIS DUCT. CPL. SMITH EXAMINED THE SAME AREA. 
THE HOLE IN THE LINER WAS THEN PROBED BY CPL. CLARKE TO PROVE THAT THE HOLE IN FACT WAS 
COMPLETELY THROUGH THE LINER. 
THE EXAMINATION W A S CONCLUDED AND NOTES WERE COMPLETED. 
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Today's Globe and Mail report on the Gustafsen Lake trial with the headlines, "RCMP tactics warlike 
triai told", "Hollow-point bullets used in BC native standoff, mountie testifies", 
Souicc 
Globe and Mail 
Unclassified 
Hie Globe ar.d Mail article quotes the testimony from Inspector Roger Kemble that some mounties used 
hollow point bullets although they are prohibited as military ammunition under international conventions 
because oi'liseir devastating impact. 
Domestic police agencies in Canada are not bound by provisions within The Hague Declaration that 
restrict the sriiitary to use non-expanding ammunition. The RCMP has used hollow point ammunition 
since 1976, i s solid point ammunition was determined to be inadequate for the puiposes of law 
cnfoieeiiiciii duties. Hollow point bullets are likely to incapacitate uu armed aggressor more quickly. 
Also, as holiew point bullets expend more o f their energy by expanding, they .are more likely to stay 
within the t : : y . 'Iliat means iess chance that a bullet will continue through mid-strike an innocent 
bystander. 
Hie Gusiafstn Lake trial is expected to continue for several months. 
3uS3«>lcO Reply - fttyjnso $yggd$$t 
• D 
- 1 AM AWARE THAT RCMP MEMBERS ARE USING HOLLOW POINT AMMUNITION. 
- AS THIS MATTER IS CURRENTLY BEFORE THE COURTS, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE 
FOR.ME 7 0 COMMENT FURTHER. 
- AS THIS MATTER FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF B.C., 
ALL FURTHER QUESTIONS SHOULD Bli DIRECTED TO THE PROVINCIAL ATTORNEY 
GENERAL • 
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